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Abstract 
 
Eastern and southern Africa, a region that is home to a twentieth of the world’s population, 
accounts for half the number of people living with HIV globally, including an increasingly drug 
resistant Tuberculosis epidemic. The high mortality and untold human suffering associated with 
HIV in the region during the late 1990s and early 2000s has mostly been mitigated by a rapid scale 
up of national HIV treatment programmes over the past decade, largely made possible by generic 
competition from Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
 
The sustainability of treatment programmes in the region depends on various factors. National HIV 
treatment programmes are largely financed by multilateral donor mechanisms which are facing a 
decline in funding for the first time in the history of the AIDS response. Indian pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are increasingly encountering patent barriers stemming from the country’s 
implementation of its intellectual property obligations under the World Trade Organisation’s 
TRIPS Agreement. As eastern and southern African countries increasingly focus on local 
pharmaceutical production and south-south co-operation as vehicles for treatment sustainability, 
this thesis examines the extent to which public health related flexibilities present in the TRIPS 
Agreement can be used to as enablers of affordable treatment, both in domestic intellectual 
property legislation, and relevant regional platforms.  
 
The thesis undertakes case studies of the policy and legislative environment in two countries with 
very different profiles: The United Republic of Tanzania as a least developed country with a 
nascent local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and South Africa, as the country with the 
largest pharmaceutical industry on the continent present the full range of country profiles in the 
region. Conclusions are drawn regarding the optimization of legislative and policy frameworks to 
facilitate both the importation and local production of health technologies. Finally, the thesis 
explores challenges and opportunities facing various south-south co-operation initiatives in the 
region. 
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1. Background 
 
“The Fight against HIV/AIDS requires leadership from all parts of government- and it needs to 
go right to the top. AIDS is far more than a health crisis. It is a threat to development itself” 
 
Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General   
 
 
The acquired immune-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) caused by the human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) first captured global community’s attention in the early 1980s when reports emerged of the 
devastating impact it was having among homosexual males in the United States (US). A few years 
later, it became clear that the impact of the epidemic would be most acutely felt by the resource 
constrained countries of sub-Saharan Africa. As of the end of 2012, at least 25 million people had 
lost their lives to AIDS related illnesses. An estimated 35.3 million people were living with HIV 
globally as of the end of 2013. Sub-Saharan Africa, a region that is home to an eighth of the world’s 
population remains the worst affected by the AIDS epidemic, accounting for 71 percent of the 
global disease burden and three quarters of all AIDS related deaths.1  
 
Since HIV was identified as the cause of AIDS, there has been large-scale research to discover and 
develop compounds to treat patients. In 1987, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved a cancer medicine zidovudine2 (AZT) invented in the 1960s as a treatment to stifle the 
replication of HIV in the human body. Since then, the number of antiretroviral (ARV) agents 
available has expanded and new treatments, particularly the combination therapies, have had an 
impressive impact in reducing morbidity and mortality.3 The emergence of combination 
antiretroviral therapy (ART) to treat HIV, has provided great impetus to the AIDS response. It has 
                                                 
1 UNAIDS (2013) Global Fact Sheet [Online] Available: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2013/gr2013/20130923_FactSheet_
Global_en.pdf    
2 Zidovudine was developed in 1964 by the Michigan Cancer Foundation, with significant federal funding. Marketing 
approval was never obtained for zidovudine as a cancer treatment because of the high levels of toxicity the requisite 
amounts of zidovudine produced when used for cancer therapy. 
3 ARV medicines interfere with the lifecycle of HIV by affecting its ability to replicate in the patient’s body. When 
administered in dual or triple combination, the therapy becomes even more effective. Once the ability of the virus to 
replicate has been stunted, the patient’s immune system is able to recover. The recovery prevents the onset of 
opportunistic infections (OIs) which the body may otherwise have been unable to repel. 
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also saved millions from a typically painful, undignified death. ART has served as a rallying point 
for treatment activists who assert that access to ART is a core component of the broader human 
right to health.4A quarter of a century on from the introduction of the first ARV, patients living 
with HIV have access to a considerably larger selection of health technologies which can be used 
to prevent, diagnose and treat the disease.  
 
In addition to the millions of lives saved, the roll out of large scale treatment programmes has had 
a number of important and beneficial consequences.  First, the effective treatment of people living 
with HIV has had positive outcomes on other diseases such as tuberculosis (TB). ART has been 
shown to reduce the risk of TB infection among people living with HIV by 65 percent. Second, 
there is a growing body of evidence to show that patients on ART have a much lower (up to 96 
percent reduction) risk of transmitting HIV to their sexual partners. Treatment, as it turns out, is 
also an extremely effective prevention strategy. Finally, treatment makes economic sense. Recent 
studies show that large scale HIV treatment programmes have resulted in cost savings across the 
heath-system over the short term. Patients on effective ART spend far less time in hospital 
requiring treatment for opportunistic infections or end of life care as those people with AIDS do. 
Aside from cost savings in the healthcare sector, the economic benefits of treatment including 
increased labour productivity and averted orphan care can offset and exceed the costs of treatment. 
A definition of the various terms used to refer to treatment access in this thesis can be found in 
appendix one.  
 
As the effectiveness of medicines used to treat HIV became apparent in the late 1990s, so too did 
the fact that they were extremely expensive and unaffordable to the vast majority of people in need 
of treatment. This situation more than any before, drew into sharp focus, the role of intellectual 
property related legislation and policy as a key factor in the availability and affordability of HIV 
treatment access. The situation came to a head in the late 1990s and early 2000s as tensions 
between governments representing the owners of health technologies required to treat HIV and 
those in greatest need boiled over in a series of national and international disputes. In 2001, the 
                                                 
4 The right to health is recognised in several international instruments including in Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).Other treaties which recognise the right in similar terms including the Constitution of the WHO. 
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Indian pharmaceutical manufacturing giant Cipla, offered to produce a generic version of a fixed-
dose combination ARV at the price of US$350 per patient per year or effectively a dollar a day, 
thus making the prospect of affordable treatment a reality. However, the consequences of drug 
resistance and the development of more efficacious, less toxic, new generation ARVs means that 
the cost of HIV treatment remains a continuous and present challenge. With the flat-lining of 
multilateral AIDS funding and a growing expectations that countries in eastern and southern Africa 
should assume greater responsibility for the maintenance and scale up of treatment programmes, 
the role of intellectual property policy and legislation in facilitating access to affordable treatment 
for HIV will become of greater relevance. So too, will the ability of government officials and civil 
society to effectively use law and policy to scale up and maintain treatment access.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify some commonly used terminology in the 
existing literature on intellectual property and access to treatment and other terms used regularly. 
A list of the aforesaid terminology used in the thesis can be found in appendix one. 
 
 
1.1 Intellectual Property as a Determinant of Treatment Sustainability in Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
 
There are several factors that impact on the affordability and availability of ARVs in low and 
middle income countries (LMICs) in general, including countries in eastern and southern Africa. 
For the purposes of this thesis, they have been clustered into three sets of issues:  
 
The first set relates to economies of scale and market dynamics. This includes the availability of 
bilateral and multilateral funding mechanisms like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (GFATM) and the US backed President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) to finance the procurement of ARVs. They also relate to the capacity of the domestic 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and the availability of competitively priced active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in LMICs with significant manufacturing capacity.  
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The second set of issues relate to legal, policy and regulatory factors. These include the 
effectiveness of domestic industrial property, patent, competition and medicines legislation, the 
industrial policy objectives of LMIC governments and the capacity of drug regulatory authorities 
to approve new health technologies expeditiously to promote treatment access.  
 
The third set of issues address the ability of the national supply chain to efficiently deliver health 
technologies across the health system. These include the availability of market intelligence on the 
pricing and supply of health technologies and the capacity of local authorities to forecast demand 
for health technologies in order to maintain adequate supplies across national health systems. 
 
While these sets of issues are inter-connected and all have an impact on treatment outcomes, this 
thesis, in using the TRIPS Agreement as its primary lens, will most closely examine the intellectual 
property related legislative and policy factors that impede or facilitate treatment access. Moreover, 
the thesis examines the role that legal, policy and regulatory environments play in facilitating either 
the importation or local production of health technologies. In so doing, this thesis will touch on 
some of the factors contained in the first set of issues including economies of scale, market 
dynamics and local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 
 
Before the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995, countries in eastern and southern 
Africa enjoyed a significant degree of latitude to align their intellectual property, competition and 
medicines regulations with national development objectives. However, with the adoption of the 
TRIPS Agreement, eastern and southern African countries who are WTO Members5 and not 
classified as LDCs are now required to recognize patents for inventions in all fields of technology 
including pharmaceuticals (with limited exceptions) for a minimum period of 20 years and to 
enforce patent rights. Public health related TRIPS flexibilities remain available and provide 
countries with some latitude to customize their intellectual property, competition and medicines 
legislation so as to address their national objectives including the prioritization of public health 
goals.  
                                                 
5 Most countries in the region are WTO Members with the exception of Comoros, Seychelles, South Sudan and 
Ethiopia who have all commenced the process of acceding to the WTO. The only country in the region yet to start 
the WTO accession process is Eritrea. 
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Public health related TRIPS flexibilities can be interpreted and implemented in a manner that 
promotes public health objectives of WTO Members. A brief synopsis of the key public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities follows below: 
 
TRIPS 
Flexibility  
                         Practical Implications 
 
Transitional 
periods, 
exclusion from 
patentability 
LDCs are exempt from applying the TRIPS Agreement other than 
Articles 3,6 47 and 58 until 1 July 2021 or a subsequent date determined 
by WTO Members and can further choose to exempt pharmaceuticals 
from patentability until 1 January 2016, or a subsequent date as 
determined by the WTO Members.   
Compulsory 
licenses and 
government use 
orders 
 
A compulsory licence authorises a government to license the use of a 
patented invention to itself or a third party, without the consent of the 
patent-holder.  A compulsory licence authorising the government itself 
to use a patented invention is also known as a government use license. 
In the public health context, compulsory licensing can enable domestic 
production and/or importation of generic medicines by both private 
and public sectors, and increase access to treatment. 
Determining 
criteria for 
patentability 
While the number of new and innovative pharmaceutical products is 
small and declining, thousands of patents are being granted for 
pharmaceuticals. Article 27.1 provides WTO Members the latitude to 
determine domestic criteria for inventiveness, novelty and industrial 
applicability, the three step test prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement to 
reduce instances of ever-greening. 
Parallel 
importation 
Pharmaceutical companies often charge lower prices for a medicine in 
one country than in another, taking into account a range of market 
                                                 
6 Requiring WTO Members to give nationals of other Members the same treatment as their own nationals. 
7 Requiring WTO Members to provide equal trading opportunities to all Members. 
8  Article 5 notes that “The obligations under Articles 3 and 4 do not apply to procedures provided in multilateral 
agreements concluded under the auspices of WIPO relating to the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual 
property rights.” 
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factors. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement authorises WTO Members 
to import a patented medicine from the market of another country 
without the consent of the patent holder.  
General 
exceptions to 
patentability 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement authorises WTO Members to 
engage in specific of activities without the consent of the patent which 
would otherwise be regarded as a violation of patent rights. While the 
language in Article 30 is not specfic,  two of the most notable 
exceptions, from the perspective of access to pharmaceutical products, 
are the early working (or Bolar) exception, and the scientific research 
or experimental use exception 
Protection of 
test data 
 
Article 39.3 requires WTO Members to protect pharmaceutical test 
data required to be submitted for marketing approval from unfair 
commercial use. Article 39.3 only requires protection of undisclosed 
test data originated from new chemical entities and that which requires 
considerable effort to generate. Some developed countries have chosen 
to implement their Article 39.3 obligations by granting a period of 
exclusive rights on pharmaceutical test data known as data exclusivity.  
Several developing countries continue to assert their right to define 
unfair commercial use in the context of their own national interest and 
laws.    
Remedies for 
anti-competitive 
behaviour 
A number of provisions in the TRIPS Agreement authorise Members 
to take measures to mitigate anti-competitive behaviour by 
pharmaceutical companies both in national and international markets. 
These include: 
 Article 6 which authorises parallel importation, thus providing 
a remedy to differential pricing in various markets by 
pharmaceutical companies; 
  Article 8.2 which authorises Members to take measures to 
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights; 
 Article 31(k) which authorises the use of compulsory licensing 
to remedy anti-competitive behaviour; and  
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 Article 40, which confers the right on to WTO Members to 
take action against restrictive licensing practices which may 
otherwise limit the transfer of technology. 
30 August 2003 
Mechanism  
Under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, medicines produced 
under compulsory license should normally be “predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market.” The 2003 WTO Paragraph 6 Decision 
and the subsequent amendment of Article 31bis created a temporary 
waiver from this general rule, to enable the production and export of 
generic versions of patented medicines under compulsory licence. 
Under this system, countries with insufficient local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity may import generic medicines produced under 
compulsory licence, subject to terms and conditions set out in the 
Decision. Paragraph 6 of the 30 August Decision also allows WTO 
Members who belong to regional economic groupings where at least 
half the members are LDCs to export products manufactured or 
imported under a compulsory license to other countries within that 
regional economic grouping.  
 
 
Yet, despite the presence of policy space, the number of countries that have effectively employed 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities to facilitate treatment access are relatively few. A 2010 
study undertaken by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) examining the extent 
to which five TRIPS flexibilities namely, transition periods, the patentability of substances existing 
in nature, disclosure-related flexibilities, aspects related to substantive examination and the ex-
officio Intellectual Office control of anti-competitive clauses in patent licensing agreements9 had 
been incorporated by 142 countries found that developing countries and LDCs were less likely to 
have incorporated TRIPS flexibilities than their developed country counterparts. To date, 
intellectual property legislation in eastern and southern Africa has not been a key determinant of 
                                                 
9 See WIPO 2010. Legislative implementation at the national and regional levels. CDIP/5/4. Geneva [Online] 
Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_7/cdip_7_3-main1.pdf  
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treatment access. The singularly most important intellectual property related development to affect 
treatment sustainability in eastern and southern Africa since the entry into force of the TRIPS 
Agreement was the passing of the 2005 Patents Amendment Act in India. The Act which was 
passed to ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, was a sea-change for a country that 
previously only provided for patent protection for pharmaceutical processes. The previous Act in 
India from 1970 had been passed with the explicit aim of supporting the growth of the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry. The absence of product patent protection in the 1970 Act enabled reverse 
engineering with the result that Indian companies were able to manufacture and produce generic 
medicines easily. This led to the country earning a reputation for producing good quality, highly 
competitively priced medicines, a drastic departure from the pre-1970 era where Indian consumers 
paid some of the highest prices for medicines in the world. It should be noted that in addition to 
an enabling legislative environment, India’s industrial manufacturing capacity and the availability 
of highly qualified technical and scientific expertise were critical elements in its scale up of 
pharmaceutical production. 
 
The role of the Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturing industry in sustaining national AIDS 
treatment programmes in eastern and southern Africa cannot be overstated. A study analysing the 
donor purchases of ARVs in LMICs from 2003 to 2008 across over 100 LMICs including several 
in eastern and southern Africa found that approximately 80 percent of all ARVs procured in these 
countries were Indian generics.10  While India’s 2005 Patents Amendment Act has had no impact 
on the price of first line ARVs because several competitors manufacture first line ART regimens, 
several of the newer generation ARVs such as raltegravir and etravirine11 are under patent in India 
and will remain so for years to come. India’s Patents Act of 2005 coupled with the limited presence 
of generic competitors for newer generation ARVs significantly undermines the viability of India 
as a default producer of easily exportable new generation generic ARVs. 
 
                                                 
10 See Waning B, Diedrichsen E, and Moon S (2012) ‘A lifeline to treatment: the role of Indian generic manufacturers 
in supplying antiretroviral medicines to developing countries.’ Journal of the International AIDS Society 13:35. 
11 According to information obtained from the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) database, a patent was granted in India 
in 2002 for raltegravir and will be in place until 2022. A patent for etravirine is valid in India until 2019, with additional 
patent application on a new form awaiting examination, which, if granted, would extent the patent term to 2026. 
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There is good reason to believe that the intellectual property legislation of eastern and southern 
African countries and the degree to which they contain implementable, public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities will play an increasingly important role in sustaining national treatment programmes. 
National legislation will become a key determinant in sustaining treatment programmes which 
include newer generation medicines likely to be patented in India and other countries with 
significant manufacturing capacity.  This outlook is supported by three eventualities in the region. 
 
 First, the great majority of ART programmes in eastern and southern Africa are funded by 
multilateral financing mechanisms such as PEPFAR and the Global Fund which in turn, are mostly 
financed by donor governments. With the onset of the global economic crisis of 2008, multilateral 
funding for the AIDS response has flat-lined. The year 2011 marked the first time that domestic 
spending exceeded donor funding of the AIDS response, with the margin widening in 2012. There 
is a growing realisation by governments in eastern and southern Africa that they will be expected 
to bear greater responsibility for financing ART programmes in their countries.  
 
Second, with the revision of WHO treatment guidelines in June 2013,12 the number of people 
eligible for ART globally increased to an estimated 21.2 million people at the end of 2013, the 
large majority of who live in Africa. While an impressive scale up in treatment has taken place in 
recent years, many more people are eligible for treatment than are receiving it at present.  
 
Third, almost all the new generation ARVs are patented in several eastern and southern African 
countries. Reasons for this include the patent registration system in South Africa, and lax patent 
examination standards in regional offices which undertake substantive patent examinations on 
behalf of many countries in the region. Both these points will be elaborated upon below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 WHO (2013) Consolidated Guidelines on the Use of Antiretroviral Drugs for Treating and Preventing HIV 
Infection: Recommendations for a Public Health Approach, Geneva [Online] Available: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85321/1/9789241505727_eng.pdf  
Page | 22 
 
1.2 Aims of Research 
  
This thesis has three aims. The first is to demonstrate that many countries in eastern and southern 
Africa have not fully incorporated public health related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation 
in a way that would support their ability to sustain and expand national treatment programmes. 
 
The second aim of the thesis is to delve further into the intellectual property related legislative and 
policy levers available to countries in eastern and southern Africa to sustain and expand national 
treatment programmes through the use of case studies. The case studies will examine policy 
options of countries in eastern and southern Africa both with and without significant 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.  
 
The final aim of this thesis is to demonstrate how the current functioning of regional intellectual 
property offices such as the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) to which 
most eastern and southern African countries belong, is impeding the sustainability of national 
treatment programmes. In so doing, the thesis will highlight the importance of policy coherence of 
recent initiatives aimed at promoting regional co-operation in the trade of essential medicines are 
to be successful. Recommendations will be made to advance the public health objectives of 
countries in the region with significant local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, and those 
without.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses  
 
The affordability and availability of health technologies hinges on a number of factors ranging 
from market dynamics and the legal, policy and regulatory environment, to the capacity of the 
health system to deliver health technologies across its supply and distribution chain. This thesis 
will examine the degree to which countries in eastern and southern Africa have incorporated public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities into national laws with a focus on patent, competition and drug 
regulatory legislation. In so doing, the thesis will test the following hypotheses: 
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First, the incorporation of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into domestic legislation has 
not been a priority for countries in eastern and southern Africa because most patients on ART in 
the region predominantly are still on first-line ART regimens, which are both affordable, and 
presently funded by bilateral and multilateral donor institutions such as the GFATM and PEPFAR. 
The incorporation and use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities has not been needed to treat 
patients in eastern and southern African countries. However, public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities will become more important as multilateral funding declines and treatment 
programmes require the greater use of more expensive new-generation ARVs increasingly being 
patented in countries with significant pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in the region such as 
South Africa, and elsewhere as is the case in India. 
 
Second, there are capacity constraints within the relevant government departments in eastern and 
southern Africa that hinder the full integration of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into 
relevant national legislation and their use when needed.  
 
Third, while capacity constraints and a reliance on donor funding are both present, these two 
factors alone do not provide a holistic picture of challenges in the region which are more complex 
than may appear at first glance. There is a significant degree of legislative and policy incoherence 
at the national and regional levels, which, if not addressed by law reform and increased co-
ordination, could undermine the incorporation and use of TRIPS flexibilities both at the national 
and regional level, thus bringing the sustainability of treatment programmes into question.   
 
As postulated in the second hypothesis, capacity constraints have impeded the full integration and 
use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities. They have also contributed to the legislative and 
policy incoherence advanced in the third hypotheses. In some instances however, the underlying 
reasons for the policy incoherence extend beyond capacity constraints and are the result of 
overlapping organisational mandates, insufficient co-ordination at the national and regional levels 
and at times, competing interests between national and regional institutions. 
 
The first two hypotheses largely re-affirm the existing conventional wisdom of much of the 
academic research in this field, far less research has been undertaken on what impact legislative 
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and policy coherence at the national and regional levels has had on the ability of countries in 
eastern and southern Africa to sustain and scale up national treatment programmes. The testing of 
the third hypothesis would be the primary contribution of this thesis to the rich existing field of 
literature. The hypotheses advanced are tested by the introduction of three research questions: 
 
(i) What is the funding source for the national AIDS, TB and malaria treatment programmes 
and how sustainable is that funding? 
 
(ii) In the event the current sources of funding are unsustainable, how can public health related 
flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement be employed by countries in eastern and 
southern Africa to sustain and expand treatment programmes while supporting regional 
initiatives to strengthen local pharmaceutical industries? 
 
(iii) What legislative and policy coherence is required to support the more effective use of 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities by eastern and southern African countries?  
 
The thesis further argues that the considerable differences in levels of industrial development 
between countries in eastern and southern Africa necessitates a greater distinction being made 
between countries with significant local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and those without. 
The testing of this argument lies in the country case studies found in this thesis. The country studies 
will analyse the research questions through the lens of countries with differing capacities in the 
area of pharmaceutical production. Furthermore, this thesis assets that any regional initiatives to 
promote a sustainable supply of essential medicines must be supplemented at the national level 
with the careful assessment and adaptation of national legislation to incorporate public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities. This assertion will be tested against the discussion on the various intra-
regional and inter-regional initiatives in in eastern and southern Africa aimed at fostering co-
operation between countries to improve access to essential medicines. 
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1.4 Research Methodology, Sources and Limitations  
 
The thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of two countries in eastern and Southern Africa, with 
different profiles, challenges and opportunities, and in so doing, draws conclusions applicable to 
other countries in the region in similar circumstances. In addition to the two country case studies, 
a review of exiting regional initiatives aimed at promoting regional co-operation on treatment 
access in eastern and southern Africa is undertaken. Tanzania and South Africa were identified as 
the two country case studies for the following reasons. First, both countries have been undertaking 
intellectual property related policy and legislative reform with implications on treatment access. 
There has been a significant amount of country level activity and government engagement on the 
issue. Second, a deliberate decision was taken to conduct studies of two countries with very 
different profiles. The 24 countries which, for the purposes of this thesis, comprise the eastern and 
southern African region vary widely with regards levels of industrialisation, income per capita, 
capacity of government officials and national institutions to effectively implement laws and 
policies and varying membership of regional economic communities and south-south co-operation 
initiatives.  
 
In many ways, Tanzania and South Africa represent stark contrasts. Tanzania is ranked 159th out 
of 187 countries included in the 2014 Human Development Index of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). It has a low industrial base, a nascent local pharmaceutical 
industry and is a net importer of health technologies, a situation unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future. Tanzania is classified as an LDC which accords it differential treatment 
according to WTO rules like many countries in eastern and southern Africa.. Its government 
officials and institutions are regarded as having increasing but still modest levels of capacity. As 
with many countries in the eastern and southern African region, Tanzania is largely dependent on 
multilateral financing to sustain its national treatment programme. The country is a member of 
both the East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), each with different regional initiatives on intra-regional co-operation treatment access.  
 
South Africa on the other hand, is the largest economy on the continent after Nigeria and dominates 
the SADC region, accounting for 80 percent total trade volumes. It has the largest pharmaceutical 
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base on the continent and is home to a top 10 global generic manufacturer. The country has 
comparatively speaking, strong local institutions including a Competition Commission, Medicines 
Control Council (MCC) and Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC). It is a 
member of the BRICS club of countries, a group of five large developing and emerging market 
economies. South Africa is included as a country case study because it tells a very different story 
of the region, but also because it is central to many opportunities for regional co-operation on 
treatment access. Together, these two case studies provide a good assessment of opportunities and 
challenges facing countries in the eastern and southern African region.  
 
This thesis makes use of both desk reviews of existing literature and empirical data, which often 
acted as a control mechanism to test the validity of the findings of the desk review 
 
1.4.1 Empirical data 
 
Most of the empirical data were collected during field visits to Tanzania and South Africa. This 
thesis has benefitted tremendously from my work at UNDP on matters of intellectual property, 
innovation and trade which entailed providing policy and technical advice to several countries in 
the eastern and southern African region from 2008 to 2014 as well as the opportunity to interact 
with government officials working in intellectual property issues in the region. 
  
The data were collected through a limited number of interviews and primarily, though 
conversations held with key government officials representing the ministries of Trade and 
Industry, Health and Social Welfare and the ministry of Communication, Science and Technology 
in Tanzania as well as civil society organisations, representatives of bilateral and multilateral 
development co-operation organisations and the private sector including local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. In South Africa, interviews were conducted and conversations held with officials 
from the Department of Trade and Industry, Science and Technology, Health and the Competition 
Commission. Several discussions were also held with members of civil society, intellectual 
property lawyers, consultants and representatives of the local pharmaceutical manufacturing 
industry.  The interview data in many cases provided an important picture of the intricacies and 
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political considerations which drove national and regional policy and legislative making in the 
area of intellectual property.  
 
Field visits to Arusha, Tanzania the headquarters of the East African Community Secretariat took 
place in March and December 2010. Field visits to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania took place in October 
2013 and February 2014. Field visits to South Africa took place in Cape Town in March 2011, 
Pretoria in June 2011, and Johannesburg in February 2013.  All interviews for this study were held 
on a non-attributable basis because of the political sensitivities involved. Much of the information 
which was obtained during the interviews is not cited in the thesis if there was a risk of the 
information being attributable to any given individual. A non-attributable list of interviewees can 
be found in appendix three. 
 
The cut-off date for data used is October 2014. Attempts to collect information through the use of 
questionnaires met with limited success. There was a high rate of unresponsiveness of many 
stakeholders in the region in general and in the research countries. There was also a reluctance on 
the part of some regional intellectual property officials to share information they considered to be 
politically sensitive, and to be cited as the source of that information. The interviews and face to 
face conversations which took place proved to be a valuable source of information and provided 
much contextual insight. They also served a useful purpose of validating the desk research and 
acted as a control mechanism to test the validity of the findings. 
 
1.4.2 Secondary Sources 
 
The theoretical data rely on a combination of relevant legal, trade and public health related 
literature, as well as legislation, protocols and case law. These data are comprised of studies, plans 
reports from national governments, multilateral organisations including the WTO and a number of 
United Nations organizations, academic and research institutions, civil society as well as public 
interest organisations working on issues of intellectual property, trade, competitive and consumer 
policy, public health innovative financing mechanisms. 
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1.4.3 Analytical Framework 
 
There is a large volume of existing literature on the use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
to facilitate treatment access in LMICs. Many authors and researchers have noted that the impact 
of intellectual property legislation varies widely depending to a country’s level of development 
and should be tailored to address specific national objectives including public health. According 
to the Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
(CIPIH): 
 
“It is also assumed that society at large will be able to benefit from present and future innovation. 
But where most consumers of health products are poor, as are the great majority in developing 
countries, the monopoly costs associated with patents can limit the affordability of patented health-
care products required by poor people in the absence of other measures to reduce prices or 
increase funding. Thus the overall effect of intellectual property regimes is context-specific – the 
impact in a country such as India may differ from that in Thailand or in Ghana.”13 
 
A key question that has emerged since the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 is 
whether the obligations placed on developing countries who are WTO Members are reasonable 
and whether the flexibilities present in the TRIPS Agreement provide sufficient latitude to 
developing country members to address public health concerns. Abbott14 has argued that the 
burden of proof to demonstrate the benefits of the TRIPS Agreement to developing countries lies 
with developed countries and that failure to do so provided sufficient justification for a review of 
the provisions of TRIPS. Noting that the TRIPS Agreement resulted in billions of dollars in wealth 
transfer from technology importing countries to technology exporting countries, Dutfield and 
Suthersanen15 re-iterate Trebilcock and Howse’s assertion that:  
                                                 
13 See WHO (2006) Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World 
Health Organization, Geneva, [Online] Available: 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf  
14 Abbott F, (2001)‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference’ 
Occasional paper 7, QUNO, Geneva. In this article written shortly before the fourth WTO Ministerial conference in 
Doha, he recommended that developing countries request a review of the TRIPS Agreement as it did not sufficiently 
address their needs.  
15 Dutfield G, and Suthersanen U, (2004) ‘Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The 
Lessons of history’ Occasional Paper 15, QUNO.  
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“A country would have little or no interest in protecting intellectual property rights in products of 
which it is solely an imitator and intends to remain so – here the national interest is above 
consumer welfare, i.e. sourcing the product as cheaply as possible. Such is the case for many poor 
countries.”16 
 
The debate over the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on developing countries has shifted in recent 
years away from a possible review and amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to one over whether 
countries can more effectively utilize public health related TRIPS flexibilities. The reasons for a 
shift in the debate are several. First, the reality remains that the majority of countries in eastern 
and southern Africa have not amended their legislation to optimize the use of public health related 
flexibilities.  An effort by developing countries and LDCs to push for an amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement stands less chance of success if its proponents are unable to show that they have taken 
steps to use the Agreement to increase access to treatment and that these efforts have been 
undermined by the complexities of using public health related TRIPS flexibilities. Deere17 notes 
in her book that more than half of WTO developing country Members did not meet the 1 January 
2000 deadline to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, as early as 2007, more than half of the 
WTO LDC membership had already enacted intellectual property legislation, well in advance of 
the then 1 July 2013 deadline.  
 
Deere also asserts that the failure of many developing countries and LDCs to change their laws 
can be linked to the uncertain international legal environment. This is an argument also made by 
Abbott and Reichman18 who, in discussing examples of compulsory licensing in Brazil and 
Thailand ascribe the decision to issue compulsory licenses to the increased public understanding 
of public health related flexibilities. They contrast the extent of legal certainty that surrounded 
these licenses in Brazil and Thailand with the situation in South African in 1997, where the 
                                                 
16 Trebilcock M, and Howse R, (1999) “The Regulation of International Trade” (2nd ed.), London: Routledge, at 
314. 
17 Deere C, (2008) “The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property 
Reform in Developing Countries” Oxford University Press. 
18 Abbott F, and Reichman J, (2007) ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and 
Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ Journal of International Economic Law 
10(4), 921–987. 
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incorporation of parallel importation into domestic legislation by the government resulted in a 
lawsuit by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa.19 
 
In addition to legal uncertainty, capacity constraints have been identified as another challenge that 
has impeded the use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities. Musungu and Oh20 found that 
greater numbers of developing countries and LDCs, possibly buoyed by the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health, have been incorporating into domestic legislation, and using public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities in larger numbers since 2001. They identify the eastern and 
southern African countries of Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe as having issued compulsory 
licenses or government use orders. While also citing a general lack of clarity about legal options 
available to countries, Musungu and Oh also identify a lack of local legal and technical expertise 
to incorporate and implement flexibilities in national law and policy as an obvious problem. Beall 
and Kuhn21 analyse the 24 various occasions between 1995 and 2011 where they assert that a 
compulsory license was issued, or a scenario tantamount to a compulsory license occurred. They 
conclude that the barriers to compulsory licensing go well beyond the lack of local pharmaceutical 
production capacity, and likely extend to health system incapacity, political pressure from 
developed countries, and the legislative difficulties of issuing compulsory licenses. 
 
In addition to institutional and technical capacity constraints, Matthews,22 identifies pressure from 
bilateral and regional trade agreements as well as technical assistance provided by both bilateral 
and multilateral sources as an important determinant in undermining the greater incorporation and 
use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities by developing countries and LDCs. He notes that 
many providers of technical capacity focus on intellectual property protection and enforcement 
rather than the optimization of public health related TRIPS flexibilities and that more should be 
done to ensure that the technical advice countries receive promotes their national interests.  
 
                                                 
19 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others (CCT31/99) [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674; 2000 (3) BCLR 241. 
20Musungu S, and Oh C, (2006) ‘The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They Promote 
Access to Medicines?’ South Centre, Geneva. 
21 Beall R, Kuhn R (2012) ‘Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A 
Database Analysis’ PLoS Med 9(1): e1001154. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154. 
22 Matthews D, (2005) ‘TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: The problem with 
Technical Assistance and Free Trade Agreements’ EIPR Issue 11, 420-427. 
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1.5 Contribution to the Field of Research 
 
The brief synopsis of relevant literature referred to above is an indication of the rich debate of 
relevance to the research problem identified in this thesis. However, little academic research exists 
which analyses the impact of actual or attempted use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
in eastern and southern African countries and whether the measures adopted by these governments 
actually resulted in reduced prices or increased availability of essential medicines. In addition, the 
existing literature in almost all cases identifies capacity constraints, political pressure and 
inappropriate technical assistance as the primary reasons why more countries have not fully 
incorporated and used public health TRIPS flexibilities. Far less literature addresses what steps 
countries should take to address these challenges. Even less literature relates to the role of policy 
incoherence among the national and regional stakeholders in perpetuating the current situation. 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by examining in detail, how public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities can be optimally employed by countries in eastern and southern Africa 
to sustain and accelerate national treatment programmes. In so doing, the thesis will explore in 
detail, how domestic legislative and policy reform in Tanzania and South Africa can support 
national policy objectives to sustain antiretroviral treatment programmes. In addition, the thesis 
will examine how the policy positions and objectives of the different government ministries and 
stakeholders in South Africa, Tanzania and the regional economic communities may be 
undermining the progressive policies and initiatives being embarked upon to sustain and accelerate 
access to treatment for HIV, In so doing, discusses options to address this situation. Finally, the 
thesis will discuss opportunities to increase the level of policy coherence required to address the 
inter-connected challenges of treatment access. 
 
1.6 Research Outline  
 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter one, which, in addition to providing a 
snapshot of the current situation with regards the availability of treatment access in eastern and 
southern Africa, poses the research problem and advances the three hypotheses to be tested in the 
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subsequent chapters. The first chapter ends with a literature review and an assessment of how this 
thesis will make a contribution to a rich body of existing literature in this specific field of 
intellectual property law.  
 
Chapter two focuses on the historical evolution of intellectual property and in so doing, traces the 
participation of eastern and southern African countries in the multilateral intellectual property rule 
making process. The chapter further examines the first attempts by developing countries to use the 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities to advance public health objectives and the differences 
which arose between developed and developing WTO Members over the interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. The chapter discusses the impact of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public health and the 30 August 2003 Decision. Chapter two concludes with an 
assessment of some of the emerging developments in intellectual property which may further 
impede the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the region.  
 
Chapter three examines the degree to which public health related TRIPS flexibilities have been 
employed by countries in eastern and southern Africa to increase access to treatment and what the 
outcomes of these attempts have been. The chapter analyses the instances where the use of public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities did not result in the desired outcome of ARV price reductions 
and discusses some of the challenges that may have prevented the more effective use of the TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the first of two country specific case studies of countries in eastern and 
southern Africa. Tanzania and South Africa have distinct profiles with regards their reliance on 
multilateral funding to sustain national treatment programmes, the level of sophistication of their 
local pharmaceutical industries, their membership of different regional economic organisations 
and their differing rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Chapter four analyses the 
case of the United Republic of Tanzania; which comprises mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, each 
with its own patent and drug regulatory legislation. As an LDC with a nascent local pharmaceutical 
industry Tanzania is likely to be a long term importer of health technologies. Chapter four draws 
conclusions on how the reform of policy and legislation in Tanzania could promote both the 
importation of health technologies into the country and facilitate their regional trade. 
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Chapter five examines the case of South Africa, which, as a developing country, was required to 
have been TRIPS compliant since 1 January 2000. South Africa is home to the most advanced 
local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry on the continent which in recent years, has been 
making inroads into the continent with the acquisition of pharmaceutical manufacturing companies 
in a number of sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, Chapter five examines South Africa’s 
legislative and policy environment in relation to the TRIPS Agreement with a focus on medicines, 
competition and patent legislation. The role of various government departments in shaping South 
Africa’s policies on treatment access and local pharmaceutical production is examined, as is the 
policy incoherence which appears to exist between them. 
 
Chapter six examines, from a south-south co-operation perspective, intellectual property policy 
options available to countries in eastern and southern Africa to increase the trade in health 
technologies. From the regional perspective, chapter six will focus on the prospects for intra-
regional co-operation within the African Union, East African Community and the Southern 
African Development Community. Chapter six will also explore opportunities for south-south co-
operation (as defined in appendix one) between eastern and southern African countries and large 
developing countries with pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity including India, China and 
Brazil.  Finally, in testing the third hypothesis advanced in this thesis, chapter six will examine 
how the policy positions and objectives of different regional stakeholders may be undermining the 
progressive policies and initiatives being embarked upon to sustain and accelerate access to 
treatment for HIV, TB and other epidemics.  
 
As the conclusion of the thesis, chapter seven will review the hypotheses advanced in chapter one 
and in assessing their validity, make recommendations on how greater policy coherence can be 
achieved through legislative and policy reform at the national level, and greater co-ordination 
among regional economic organisations to promote a sustainable supply of health technologies in 
eastern and southern African countries. 
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2. The Evolution of intellectual Property Law: What Impact on Treatment Access in 
Eastern and Southern African Countries? 
 
“We are simply asking for fair and equitable rules that would take into account our development 
needs and allow us to participate fully in the trade system. But instead, we risk being pressured 
again into accepting rules we don’t need and can’t afford…”  
 
Ambassador Nathan Irumba, Mission of Uganda and Representative of Least Developed Countries 
at the WTO 
 
 
2.1 Intellectual Property and Innovation: What Pathway for Eastern and Southern African 
Countries?  
 
The debate over the role of intellectual property in stimulating the innovation of health 
technologies is a complex one with wide-ranging opinions. Many scholars have argued that high 
levels of intellectual property protection are necessary to incentivise innovation of new health 
technologies. According to Grabowski,23 the costs of pharmaceutical research and development 
(R&D) are so high and the costs of imitation so low that the originator pharmaceutical industry is 
more vulnerable to so called ‘free riders’ than other industries. Thus, he argues, patent protection 
is a key determinant to incentivise the development of new pharmaceutical products.24 He cites the 
example of Canada, which had incorporated legislation to encourage compulsory licensing and 
argues that as a result there were very few, if any incentives for originator pharmaceutical 
companies to undertake R&D. He notes that since the adoption of a legislative environment 
promoting higher levels of pharmaceutical patent protection, there has been a dramatic growth in 
R&D investment in Canada’s domestic pharmaceutical industry. Others make the case for stronger 
                                                 
23 Grabowski H, (2002) ‘Patents, innovation and access to new pharmaceuticals’ Journal of International Economic 
Law 2002 5(4):849-860, Oxford University Press. 
24 He notes that typically, less than 1 percent of the compounds examined in the pre-clinical stage move to clinical 
trials involving humans and that only 20 percent of the compounds entering clinical trials typically obtain marketing 
approval from drug regulatory authorities.  
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intellectual property protection on the basis that it will not only induce greater levels of R&D but 
that it would also incentivise technology transfer between developed and developing countries.25 
 
Others argue that heightened intellectual property protection, especially in developing countries 
will provide monopoly power to multinational companies thereby leading to ‘rent extraction’ from 
poor developing countries.26 Branstetter27 reviews a number of important empirical studies 28 and 
concludes that most fail to find evidence of a strong response in domestic innovation that could be 
reasonably ascribed to the effects of stronger intellectual property rights. He concludes that, if 
anything, overly-broad patent rights can actually retard the pace of innovation29 because initial 
patent holders are able to block the necessary ‘follow on’ research which could have increased 
quality and lowered the product prices.30 Drahos and Braitwaite note that the property rights which 
emerge in the market place are not necessarily efficient because those who shape the design of 
property rights may be less interested in maximizing efficiencies and more interested in exacting 
rents.31 In his book on corporate social responsibility, Banerjee32 argues that while the R&D based 
pharmaceutical industry routinely cites patent protection as a necessity to guarantee R&D 
                                                 
25 See Evenson R, and Kanwar S, (2001) ‘Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur Technological Change’, Yale 
Economic Growth Centre Discussion Paper. No. 831. The authors mapped five aspects of patent laws: extent of 
coverage, observance of international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms 
and the duration of protection in 32 countries from 1981 to 1990. They found that because there is a strong positive 
association between countries’ intellectual property protection and their R&D investment expenditure that intellectual 
property rights are significant incentives for innovation. 
26 McCalman P, (2001) ‘Reaping what you Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization’ 
Journal of International Economics 161-86. 
27 Branstetter L, (2004) ‘Do stronger patents induce more local innovation?’ JIEL 7(2), Oxford University Press, 359-
370. 
28 Chief among these is the research by Lerner J, (2002) ‘Patent Protection and Innovation over 150 Years’ National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 8977, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Lerner examined the impact of 
patent reform across 60 countries over a 150 year period and found that the strengthening of patent laws did not 
increase domestic patent applications but rather led to significant increases in patenting by foreigners in the reforming 
country. The two other studies that form the basis of the author’s conclusions are Sakakibara M, and Branstetter L, 
(2001) ‘Do patents encourage more innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Reforms’, 32 RAND Journal 
of Economics and Branstetter L; and Branstetter L, and Nakamura Y, (2003) ‘Is Japanese Innovative Capacity in 
Decline?’, in Blomstrom M, Corbett J, Hayashi F, and Kashyap (eds) (1993) “Structural Impediments to Growth in 
Japan”, University of Chicago Press.   
29 Ibid Branstetter (2004), at 361. 
30 See also Scotchmer S, (1991) ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law’ 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 at 29. 
31 Drahos P, and Braithwaite J, (2003) Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New 
York, New Press, 2003), 19–38 
32  Banerjee S, (2007) “Corporate Social Responsibility: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham at 56-57.  
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investment, the reality is that originator pharmaceutical manufacturers spend two to three times 
more on marketing than on R&D and routinely refuse to divulge their actual R&D costs 33 
 
Other scholars believe that intellectual property policy should be tailored to meet specific contexts 
and situations. Blair and Cottier for example, distinguish between R&D required for so called 
public goods such as parks roads, national education and defence and the options available to 
governments to solve the problem of free riders such as imposing taxes or a user fee on those who 
uses the resources and the facilities on the one hand and trying to regulate the problem of free 
riding on other goods such as pharmaceuticals. They argue that for some inventors, there is 
sufficient incentive to innovate because of the benefit of being the first to being a product to 
market, particularly if the costs of reverse engineering the product are high. If, however, the costs 
of reverse engineering are comparatively low, then the patent system is the most efficient way of 
addressing the dilemma of free riding.34   
 
The tailoring of intellectual property legislation and policy to meet specific country objectives and 
priorities is a practice almost as old as intellectual property itself. The principle “one size does not 
fit all” was the rationale behind the inclusion of public health related flexibilities into the TRIPS 
Agreement. For the countries of eastern and Southern Africa, the debate over the role of intellectual 
property in incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation is of particular relevance to South Africa 
given the manufacturing capacity of its local pharmaceutical sector as elaborated upon in chapter 
five. Even for South Africa, the question of greater relevance for the purposes of this thesis is how 
intellectual property legislation and policy can be employed both incentivise domestic innovation 
while facilitating technology transfer, and affordable access to health technologies in a manner 
required to sustain national treatment programmes for HIV and other diseases. For other eastern 
and southern African countries, many of who are LDCs with limited local pharmaceutical 
                                                 
33 He cites the case of Bowsher v Merck and Co Inc, 460 U.S. 824 (1983) in which Merck filed a petition to prevent 
a US government agency from accessing information on the direct and indirect costs of manufacturing a medicine 
being supplied to the government agency. The Federal District Court held in a judgement which was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals, that the agency was entitled to inspect information pertaining to the direct costs including 
manufacturing and delivery, access to indirect costs which included marketing, promotion, distribution and 
administration costs did not have to be disclosed. 
34 See Blair R, and Cottier T, (2005) “Intellectual Property: Economic and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies” 
Cambridge University press, at 15. 
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manufacturing capacity as is the case with Tanzania, intellectual property legislation is more likely 
to be tailored to sustain national treatment programmes and to incentivise technology transfer to a 
nascent local pharmaceutical industry. 
 
In unpacking the first two hypotheses advanced in chapter one, namely, that the incorporation of 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation of countries in eastern and 
southern Africa has not been a priority to date, and that there are capacity constraints within the 
relevant government departments in the region which explains the partial adoption and integration 
of public health related flexibilities, this chapter traces the evolution of formal intellectual property 
rules from the pre-TRIPS era, to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement and the increased focus on 
intellectual property protection and enforcement.  In so doing, this chapter examines the role of 
eastern and southern African countries in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement in 1995. The chapter then assesses the reaction of countries in the region when the 
implications of the TRIPS Agreement on access to medicines became apparent in disputes between 
developed and developing WTO Members over the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in the 
late 1990s.  
 
Next, this chapter examines the role of countries in eastern and southern Africa in debates at the 
WTO which led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health. The chapter then examines how the 30 August 2003 Decision and the potential impact it 
may have on the ability of countries without significant domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity to sustain national treatment programmes on intellectual property and public health. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of how intellectual property protection and 
enforcement have evolved within eastern and southern Africa to exceed the minimum standards 
required by the TRIPS Agreement in some cases, and discusses the potential implications of these 
developments on access to health technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 38 
 
2.2     The Origins of Intellectual Property 
  
Drahos categorises the evolution of intellectual property law into three periods: the territorial, 
international and global.35 In the territorial phase, patents were essentially only enforceable in the 
countries where they had been granted. The international phase brought with it the onset of 
international treaties described below. The global period commenced shortly after world war two, 
as debates between countries occurred at various UN and multilateral forums, leading eventually 
to the inclusion of intellectual property into the scope of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
and the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. The first recorded intellectual property 
statute developed with the explicit purpose of promoting innovation dates back to 1474 in 
Venice.36 Mandich notes that this was the first time a legal and institutional form of intellectual 
property was developed to establish the ownership of knowledge.37 Interestingly, some important 
elements present in modern day intellectual property laws can be traced back to the Venetian statue 
as explained by Mandich below: 
 
“Venice was the first to have continuously and constantly applied certain rules to patents of 
invention instead of granting an occasional isolated monopoly. Among these rules were these: the 
protection always was extended to an inventor, provided that his invention was recognized as 
useful; that the patent term was limited; that the right was transferrable inter vivos and mortis 
causa; and that it was subject to a compulsory license in favour of the state, that a patent was 
forfeited by failure to use it within certain term and that it failed in cases of prior knowledge within 
the territory of the Republic.”38 
 
From early on in the evolution process, intellectual property law was used as a policy lever to 
transfer technology and incentivize innovation. According to MacLeod,39 one of the motivating 
                                                 
35 Drahos P, (1997) ‘States and Intellectual Property: The past, the Present and the Future’ in Sauders D, and 
Sherman B, (eds) From Berne to Geneva: Recent Developments in In International Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights, Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy, Queensland, Australia, 47-70. 
36 May C, (2002) ‘The Venetian Movement: new technologies, legal innovation and the institutional origins of 
intellectual property’ in Vaver D, (2006) “Intellectual Property Rights: Critical concepts in Law” Volume 3, 
Routledge.  
37 Mandich G, (1948) ‘Venetian patents (1450-1550)’, Journal of the Patent Office Society 30: 166-224.   
38 Ibid Mandich. 
39  MacLeod C, (1991) ‘The paradoxes of patenting: Invention and its diffusion in the 18th and 19th century Britain, 
France and North America’, Technology and Culture 32 (4), 885-911. 
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factors behind the development of the first formal English intellectual property law, the Statute of 
Monopolies of 1623, which occurred at a time when England was less technologically advanced 
than both France and the Netherlands, was the goal of incentivizing foreign craftsmen to settle in 
England in a bid to boost the country’s technological base.40 From an early point in the 
development of formal intellectual property laws, countries retained the prerogative to customise 
their intellectual property laws in order to meet its particular needs or priorities. As Dutfield and 
Suthersanen41 observed, by the 1880s, there were five areas of variation between patent systems 
adopted by countries: the definition of novelty, the length of patent terms,42 the treatment of foreign 
patent applicants, exceptions to patentability and requirements about the local working of a patent. 
For instance, the German Reichspatentgesetz of 1877 passed six years before the Paris Convention 
entered into force, excluded from patentability inventions considered to be against public order 
including several agricultural and chemical products as well as medicines.43 Switzerland 
suspended its patent system from 1802 until 1888, five years after the Paris Convention came into 
operation44 at which time it was considered a ‘patent piracy’ country. Even after a patent Act 
eventually came into force, it excluded substances and processes from patentability until 1978.45   
 
2.2.1 The First International Intellectual Property Treaties 
 
The move to expand the domain of intellectual property gained momentum late in the second half 
of nineteenth century and was to a large degree, driven by influential associations of authors, 
publishers, lawyers and literary societies interested in the protection of literary and artistic works.46 
                                                 
40 See Cornish W, (1999) “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, trade Marks and Allied rights” (4 th edition), 
London.  While disapproving of monopolies in general, the Statute provided the true and first inventor a 14 year period 
of exclusivity over the invention. This period of exclusivity was provided on condition that the rights conferred were 
not in violation of the law, did not generally result in increased prices in the domestic market, did disrupt trade and 
were not generally inconvenient. The 14 year period of exclusivity could be extended for an additional seven years 
under certain circumstances. 
41 Dutfield G, and Suthersanen U, (2008) “Global Intellectual Property Law”, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 
at 24. 
42 At the time, the Patent term in the UK was 14 years from date of filing, while France and Germany provided 
patent protection for 15 years from the date of grant, and the US provided 17 years. 
43 Jost D, and Cottier T, (2012) ‘Broad Concerns about Nanotechnology Patents: Symptoms and Diagnosis’ 
Working Paper 2012/13, World Trade Institute [Online] Available: http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-
trade.ch/wp3/3.3c/NCCR%20WP2012_13_NanoPatentsSymptomsDiagnostic_Jost_Cottier2012June.pdf  
44 Dessemontet F, (2000) ‘Intellectual property in Switzerland’, Kluwer Law International at 23. 
45 Ibid Jost and Cottier at 27 who note that at the time, the founder of Geigy AG, which evolved into the originator 
Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis denounced patents as “a paradise for parasites.” 
46 Ibid Dutfield and Suthersanen at 26. 
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These efforts culminated in the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(Paris Convention) and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (Berne Convention), the first binding international intellectual property agreements.47 The 
adoption of these two treaties signalled the beginning of the international phase of Intellectual 
property law as described above by Drahos. For the first time, the Paris Convention required 
signatory countries to provide for national treatment of foreign works under domestic laws for 
patents, trademarks, industrial designs, trade names, appellations of origin and utility models. The 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to some degree owes its establishment to a 
perceived need for an organisation to inter alia, administer the Paris and Berne Conventions and 
to promote the harmonization of national intellectual property legislation.48 
 
One of the reasons why the Paris Convention was considered acceptable to some developing 
countries at the time, lay in the policy space countries retained to customise intellectual property 
legislation to meet national policy objectives with the exception of the national treatment 
principle.49  Under the Paris Convention, countries retained the discretion to determine the duration 
of a patent’s validity under national law, and to exclude certain fields of technology from 
patentability. The Convention also provided for the revocation of patents, and the issuance of 
compulsory licenses to remedy abuses by right holders. 
 
An issue of concern for developed countries who were signatory to the Paris Convention was the 
general reluctance of many newly independent states to sign the Convention as well as a lack of 
enthusiasm that a number of developing country members had about the misalignment of the 
Convention’s objectives with their own national interests.50 South Africa which became a Union 
in 1910 was the first country in the region to sign the Convention in 1947. Even-though a wave of 
                                                 
47 See Matthews D, (2002), “Globalising Intellectual Property Rights – The TRIPS Agreement”,   Routledge/Warwick 
Studies in Globalisation, at 11.  
48 Although created in 1967, the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation entered into 
force in 1970.  WIPO officially became a specialized Agency of the UN in December 1974 with the entry into force 
of the Agreement between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organisation [Online] Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/  
49 The national treatment principle required that countries extend to foreigners, the same legal rights and remedies 
available to their nationals. 
50 Patel notes that of the original 14 Signatories, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala withdrew from the 
Convention in 1886, 1887 and 1895 respectively. See Patel S, (1989), ‘Intellectual Property Rights in the Uruguay 
Round: A Disaster for the South?’ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 18, 978-989. 
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independence swept across eastern and southern Africa resulting in the emergence of at least 20 
countries by 1977, less than half of them signed the Paris Convention.51 Scholars point to a 
difference of opinion between developed and developing countries over the role of intellectual 
property as a policy lever for development objectives as a probable reason why so few developing 
countries including those from eastern and southern Africa agreed to sign the Paris Convention.52 
Another reason may be advanced for why some countries in the region may have signed the Paris 
Convention despite the general lack of consensus between developed and developing countries 
over its purpose and utility. Virtually all the eastern and southern African countries who signed 
the Paris Convention in the 1970s were newly independent states preoccupied with the political 
and economic challenges that new nationhood brought with it. Countries in the region also 
inherited colonial laws which had not yet been customised to reflect national interests. Given the 
circumstances, intellectual property law reform was unlikely to have been a priority.  
 
A number of developed countries retained their own misgivings about the Paris Convention53 
which in their opinion did not contain sufficiently robust enforcement provisions or an effective 
and binding dispute settlement mechanism. This, combined with a ‘pro-development’ shift towards 
intellectual property law reform by large developing countries like Brazil and India fuelled the 
debate which moved to the UN General Assembly in the 1960s. In 1961, Brazil tabled a draft 
resolution before the General Assembly calling on the Secretary General to conduct an analysis of 
the effects of patents on developing countries with the eventual holding of a conference on patents 
and the special needs of developing countries.54 According to Deere, the aim of the Brazilians was 
to use a subsequent report to push for the revision of the Paris Convention to more appropriately 
address the needs of developing countries. The international conference never took place.55 
Meanwhile, 1964 saw the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), an initiative largely driven by developing countries. In continuing their 
                                                 
51 These countries in chronological order are:  The United Republic of Tanzania in 1963, Madagascar in 1963, 
Malawi in 1964, Zambia 1965, Kenya and Uganda both on 14 June 1965, Mauritius in 1976 and Burundi in1977.  
52 See de Koning M, (1997), ‘Why the Coercion-based Approach is not the only answer to international piracy in the 
Asia-Pacific Region’ European Intellectual Property Review 2: 59-77. 
53 Ibid Patel. See also Scotchmer S, (2001)‘The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties’ Institute of 
Economic and Business Research, Working Paper E01-304, University of California, Berkley at 5-6. [Online] 
Available: http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Scotchmer2001.pdf  
54 Deere C, (2009) ‘Developing Country Perspectives on Intellectual Property in the WTO: Setting the Pre-TRIPS 
Context’ Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, Edward Elgar, Oxford.  
55 Ibid Deere at 8 
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efforts to push for the revision of the Paris Convention, developing countries in 1970, tabled a 
Resolution in the UN General Assembly on an ‘International Development Strategy for the Second 
UN Development Decade calling for, among other things, a review of the international Convention 
relating to patents.56  
 
2.2.2 Movement Towards a New International Intellectual Property Agreement 
 
Developed countries on the other hand also intensified their efforts to revise both the Paris and 
Berne Conventions, which led to the establishment of WIPO in 1967. This momentum was 
bolstered by various industry associations who focused on the impact of piracy and the increase in 
copyright violations which they alleged, was leading to a decline in revenue.57The attempted 
consolidation of the Paris and Berne Conventions met with a tepid response by developing 
countries following the release of a 1974 report by UNCTAD 58  which found that 84 percent of 
patents published in developing countries were owned by the nationals of five countries - the US, 
France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK) - and that less than one percent of 
patents in developing countries were filed by nationals. After a number of unsuccessful attempts 
in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1984 to revise the Paris Convention, it became clear to developed 
countries that another avenue to increasing the scope of international intellectual property 
protection would have to be found.59  
 
                                                 
56 See Resolution 2626, adopted during the 25th Session of the UN General Assembly dated 24 October 1970. 
According to paragraph 64:  
“Developed and developing countries and competent international organizations will draw up and implement a 
programme for promoting the transfer of technology to developing countries which, will include, inter alia, the 
review of international conventions on patents, the identification and reduction of obstacles to the transfer of 
technology to developing countries, facilitating access to patented and non-patented technologies to developing 
countries under fair terms and conditions…”  
See also Baker B, and Avafia T, (2011) ‘The Evolution of IPRs: From Humble Beginnings to the Modern Day 
TRIPS Plus Era: Implications for Treatment Access’ Working Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the 
Technical Advisory Group of the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, 7-9 July 2011. 
57 See Blakeney M, (1995) ‘Intellectual Property in World Trade’, International Trade Law and Regulation, 1, 76-81.  
58 UNCTAD (1974), ‘The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries’, New 
York, UN Publications. 
59 For a summary of the 1974 UNCTAD report, the differences in position between the developed and developing 
countries as well as comprehensive discussion on the unsuccessful attempts by developed countries to revise the Paris 
Convention to contain more comprehensive enforcement and dispute settlement provisions until the commencement 
of the Uruguay Trade round in 1986, refer to Matthews 2002, at 11-17.  
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Meanwhile, during the 1970s, industry associations intensified their efforts to make a stronger case 
for intellectual property protection. These initiatives were led by the Association of American 
Publishers60 (AAP), the Anti-counterfeiting Coalition, the Intellectual Property Committee, an 
international business coalition whose membership included originator pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and the Copyright Alliance.61 The failure to successfully introduce more stringent 
law enforcement and binding dispute settlement provisions into the Paris Convention and a stalling 
of the Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations 62 prompted the US government to move away 
from its case by case approach to intellectual property infringements and to introduce amendments 
to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.63  The revised Section 301 enabled the US to place 
pressure on countries to meet its demands for intellectual property protection, and in effect, for a 
clearer nexus between intellectual property protection and trading rules to be drawn.64 
 
2.2.3 The Uruguay Trading Round and the Commencement of Negotiations Leading to 
TRIPS 
 
As the Uruguay round of trade negotiations commenced in 1986,65 it was clear from the outset that 
there was a divergence of opinion over the inclusion of intellectual property between the developed 
countries, in particular, the US, and developing countries operating (in this instance) under the 
group of 10 (G10)66  umbrella whose membership included Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania. The US 
proposed that intellectual property be added to the negotiations because of the GATT’s binding 
dispute settlement mechanism.67 The G10 questioned whether the GATT was the most appropriate 
                                                 
60 The AAP is the principal trade association of U.S. book publishing industry. 
61 See Sell S, (1998), ‘Power and Ideas: The North-South politics of intellectual property and anti-trust’, State 
University of New York.  
62 The Tokyo Trade Round of the GATT took place from 1973 to 1979, involved, at its height, negotiations between 
102 countries and is remembered for being the first round where non-tariff barriers were the subject of negotiation 
between GATT Contracting States. 
63 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the statutory provision which gives the US government authority to 
impose trade sanctions against foreign countries maintaining policies, laws or practices which violate or impinge on 
US rights under existing trade agreements. 
64 Henderson E, (1997) ‘TRIPS and the Third World: The Example of Pharmaceutical Patents in India’, European 
Intellectual Property Review 11, 651-663, at 652. 
65 The Uruguay Trade Round of negotiations, the most ambitious of the GATT trade rounds took place from 1986 to 
1994 and extended the scope of negotiations beyond goods to the new areas of services and intellectual property. 
66 The G10 countries opposed to the inclusion of intellectual property into the negotiations were Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia.  
67 Stewart T, (1993) “The GATT Uruguay Round: A negotiating history (1986-1992)”, Netherlands, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers. 
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forum to address intellectual property matters, arguing instead that WIPO was the most appropriate 
organisation.68  
 
Early on in the negotiations, the US sought to expand the subject matter being negotiated to include 
patents, trade secrets, industrial designs, integrated circuit designs, copyright and trademarks with 
each GATT contracting party to implement the requisite national laws to protect these various 
aspects of intellectual property.69This led again to a polarisation between developed and 
developing countries over whether the scope of the intellectual property subject matter being 
negotiated.70 The impasse was essentially resolved following the threat of bilateral trade sanctions 
by the US under Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Tariff Act of 1988.  
 
In April 1991, the USTR placed India, China and Thailand on its priority watch list for inadequate 
patent protection of pharmaceutical products and the piracy of books, tapes and videos under 
copyright protection in the US.71 In 1992, the US revoked tariff concessions that India had for 
pharmaceutical products, resulting in an estimated US$ 60 million loss. Shortly thereafter, the 
Republic of Korea and Brazil were threatened with bilateral trading sanctions on the basis of their 
alleged violations under Section 301. These incidents, together with ‘negotiation fatigue,’ (the 
Uruguay round had commenced in 1986) a shortage of qualified technical experts representing 
most developing countries at the GATT Secretariat in Geneva and a strategy of threatening those 
countries perceived to be paying inadequate attention to intellectual property protection while  
offering much sought after concessions to key developing countries in the areas of agriculture and 
textiles,72 meant that by the final stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations in the first few years 
of the 1990s, the majority of developing countries had stopped opposing the inclusion of the TRIPS 
                                                 
68 Ibid Blakeney 1996 at 544. 
69 Ibid Stewart at 2266. 
 
71 Ibid Stewart at 2259 
72 Ryan M, (1998) ‘Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of International law’ 9: 11-67.  Also 
refer to Michalopoulos C, (2002) ‘Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in TRIPS’ Quaker 
United Nations Office (QUNO) at 11 [Online] Available:  
 http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Special-Differential-Treatment-in-TRIPS-English.pdf   
The author suggests that if a bargain was done on the inclusion of TRIPS, it would have been facilitated by developed 
country commitments to liberalise trade in agriculture and textiles. The irony is that these were two sectors in which 
developed country practices were already in violation of the GATT (in agriculture, because of the sector was 
previously excluded from trade liberalisation within the GATT and in textiles, where developed countries insisted on 
maintaining import quotas, in clear violation of GATT provisions.  
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Agreement under the umbrella of the soon to be established WTO. The TRIPS Agreement was 
duly adopted as one of the key Agreements of the newly established WTO.73   
 
A combination of reasons have been provided by various scholars as to why eastern and southern 
African countries were not more actively involved in the intellectual property related aspects of 
the Uruguay round of negotiations.   Matthews has suggested that developing countries were not 
completely aware of the far-reaching implications of the negotiations and were hampered by a lack 
of resources and adequate information to meaningfully participate.74 Adede75 offers two reasons 
why eastern and southern African countries did not object more actively to the inclusion of 
intellectual property under the ambit of the WTO. First, he argues that even though developing 
countries including the African Group did not believe that increased intellectual property 
protection would be in their developmental interests, when presented with market access which 
would result in gains in agriculture, textiles and tropical products, the Uruguay round seemed more 
attractive to them. Second, once the Section 301 Watch list was deployed by the US against large 
developing countries, African countries may have believed that it was more strategic to engage in 
multilateral negotiations than to make bilateral concessions and that a multilateral framework with 
a dispute settlement mechanism in place, would ultimately be more in their interests, than 
unilateral sanctions imposed by large, influential countries like the US. Regardless of what the 
reasons may have been, a review of proposals by a group of 12 developing countries included 
Egypt, Nigeria Tanzania, and subsequently, Zimbabwe in 1990 would suggest that countries had 
made the decision to negotiate on the contents of an inevitable multilateral agreement on 
intellectual property rather than to opposing its inclusion.76  
 
                                                 
73 The TRIPS Agreement was adopted during the conclusion of the Uruguay Trade Round in Marrakesh, Morocco 
on 12-15 April 1994. 
74 See Matthews D, (2002) ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Will the Uruguay Round 
Consensus Hold?’ CGSR working paper no 99/02,University of Warwick, at 3[Online] Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319545  
See also Arewa O, (2006) ‘TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge and Global 
Intellectual Property Frameworks’ Marquette Intellectual Property Review, Vol. 10, 156, Northwestern University 
[Online] Available: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=889384    
75 Adede A, (2001) ‘The Political Economy of the TRIPS Agreement: Origins and History of Negotiations’ 
presented as a background paper at a stakeholders’ dialogue for eastern and southern African countries in June 2001 
[Online] Available: http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/1273.pdf  
76 See MTN/GNG/NG 11/W71. 
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2.3 The TRIPS Agreement and Implications on Innovation and Public Health in 
Developing Countries: Benefit or Burden 
 
When the Uruguay round of trade negotiations commenced in 1986, more than 40 GATT Members 
did not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products.77 As it entered into force in 1995, 
the TRIPS Agreement prescribed minimum standards of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement on WTO Members. These minimum standards apply to the availability, scope and 
use of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in copyrights and related rights, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits and 
protection of undisclosed information.78 Developing countries and LDCs who were WTO 
Members saw a large reduction of policy space that could be used to customise national intellectual 
property policy regimes to meet their specific industrial and strategic objectives. While some 
policy space remains, the TRIPS Agreement constitutes a definitive expansion on the minimum 
standards required by the Paris Convention. Much has been written about the policy space 
available to developing countries to enact patent laws aimed at promoting local innovation and 
technology transfer.”79  From the perspective of countries in eastern and southern Africa, if the 
bulk of innovation remains concentrated in developed countries where there is a high probability 
of strong patent protection, there is precious little incentive to strengthen intellectual property laws 
which may act as a further impediment to the diffusion of that technology.80  
 
                                                 
77 WHO, (2002) Network for monitoring the impact of globalisation and TRIPS on access to medicines, Health 
Economics and Drugs, EDM Series no 11, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002, 1. 
78 Falvey E, (2002) ‘Trade and the Globalisation of Patent Rights’, Internationalisation of Economic Policy, University 
of Nottingham at 22.   
79 Correa C, (2000) “Intellectual Property Rights and the use of compulsory licenses: Options for developing 
Countries” South centre T.R.A.D.E. Working papers, 5, Geneva: South Centre. One of the conclusive findings of the 
UK established Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) was that a one size fits all approach is not a 
desirable goal. At certain stages of a country’s development, weak levels of intellectual property protection are more 
likely to yield results than strong intellectual property protection. The Commission also drew the distinction between 
developing countries (e.g. India on the on hand and Swaziland on the other) and concluded that the different levels of 
scientific and technological capacities should determine what their optimal IPR system should be and that the IP 
regime most suitable in developing countries could vary widely.  
80 Ibid Flavey at19. A World Bank Publication, World Bank, (2001), ‘Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 
Countries’ Washington DC, World Bank found that TRIPS represents a yearly US$ 20 billion transfer of wealth from 
the technology importing nations, most of who are developing countries, to the technology exporters, most of who are 
developed countries. 
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The other notable impact of the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries relates to the costs of 
administering a patent system. A fully functioning patent office should have the means to scrutinise 
the validity of patent applications and to adjudicate in the event of a dispute over the registration, 
maintenance and enforcement of a patent.81 In 2002, the World Bank estimated that the 
administrative costs of complying with TRIPS. In Egypt, it was estimated that fixed costs would 
amount to approximately US$ 800 000 with annual training costs of US$ 1 million. Bangladesh 
estimated a start-up (including the drafting of legislation) cost of at least US$ 250 000 and an 
annual cost of more than US$ 1.1 million for judicial work, training and efforts to increase 
enforcement. 82 An UNCTAD study conducted shortly after the TRIPS Agreement came into force 
estimated that the costs of establishing a functioning intellectual property protection and 
enforcement system are in the range of US$ 1.5- US$ 2.0 million while the operating costs are 
estimated to be in the region of US$ 1 million per annum.83  
 
The pecuniary costs are the tip of the iceberg when considering the costs involved in strategically 
leveraging a national intellectual property system. There are other expenses related to the 
meaningful participation in norm setting, which includes maintaining country representation in 
forums where intellectual property is debated and negotiated. According to a study paper presented 
before the 2002 UK CIPR: 
 
 “For any country, effective participation in these organisations requires, we argue, a combination 
of four main elements of institutional capacity: permanent representation in Geneva; 
appropriately staffed expert delegations able to attend WTO/WIPO meetings; adequate technical 
support for policy analysis within the lead government departments; and functional mechanisms 
                                                 
81 According to advice provided by WIPO to LDCs in a document entitled “Establishing and Modernizing the 
Structure and Administration of an Intellectual Property Office, Services and Facilities”, LDCs are encouraged to 
establish an Intellectual Property Office, which would, inter alia, examine patent applications and oppositions, 
publishing applications, grants and refusals, promoting the use of the patent system and disseminating information to 
the general public. The document also recommends that the Industrial Property Office be divided into departments 
including: (a) The Directorate General, (b) a Patent Department, (c) a Trademark Department, (d) An industrial designs 
department (e) Other Registration Departments and Devices; and (f) other Titles of Protection or Subject Matters.  
This paper while written in 2001, did not elaborate on the fact that LDCs did not have to implement the TRIPS 
Agreement except Articles 3, 4 and 5 until 1 January 2006 at the time, which has been extended subsequently to 1 
July 2021 or a subsequent date as agreed by WTO Members.  
82 See World Bank (2002) ‘Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries: Making Trade Work for the 
Poor, Washington DC for a discussion of some of the administrative costs facing developing countries. 
83 UNCTAD (1996) ‘The TRIPS Agreement and the Developing Countries’, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
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for policy co-ordination and discussion “in capital”. Effective permanent representation in 
Geneva is important for ensuring good information flows back to capital; participation in informal 
consultations (like the WTO Green Room meetings) as part of the negotiating process; alliance 
building with like-minded countries; eligibility for Chairmanship of WTO meetings; and for better 
access to the invaluable services and assistance available from the WTO and WIPO Secretariats. 
The limitations and constraints to effective participation that derive from lack of permanent 
representation in Geneva... continue to apply for a significant number of developing countries”84  
 
The authors found that in 2002, at least 20 of the 45 LDCs that were Members of the WTO or 
WIPO Member States did not have official representation in Geneva.85 Even those who had 
representation were severely resource constrained and had inadequate representation in Geneva 
with one or two professionals who struggled to cope with the overwhelming volume of meetings 
in Geneva, many of them taking place simultaneously.86 According to Schaffer: 
 
“Because of capacity constraints, many developing countries are unable to advance their interests 
in WTO negotiations, before WTO committees, and in dispute settlement as effectively as their 
developed country counterparts.”87 
 
Aside from the lack of negotiating capacity and access to information which impeded more active 
participation of developing countries, Watal has suggested that lack of access to reliable economic 
impact assessment on the impact of the TRIPS Agreement played a role in shaping the response 
of developing countries to the TRIPS Agreement.88 As the full implications of the TRIPS 
Agreement on access to HIV treatment became clearer, developing countries began to assert that 
developed countries were not meeting their commitments, under Article 66.2 by failing to provide 
                                                 
84 Leesti M, and Pengelly T, (2002) Study Paper 9, “Institutional Issues for Developing Countries in Intellectual 
Property Policy Making, Administration & Enforcement” UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, [Online] 
available: http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp9_pengelly_study.pdf  
85 Ibid Leesti and Pengelly at 24. 
86 Sampson G, (2000) ‘Trade, Environment and the WTO: the Post Seattle Agenda’. As Sampson, the former Director 
of the WTO’s Trade and Environment Division, notes, the Egyptian delegation to the WTO has estimated that there 
were 2,847 meetings in the WTO in 1997, or an average of 10 meetings per working day. 
87 Schaffer G, (2006) ‘Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Serve Developing Countries’, 
Wisconsin International Law Journal,  [Online] available: http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/wilj/issues/23/4/shaffer.pdf  
88 Ibid Watal 1999. 
Page | 49 
 
adequate incentives to facilitate the transfer of technology.89 A number of developing countries 
began calling for a review of the TRIPS Agreement in the late 1990s.90 Interestingly, calls for the 
review of TRIPS were based on a lack of consensus on negotiations around geographical 
indications and later expanded to include concerns that developing countries including Kenya had 
regarding provisions in the TRIPS Agreement affecting the sovereignty that countries have over 
natural resources as reflected in the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).91 
There were, also to be sharp differences of opinion between developing and developed countries 
over the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement as discussed below. 
 
2.3.1 Public Health Provisions in the TRIPS Agreement: Differences of Interpretation 
between Countries 
 
The lack of consensus between WTO Members over the use of public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities became apparent shortly after the establishment of the WTO. After 1995, developing 
countries soon began to re-assess the Agreement with the intention of identifying the ambiguities 
that existed as well as any manoeuvring room which remained for domestic intellectual property 
policy making.92 India interpreted to Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement in a manner which 
brought it into dispute with the US, resulting in the first use of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism93 to resolve an intellectual property dispute. The dispute originated from the claim by 
the US that India had not complied with its obligations under Article 70.8 which, inter alia, 
included a requirement to implement a mailbox mechanism to receive and preserve applications 
pending the availability of patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
products94 and that India had failed to establish a legal mechanism for the granting of exclusive 
                                                 
89 See Matthews 2002 at 28. 
90 Ibid Matthews 2002 at 34. 
91 WT/GC/W/302. 
92 Reichman J, (1998) ‘Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement after US v India’, JIEL, Oxford University 
Press 585-601 [Online] Available: 
 http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2226&context=faculty_scholarship   
93 See the first Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) Report India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products WT/DS50/R, 5 September 1997 and the Appellate Body (AB) Report India-Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (India- Mailbox) WT/DS50/AB/R. 19 December 1997. 
94 Article 70.8 required countries like India that were making use of transitional arrangements to establish a means by 
which applications for patents could be filed, to apply the same criteria of patentability as contained in Article 27.1 
and to provide patent protection for the 20 year minimum period prescribed under Article 33, from the date of filing 
of the patent. 
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marketing rights. On the issue of exclusive marketing rights, according to India’s interpretation of 
Article 70.9, it was not obliged to create the legal mechanism for exclusive marketing rights until 
such need arose. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body found that India had not met its obligations 
under Articles 70.8 and 70.9 with the AB finding that India’s textual obligation under TRIPS was 
to provide a means to implement its mailbox obligations and the establishment of a mechanism to 
grant exclusive marketing rights.95  
 
This decision together with a potentially unclear understanding of an LDC’s minimum obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement reportedly led to Ugandan officials debating whether to include a 
mailbox in a draft patent Act in September 2009 96 despite LDCs not having to comply with the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement except articles 3, 4, and 5 until 1 July 2013, at the time, an 
exemption which has been further extended to 1 July 2021. 
 
The next public health related intellectual property dispute involved the US and Brazil and related 
to the local working provisions in Brazil’s Industrial Property Law.97 Article 68 of the Brazilian 
Industrial Property Law authorises the government to issue compulsory licenses when 
manufactured goods are not being produced locally three years or more after a patent has been 
granted by the authorities. The US took issue with Article 68 on the grounds that it was overly 
broad in its scope and that Brazil could have issued a compulsory license under Article 71 on the 
grounds of national health emergency.98  
 
                                                 
95 Ortino F, and Petersmann E, (2004) “The WTO Dispute Settlement system: 1995-2003” Kluwer Law 
International, 422. 
96 Discussion with Sisule Musungu, 17 February 2010. Subsequently, the Ugandan Parliament passed an Industrial 
Property Act in 2013. The Act came into force in January 2014 upon assent by the President does not contain a 
provision for a mailbox. 
97 Amendments to Brazil’s patent law were enacted in 1996 and came into force on 1 January 1997. 
98 See ICTSD Report of 8 May 2001 entitled ‘US-Brazil War of words over pharmaceutical s and intellectual property’ 
[Online] available: http://ictsd.org/i/ip/39980/. For more on the US position, refer to the USTR, 2001, ‘Special 301 
Report’, Washington DC: United States Trade Representative [Online] Available: 
 http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uploads/images/3eyF5a1qp15PmBar9Y4QgA/usinfo_301_special2001.pdf  
Page | 51 
 
Although the US requested consultations99 and the establishment of a panel100 with Brazil under 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, (DSU) on 30 May 2000, the matter was resolved 
through a “settlement agreement” between the parties, resulting in the US withdrawing its 
complaint. Shadlen101 believes that intense pressure from AIDS activists both domestically and 
internationally (who believed that the US complaint was an attack on Brazil’s national public 
health care programme which provided free ARVs to anyone in need) played a role in the matter 
being resolved between the parties. He also asserts that there was also a fear on the part of the US 
that a DSP might find against the US, thereby creating an undesirable precedent. It was therefore 
in the interests of both parties to resolve the dispute without the risk of a precedent going against 
them. Considerable pressure was also placed on the US through the tabling of a resolution at the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission which called for the availability of appropriate 
medicines for the treatment of AIDS to be made available at accessible prices and which reminded 
UN Member States that access to ART was a fundamental human rights issue.102 The resolution 
was adopted by every member of the Commission except the US, which led to its further isolation 
on the issue.103 
 
The next dispute between developed and developing countries over the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement captured the attention not only of governments in eastern and southern Africa, of but 
that of the media, patient groups and civil society activists worldwide. The reasons for this are 
linked to the fact that an African country was involved in the dispute, and because South Africa 
had become the global epicentre of AIDS epidemic.  
 
While the first antiretroviral medicines had begun to emerge in the mid-1990s, their prohibitive 
cost, in excess of US$ 12 000 per patient per year, combined with the large number of people in 
                                                 
99 Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1, 
G/L/385, IP/D/23, 8 June 2000. 
100 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil- Measures affecting Patent Protection 
WT/DS199/39, January 2001.  
101 See Shadlen K, (2007) ‘The political economy of AIDS treatment: intellectual property and the transformation of 
generic supply’ International Studies Quarterly, 51: 559–581 
102 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/33, Access to medication in the context of pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/33, 20 April 2001.  
103  For more on the various strategies employed by the Brazilian government in its dispute with the US, see Bird R, 
and Cahoy D, (2008) ‘The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining 
Approach’, American Business Law Journal, Volume 45, Issue 2.  
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need of treatment made a national sponsored treatment programme un-feasible. In a bid to make 
use of the limited policy space the TRIPS Agreement still afforded it, on 30 October 1997, the 
South African Parliament passed the Medicines Control and Related Substances Amendment 
Act.104 The Act contained provisions including Section 15 (C), which appeared to allow a Minister 
of State,105 broad discretionary powers to authorise parallel importation as a means of reducing 
essential medicine prices.106 The South African chapter of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ 
Association (PMA) launched a High Court application to suspend the Act from coming into 
operation because of what it perceived to be the presence of unfair wide-ranging powers which 
could be improperly used. One of the contentions was that, in addition to parallel importation, 
Section 15(C) could be utilised for compulsory licensing and that, in its present form, it was 
contrary to Articles 6, 27, 28 and Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Interestingly, the US 
government opted not to bring the matter before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Two 
reasons are offered for this. The first relates to the strong emotions the case evoked and the 
potential public relations disaster which eventually led to the application being dropped by the 
PMA and a settlement being reached in April 2001.107 The second may explain the settlement the 
US reached with the Brazilian government in an earlier dispute. A DSP precedent in favour of the 
South African government might have prompted other countries to adopt similarly wide-ranging 
provisions.108  
 
Although the disputes between Brazil and South Africa were resolved without either country 
having to amend or renounce legislation, developing countries remained concerned that attempts 
to utilise intellectual property legislation to alleviate public health crises were being met with stiff 
resistance. Meanwhile, a combination of factors including  the court case brought against the South 
                                                 
104 Act 90 of 1997. 
105 It can be argued that the phrase ‘a minister of state’ as opposed to ‘the minister of state” enables the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, Health or indeed, any government minister to use Section 15(c). 
106 See Watal (1999). 
107 See Tickell S, (2001) ‘Cutting the Cost of Drugs’, Managing Intellectual Property, March 3. No case since has 
gad a greater impact on the reputation of the originator pharmaceutical industry. See also Baker and Avafia.  
108 Abbott F, (2002), ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at 
the WTO, 5 (2), Journal of International Economic Law 469 at 486, has suggested that the reason for the US 
government withdrawing its support for the pharmaceutical companies was to some degree, related to the NGO 
protesters threatening to disrupt the presidential campaign of then Vice President Al Gore unless the US withdrew its 
support to the pharmaceutical industry on this and similar public health disputes. 
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African government,109 the rapidly growing HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, a realization that 
the US was prepared to use the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism to enforce intellectual 
property rights as well as continued unilateral pressure imposed by the US by placing countries on 
watch-lists through Section 301 propelled the African Group at the WTO110 to more actively begin 
seeking clarification on the use of TRIPS flexibilities to increase access to more affordable health 
technologies.111 These initiatives include the adoption of a resolution by the 57th Session of the 
United Nations Human rights Commission calling, inter alia, on UN Member States to refrain 
from taking measures which would impede access to medicines and encouraging countries to adopt 
legislation and regulations to facilitate medicine access in their countries.112 Two World Health 
Assembly Resolutions113 in May 2001 which referred to access to essential medicines were also 
initiated to support the agenda of the African Group and developing country allies.  
 
2.4 The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
 
In April 2001, WTO Members agreed to hold a special session of the TRIPS Council. The special 
session was called to discuss the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement with a view to clarifying the flexibilities to which Members are entitled to and, 
in particular, to establish the relationship between intellectual property rights and access to 
treatment. The African Group submitted a proposal containing draft text of a ministerial 
declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health at the TRIPS Council meeting of June 
                                                 
109 The Court case was referred to in a proposal submitted by the African group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela before the TRIPS Council in June 2001. See document IP/C/W/296. 
110 The African Group as the name suggests is a coalition of African countries who had developed one common 
negotiating position on a range of trade issues, not least of all on intellectual property and public health in 2001. At 
the time, the most active members of the African Group on matters of intellectual property and treatment access 
included a number of eastern and southern African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. As of May 2014, the African Group had a membership of 42 countries. An updated list of Members is [Online] 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm 
111 On 19 June 2001, the WTO TRIPS Council held its first meeting on the implications of TRIPS on access to 
medicines. In this meeting and a subsequent one held on 25 July 2001, it became clear that developing countries were 
determined to obtain clarity on instances under which countries could use the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement to access more affordable treatment.  
112 The exact text of the agreement is available on the Human Rights Commission Website [Online] Available: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2001.21.En?Opendocument  
113 WHA54.10 Resolution calling for the scaling up of the response to HIV/AIDS and WHA 54.11 entitled “ WHO 
Medicines Strategy”. 
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2001114 in partnership with a coalition of developing countries. The proposal contained a political 
chapeau developed to ensure that the TRIPS Agreement did not undermine the right of WTO 
Members to formulate their own public health policies, as well as practical clarifications for 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement on compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and production 
for export to a country with insufficient production capacity amongst others.115 In response, at a 
Special Session of the TRIPS Council,116  the US, Japan, Switzerland, Canada and Australia 
circulated the summary of a non-paper highlighting the importance of intellectual property 
protection for the R&D of medicines and in so doing, proposed alternative language.117  
 
It became clearer to the US delegation that public pressure, especially in the face of the South 
African Court case, required that the matter be addressed at the Doha Ministerial Conference 
scheduled to take place in November 2001. This led to the final process of drafting being assigned 
to the Chair of the General Council at the WTO, Ambassador Harbison, with the understanding 
that he would work in consultation with the then Chair of the TRIPS Council, Ambassador 
Chidyausiku from Zimbabwe.118 This development, coupled with the anthrax attacks in the US in 
October 2001119 helped to pressure the US into accepting the need for a declaration on intellectual 
property and public health.  On 27 October 2001, the US made a proposal to place a moratorium 
on bringing any sub-Saharan African countries before dispute settlement for matters relating to 
TRIPS.120 The attempt by the US to offer a geographical exemption was rejected by Members and 
eventually, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health121  was adopted towards the end of 
                                                 
114 WHO (2002) “Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, Geneva [Online] 
available: http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf. See also, Kongolo, T (2003) 
‘TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Public Health’, 6(2) Journal of World Intellectual Property 373 at 374.   
115 Refer to WHO (2002) at 3 for more details on the proposal made by the African Group. 
116 Held on 19 September 2001. 
117 For a more detailed discussion of the non-paper, see Bridges Weekly Trade New Digest Volume 5 number 32  of 
25 September 2001 [Online] available: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6639/  
118 Abbott F, (2002) ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at 
the WTO, 5 (2), JIEL 469 at 486. 
119 In the aftermath of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, a number of US government buildings in Washington 
D.C. were contaminated with an anthrax-laced powder, resulting in a number of deaths and serious illnesses. In 
response to the possibility that bioterrorism would need a broader public health response, the US Secretary of Health 
and Human Services in October 2001 revealed that he had threatened R&D based company Bayer with a 
compulsory license for its patented product ciprofloxacin, if the company did not meet the government’s demand for 
a reduced price. After this episode, it became untenable for the US government to argue that there was no need for a 
declaration on intellectual property and public health.   
120 Ibid Abbott (2002) at 489. 
121 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W2, 14 November 2001. 
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the Ministerial meeting in Qatar.122 This achievement was widely viewed as a victory for 
developing countries with high disease burdens123 particularly those in eastern and southern Africa. 
The Doha Declaration recognised the gravity of the public health crisis facing many of the then 
142 WTO Members, particularly among the developing countries and LDCs and emphasised the 
impact of HIV, TB and malaria on its Members. It also affirmed that the TRIPS Agreement does 
not and should not prevent measures taken by countries to protect public health and that the TRIPS 
Agreement should be interpreted in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ rights to protect 
public health and to promote access to medicines. It also recognised the rights of each WTO 
Member to determine what in its opinion, constitutes a national emergency or a situation of 
extreme urgency. The Doha Declaration also extended the rights of LDCs to postpone the granting 
of pharmaceutical patents in their countries until 2016124 or a subsequent date to be agreed by 
WTO Members. 
 
While the Doha Declaration re-affirmed the rights of countries to issue compulsory licenses for 
the local production of medicines, an issue of great importance for countries without significant 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity remained unresolved. Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement required that any product manufactured under compulsory license would have to be 
produced predominantly for the supply of the domestic market authorising such use. This meant 
that even where hypothetically, a developing country like India, Brazil or South Africa issued a 
compulsory license for the manufacture of an essential medicine, it could only export less than 50 
percent of the supply to any other country.125 This left the majority of developing countries and 
LDCs, particularly those with high levels of disease burden including many in eastern and southern 
                                                 
122 The WTO’s 4th Ministerial conference was held in Doha, Qatar from 9-14 November 2001 and was the launch of 
the as yet, un-concluded round of trade talks known as the “Doha Development Agenda.” The Doha Ministerial 
meeting provided WTO Members with a mandate to negotiate on key issues of agriculture, non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA) and services. The Doha round has not yet been concluded despite subsequent WTO ministerial 
meetings in Cancun in 2003, Geneva in 2004, Hong Kong in 2005 and Geneva in 2009.  
123 Drahos P, (2002)‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard Setting’, 5 (5) Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 765 at 781.  
124 Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration. For further discussion on the implications of the Doha Declaration, refer to 
Sun H, (2003) ‘Reshaping the TRIPS Agreement Concerning Public Health: Two Critical Issues’ JIEL 37(1) 163-197, 
Kluwer Law International. 
125 Abbott F, (2001) ‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference’ 
Occasional paper 7, Quaker United Nations Office- Geneva at 13, suggested that before the Doha Ministerial took 
place that “Some developing Member may wish to pool productive resources and create regional supply facilities 
operating under compulsory license, with no single predominant market.”  
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Africa with no tangible solution to address their public health crises. Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration sought to address this situation by explicitly recognising that WTO Members with 
insufficient or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity had virtually no practical use for 
compulsory licensing provisions under Article 31 of TRIPS. It also tasked the TRIPS Council to 
find an expeditious solution to this problem by the end of 2002.126  
 
The 21 months it took WTO Members to find the ‘expeditious solution’ resulted in some of the 
most acrimonious disagreements between developed and developing countries since the 
establishment of the WTO.127 Unlike the negotiations which established the TRIPS Agreement, 
there was a greater involvement of civil society groups who were sympathetic to developing 
country interests.128 Organisations such as the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech), MSF, 
Third World Network (TWN) Health Action International (HAI) and Oxfam to name a few, played 
an important role in support of the African Group and other developing countries at the WTO by 
advocating for public health concerns while keeping the public informed of developments of the 
negotiations in Geneva.129  
 
According to Matthews,130 negotiations to resolve the now termed “paragraph 6 problem” 
concerned the scope of diseases to be included in an eventual agreement; the countries to be 
beneficiaries of an agreement on access to essential medicines either as importers or exporters of 
affordable essential medicines; a possible waiver of Article 31(f) of TRIPS; a moratorium on 
complaints to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in relation to Article 31(f) and finally, the 
possibility of an Article 30 solution. The debate around the scope of diseases to be covered by the 
paragraph 6 solution was a contentious one with the US insisting that a paragraph 6 solution only 
                                                 
126 Correa C, (2004) ‘Implementation of the WTO General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, WHO, 2004.  
127 Avafia T, (2005) ‘TRIPS and Public Health: the unresolved Debate’, Tralac Trade Brief 2, University of 
Stellenbosch Printers. 
128 Matthews D, (2004) ‘Is History Repeating itself? The Outcome of Negotiations on Access to Medicines, the 
HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Intellectual Property Rights in the World Trade Organisation’ University of Warwick, LGD 
(1). 
129 See Matthews D, (2006) ‘NGOs, Intellectual Property Rights and Multilateral Institutions’, Queen Mary 
Intellectual Property Institute, University of London [Online] Available: 
 http://www.ipngos.org/Report/IP-NGOs%20final%20report%20December%202006.pdf  
Some of these NGOs had provided negotiating and policy advice to developing countries even in the lead up to the 
Doha Declaration.  
130 Ibid Matthews (2004) at 6. 
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apply to medicines for HIV, TB and malaria and to the exclusion of “lifestyle” or non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) such as diabetes, hypertension and cardio-vascular disease,  while 
developing countries (the African Group in particular) maintained that a solution be adopted to for 
the importation of all medicines deemed necessary by a country to address public health 
concerns.131 The African Group was heavily involved in the negotiations around the paragraph 6 
solution.132 
 
Despite the production of a draft by Ambassador Motta, the then Chair of the TRIPS Council to at 
the last TRIPS Council meeting in December 2002, the US alone refused to accept the “Motta 
Draft” on the basis that the proposed language would allow the importation of generic medicines 
well beyond those required to treat HIV, malaria and TB.133 After further meetings at the TRIPS 
Council in January, February and June 2003 and with sustained advocacy efforts by international 
NGOs,134 reports began to surface that the US would be prepared to agree to a compromise on the 
scope of diseases if it could obtain a guarantee that the solution would only be used by LDCs and 
developing countries with high disease burdens as well as assurances that health technologies 
imported under compulsory license would not be re-exported for financial gain.135  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 Ibid Matthews (2004). 
132 During the negotiations on this matter between November 2001 and August 2003, The African Group for instance, 
in WTO Document IP/C/W/351 proposed a moratorium on bringing complaints at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body  
against developing countries who may have violated Article 31(f) of TRIPS. When the then TRIPS Council Chairman 
released a compromise text on16 December 2002 in an attempt to resolve the impasse at the WTO TRIPS Council,  
Kenya, on behalf of the African Group made the following statement: 
“The African Group is disappointed and frustrated by the progress made so far. The group feels if the discussions 
continue on the same line as they have been conducted to date, then it is unlikely that the desired solution will be 
forthcoming, and particularly one meant to address the public health problems afflicting Africa. Members may wish 
to seriously reflect on the reasons why the African group raised the issue in the TRIPS Council prior to the Doha 
conference and their subsequent expectations after the issue in the Doha [Declaration] as stated in the various 
communications of the TRIPS Council. This probably gives them a better understanding of the nature of the solution 
Africa expects.”    
133 The scope of diseases was cited by the US as the sole reason why it could not agree with the Motta Text. See 
IP/C/M/38, 5 February 2003. 
134  For a list of letters, statements and press releases by CPTech and other NGOs over the duration of the negotiations, 
refer to: http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/   
135  See for instance, a story from the Bridges Weekly digest of 3 July 2007 Volume 7 number 24‘US rumoured to 
consider change in tactic on TRIPS and Health’ [Online] available: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6927/  
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2.5 The 30 August 2003 Agreement and the 2005 Decision to Amend Article 31 of TRIPS 
 
The next chair of the TRIPS Council, Ambassador Menon of Singapore, met with a small group 
key countries including the US, Kenya, Brazil, South Africa and India and succeeded in producing 
a draft Decision. The WTO General Council was presented with a final draft of the Decision which 
was adopted on 30 August 2003,136 preceded by the reading of a statement by the Chairperson of 
the WTO General Council, the legal application of which is still a matter of debate between WTO 
Members. The Decision provides a legal pathway for countries with manufacturing capacity to 
export medicines to countries with insufficient or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity by 
establishing a mechanism to waive the application of Article 31(f) for exporting countries, and 
Article 31(h) for the importing countries.137  
 
The Decision138 requires eligible importing countries139 with the exception of LDCs to notify the 
TRIPS Council of their pharmaceutical needs and an assessment that they are unable to meet these 
needs through local production.  Next,140 eligible importing countries are required to notify the 
TRIPS Council of: 
 
(i) the names of the needed product; and 
(ii) the expected quantities (which could be expressed by the number of specific dosages, 
amount of active pharmaceutical ingredients or patients to be treated). 
                                                 
136 ‘Cheap Drugs Deal Agreed as US lifts Veto’ Frances Williams, Financial Times, 1 September 2003, 8. Refer to 
The Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
IP/C/W/405, 30 August 2003 [Online] Available: 
 http://www.wto.org/english/traptop_TRIPS_e/implem_para6_e.htm.   
137 For a paragraph by paragraph discussion of the content of the 30 August Decision, refer to UNCTAD-ICTSD, 
2005, “Resource Book on TRIPS and Development”, Cambridge University Press at 484-5. 
138 Paragraph 2. 
139 A number of industrialised countries, namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US, declared that they would not use the Waiver.  
A second set of countries including the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia reserved the right to use the Agreement in the event of a national emergency or a 
situation of extreme urgency until they had officially acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004, after which they 
would not use the Waiver.  
A third set of countries agreed that they would only use the system as importers in situations of national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency: China, Hong Kong; Israel; Korea; Kuwait; Macao; Mexico; Qatar; 
Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Turkey; and the United Arab Emirates.  
140 See Correa (2004) for a discussion on the eligibility of countries to utilise the Agreement, in particular at 15-20. 
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Where a valid patent on the product exists in the importing country, the eligible importing country 
should indicate that it has either issued or intends to issue a compulsory license. A license is to be 
issued according to the regulations of Article 31 of TRIPS.141 
 
The Decision also requires the exporting country to issue a compulsory license in compliance with 
the provisions of Article 31 of TRIPS. These obligations include the duty to negotiate with the 
patent holder for a voluntary license to be issued on reasonable terms and conditions and within a 
reasonable amount of time. The Decision also requires that the compulsory license be issued only 
to supply the particular importing country in question, and that the entirety of the product be 
exported. In addition, there are some safeguards that must be met by the exporting country in order 
to prevent the diversion of the pharmaceuticals.142  Aside from notifying the TRIPS Council of the 
destination, quantities to be supplied and the duration of the license, the exporting country should 
also ensure that the medicines can be identified by special packaging and/or labelling of the 
packages as well as any special colouring and/or shape of the medicines to ensure that they are 
easily distinguishable.143 The exporting company is expected to post a notification on a website 
administered by the WTO Secretariat with information on (i) the quantities being supplied to each 
destination, and (ii) the distinguishing features of the product(s). In addition, the exporting country 
is expected to post information on the WTO administered website with the following details:  
 the name and address of the licensee;  
 the product(s) for which the licence has been granted;  
 the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted;  
 the country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied;  
 the duration of the licence;  
 the address of the web site where the supplier will post the information mentioned above. 
                                                 
141 Correa (2004) at 15. 
142 It should be remembered that the risk of medicines destined for one market either being diverted en route, or being 
re-sold by the importing country, was one of the two primary concerns voiced by the US during the TRIPS Council 
negotiations from early 2002 to August 2003, the other one being the scope of diseases. 
143 See UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 485. 
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Paragraph 6 of the 30 August Decision also introduces an additional waiver by allowing WTO 
Members that belong to regional economic communities 144 where at least half the members are 
LDCs, to further export products that have been manufactured or imported under a compulsory 
license to other countries that are members of that regional group.145 The mechanism could in 
theory, result in countries co-operating to establish economies of scale, which, in turn, increases 
the likelihood of bulk purchasing.146 Paragraph 6 of the 30 August mechanism was clearly included 
with African countries in mind as the only regional economic communities in the world eligible 
are the SADC, the EAC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
 
As noted earlier, there continues to be a lack of consensus among WTO Members over the 
interpretation of the Statement read by then WTO General Council Chairman, Ambassador 
Castillo (the Chairperson’s Statement).147 In summary, the statement stresses that the decision will 
be interpreted and implemented on a good faith basis “and not as an instrument to pursue industrial 
or commercial policy objectives.” It also urges countries making use of the mechanism to take all 
steps within their influence to prevent the diversion of the medicines imported/exported, while 
referring to some best practice examples based on existing anti-trade diversion detections already 
in use by donor pharmaceutical companies.148 
 
Despite considerable criticism from civil society groups and treatment activists questioning the 
practical use of an administratively cumbersome mechanism149  and a statement in early December 
                                                 
144 Classified as a regional trade agreement as defined by Article XXIV of the GATT of 1994. 
145 Matthews D, (2006) ‘From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision to the December 6, 2005 agreement on an 
amendment to TRIPS: improving access to medicines in developing countries?’ I.P.Q. No. 2, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 
and Contributors. 
146 Vandoren P, and Eeckhaute J, (2003) ‘The WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health: Making it work”, 6(6) Journal of World Intellectual Property 779 at 783.   
147 The Chairperson’s statement is [Online] Available electronically: 
 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/trips_319_e.htm  
148 See Abbott F, and Reichman J, (2007) ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and 
Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ Journal of International Economic Law 10 
(4), Oxford University Press, 921-987 at 945-946 for a more detailed discussion on the Chairperson’s Statement. 
149 For a comprehensive list of press-releases, statements and documents by NGOs criticizing the effectiveness of the 
30 August 2003 Decision while raising doubts as to the wisdom of making it a permanent amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, refer to the  CPTech website [Online] Available: http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/index.html  
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2005 urging WTO Members to refrain from accepting the 30 August Decision as the final solution 
to the paragraph 6 problem150 and despite the fact that no country until that point, had attempted 
to use the mechanism, on 6 December 2005, consensus was reached at the TRIPS Council to turn 
the 30 August 2003 Decision (which was a temporary waiver) into an amendment of Article 31 of 
TRIPS thus signifying the first time in the history of the WTO that a primary agreement was to be 
amended. This outcome was viewed by many activists and NGOs as a poor return for developing 
countries including the African Group considering how much negotiating capital had been invested 
in finding a practical and usable mechanism for countries with no or insufficient manufacturing 
capacity to adequately address their public health crises.151 WTO Members initially set a deadline 
of 1 December 2007 to ratify the decision to permanently amend Article 31 of TRIPS.152 Despite 
four extensions of the deadline to 31 December 2009,153 31 December 2011,154 31 December 
2013,155 and 31 December 2015156 or a subsequent date as agreed by WTO Members, it has not 
been ratified by enough WTO Members for the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to enter into 
force.157  
 
                                                 
150 A joint statement on TRIPS and Health urged countries not to enter into an agreement which had not been shown 
to be a useful tool for developing countries to increase access to essential medicines. The statement also encouraged 
countries to focus on finding a mechanism that really would facilitate access to medicines and pointed out that until a 
permanent solution was available, developing countries could still utilize the 30 August Decision. For the complete 
statement, refer to: ‘WTO Members should reject bad deal on medicines’ joint statement by NGOs on TRIPS and 
Public Health, December 3, 2005, [Online]. Available: 
 www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos12032005.html   
151 The 6 December 2005 Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement (WT/L/641) is available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm NGOs such as MSF who, at the time, had more than 29 
000 patients on antiretroviral therapy in 29 countries were highly critical of the Decision on the basis that “ the drug 
by drug, country by country decision making process discourages economies of scale and slows down price 
reductions” Refer to the MSF Press Release of 12 December 2005 entitled ‘WTO Sacrifices Access to Medicines 
Before Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting’ for a more detailed critique of the Decision to Amend the TRIPS Agreement 
[Online] Available: http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=1E9AC826-E018-0C72-
095365D44BB1AE4C&component=toolkit.pressrelease&method=full_html  
152 See Paragraph 2 of the Decision.  
153 See WT/L/711 
154 See WT/L/785. 
155 WT/L/829. 
156 WT/L/899. 
157 While at least two thirds of WTO Members are required to ratify the decision for the permanent amendment to take 
place, as of October 2014, 53 countries (excluding Croatia which has subsequently joined the EU) and the EU had 
ratified the amendment. Assuming that the EU’s ratification constitutes an additional 28 ratifications, this still leaves 
the Amendment at around 80 countries, significantly short of the required 106 ratifications based on the WTO’s 
membership of 160 countries as of October 2014. 
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Starting with Zambia in August 2009, a growing number of African Group Members including 
countries in eastern and southern Africa have ratified the amendment to Article 31 of TRIPS.158 
The reasons for this may lie in developments outside of the realm of the TRIPS Agreement. After 
the G-8 countries endorsed its establishment in Genoa, Italy in 2001, the GFATM was established 
in January 2002 to finance the responses of the three most deadly epidemics in LMICs and to 
increase donor co-ordination, country ownership and transparency in health financing. Less than 
12 years later, the GFATM had disbursed more than US$ 22 billion in more than 1050 grants 
across 151 countries.159 PEPFAR, which was established in 2003 by President Bush to respond to 
the growing AIDS crisis in Africa, has disbursed in excess of US$ 41 billion was disbursed 
between 2003 and 2014 across approximately 60 countries. The largest recipients of GFATM and 
PEPFAR funding have naturally been the countries with the highest disease burdens in eastern and 
southern Africa. Of the countries in the region who have ratified the agreement to amend Article 
31 of TRIPS, Zambia has received more than US$ 750 million between 2002 and 2014 from the 
GFATM, and more than US$ 250 million from PEPFAR, while Botswana received US$ 17 million 
and US$ 554 million, Rwanda, US$ 920 million and US$ 394 million and Uganda, US$ 526 
million and US$ 898 million in funding from the GFATM and PEPFAR respectively.  
 
This influx of funding from multilateral and bilateral financing sources would have gone a long 
way in reducing the great sense of urgency that propelled members of the African Group in the 
early 2000s to find a solution that would enable the importation of generic medicines by countries 
without sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. The funding received by countries in 
eastern and southern Africa in response to their public health crises supports the first hypothesis 
advanced in chapter one, namely, that the incorporation and use of public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities has not been needed to treat patients in eastern and southern African countries because 
the majority of patients are on first-line ART which is financed by multilateral funding 
mechanisms. As will be discussed later in the thesis, this is not a sustainable situation given the 
anticipated decline of multilateral funding for AIDS responses in Africa 
 
                                                 
158 As of October 2014, the eastern and southern African countries that had ratified the Agreement were Botswana, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. 
159 See USAID (2013) ‘The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria’ Issue Brief [Online] Available: 
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1864/Gfatm_brief.pdf  
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2.6 Recent Developments on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property and Potential 
Implications on Essential Medicine Access in Eastern and Southern Africa 
 
2.6.1 Heightened Intellectual Property Protection through Bilateral Trade and Investment 
Agreements 
 
As discussed above, the adoption of minimum standards of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement ushered in by the TRIPS Agreement resulted in a significant loss of policy space 
available to LMICs to facilitate access to medicines through domestic legislation.  The erosion of 
policy space has been compounded by the proliferation of bilateral and regional trading agreements 
which, in some instances, have undermined the use of TRIPS flexibilities for public health 
purposes.160  An increase in bilateral and regional trade agreements has been traced back to the 
unsuccessful conclusion of the WTO Seattle Ministerial of 1999, which prompted initially, the US 
and EU, and more recently, other developed countries such as Japan and trading blocs such as the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA)161 to accelerate bilateral trading activity162 by making use of 
Article XXIV of the GATT.163  
 
The main objective of Article XXIV was to prevent RTAs from becoming obstacles to the 
development of multilateral trade, and turning them into stepping-stones towards open trade.164 
However, developed countries and trading blocs that have concluded FTAs which could negatively 
impact medicine access in developing countries include the US, Japan, EU and the EFTA trade 
bloc.165 The new generation of FTAs have also extend beyond the traditional trade negotiating 
                                                 
160 According to the WTO Secretariat, as of late 2014 January 2014, almost 600 RTAs (counting goods, services and 
accessions separately) had been received by the GATT/WTO, of which, 377 were in force. 
161 EFTA Member States include Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.  
162 The pursuit of FTAs as a replacement to stalling multilateral negotiations has also been a priority for EFTA as well 
as the European Union which has sought to replace the asymmetrical Cotonou Trading Agreement between itself and 
its former colonies with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) at various stages of conclusion with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States.  
163 Article XXIV sets the conditions under which Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) can derogate to the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle contained in Article I of the GATT. 
164 See Lang R, (2006) ‘Re-negotiating GATT Article XXIV – A priority for African countries engaged in North-
South trade agreements’, African Trade Policy Centre no. 33 Economic Commission for Africa [Online] Available: 
http://www.uneca.org/ATPC/Work%20in%20progress/33.pdf    
165 Refer to www.bilaterals.org for a comprehensive catalogue of all stories, press-releases and analytical papers 
involving FTAs that have been negotiated as well those currently being negotiated. Details of the FTAs being 
negotiated by these four countries and trading blocs is available on this website. 
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agenda —trade in goods and services— to cover the so-called “new generation” trade policy 
issues.166 
 
The most obvious consequences of ‘TRIPS plus’ provisions with implications on access to 
affordable treatment include: 
 
(a) The potential  extension of patent protection beyond the 20 year minimum required by 
TRIPS;167 
(b) Conferring a new responsibility onto Drug Regulatory Authorities, (DRAs) most of whom 
have limited knowledge of intellectual property, to consider the patent status of drugs 
before granting marketing authorization to manufacturers of generic medicines;168 
(c) The restricting of reliance on access to data on pharmaceutical products for DRAs, which 
generic companies traditionally rely on to prove the efficacy and safety of their products, 
which results in the significant slowing down of the registration, and subsequently, the 
entry into the market of generics in some countries;169  
                                                 
166 Provisions present in bilateral trading agreements for which there is no corresponding operational WTO multilateral 
agreement, include investment, government procurement, competition policy, environmental regulations and labour 
standards. Refer to Kawai M, and Wignaraja G, (2009) ‘Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges’. Asian Development 
Bank Institute Working Paper 144, Tokyo. [Online] Available: 
 http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2009/08/04/3256.asian.fta.trends.challenges/. See also Abbott F, (2004) ‘The 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional 
Free Trade Agreements’ Occasional Paper 14, Quaker United Nations Office. [Online] Available: 
http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP14Abbottfinal.pdf  
167 For instance, Article 23(a) of the US-Jordan Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area states that: 
 “With respect to pharmaceutical products that are subject to a patent…each Party shall make available an extension 
of the patent term to compensate the patent holder for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the 
marketing approval process.”  
168 See Chapter 16:10.4 of the US-Peru FTA which states that: 
“Where a Party permits, as a condition of approving the marketing of a pharmaceutical product, persons, other than 
the person originally submitting safety or efficacy information, to rely on evidence of safety or efficacy information of 
a product that was previously approved, such as evidence of prior marketing approval in the territory of the Party or 
in another territory, the Party may implement the provisions of paragraph 3 by:  
(a) implementing measures in its marketing approval process to prevent such other persons from marketing a product 
covered by a patent claiming the product or its approved method of use during the term of that patent, unless by 
consent or acquiescence of the patent owner”. 
169  For example, Article 15 of the US -Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)  which comprises of Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) is a marked departure from TRIPS. The originator of the data 
in order to prevent third parties from relying on his data, does not have to prove unfair commercial practices required 
by Article 39 of TRIPS. Furthermore, the FTA creates a previously non-existent requirement for the patent holder to 
consent or acquiesce at the least, before marketing approval for competing generic products is granted. 
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(d) The restriction of parallel imports to limited geographical configurations which may 
prevent LMICs from sourcing generics from the cheapest global supplier;170 
(e) Limiting patent oppositions;171  
(f) Compelling countries to relax criteria for patentability beyond what is required by Article 
27(1) of TRIPS;172 and 
(g) Investment provisions which regard the use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities both 
as an expropriation of property which entitles the patent owner to adequate and effective 
compensation  as well as a violation of national treatment rules both of which can be used 
as grounds to litigate against government authorities.173  
 
 
The EU’s EPA negotiations with various ACP countries are still mostly in the process of being 
finalized with a number of Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (IEPAs) having been 
concluded by the end of 2013.174 Negotiations between the EFTA countries and the Southern 
                                                 
170 Chapter 15:9 of the US-Morocco FTA obliges the parties to the Agreement to “provide that the exclusive right of 
the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a product that results from the patented process, 
without the consent of the patent owner shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its 
territory- A party may limit application of this paragraph to cases where the patent owner has placed restrictions on 
import by contract or other means.” 
171 Chapter 15:8.4 of the US FTA with Oman requires that: 
“Each Party shall provide that a patent may be revoked only on grounds that would have justified a refusal to grant 
the patent ... Where a Party provides proceedings that permit a third party to oppose the grant of a patent, a Party 
shall not make such proceedings available before the grant of the patent.” 
172 Chapter 14:8.2 of the US Bahrain FTA obliges the parties to the Agreement to make patents available for plant 
inventions. In addition, the Parties confirm that patents shall be available for any new uses or methods of using a 
known product, including products to be used for particular medical conditions. 
173 See Perkams M, and Hosking J, (2009) ‘Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through International 
Investment Agreements: Only Romance or True Love?’ Transnational Dispute Management Journal, 2, See also 
Chapter 10 of the US DR-CAFTA FTA for example provides for both the national treatment of investors in the 
signatory countries as well as compensation for expropriation of property, although the latter explicitly notes that 
compulsory licensing does not constitute expropriation. The chapter is silent on the use of other TRIPS flexibilities 
however. Similar provisions have been signed in FTAs involving the US and Oman, Australia, Chile and others.  A 
prime example of how investment provisions can result in legal challenges against a state involves an arbitration 
filing brought by Eli Lilly against Government of Canada for alleged violations of its obligations under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) when it invalidated patents for two of its pharmaceutical products. The 
requested remedy is payment in the amount of 500 million Canadian dollars, equivalent to US$ 460 million. See In 
the Arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement: Eli Lilly v. Government of Canada [Online] Available: 
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Eli-Lilly-Notice-of-Arbitration-September-12-2013.pdf   
174 The negotiation process for the EPAs has been a controversial and fractious process in eastern and southern Africa, 
where the EPA negotiations are taking between the EU and three blocs of countries. The EAC Partner States have 
initialled but not yet signed an interim EPA (IEPA), while the SADC countries in this case comprising of Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa have signed the IEPA with the exception of Angola and Namibia. 
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African Customs Union (SACU)175 excluded intellectual property relating to public health from 
the text of the final agreement when agreement was signed in June 2006 following an advocacy 
campaign by treatment activists.176  
 
The US had entered into negotiations with the SACU countries, with intellectual property as one 
of the substantive negotiating issues.177 Despite several trade rounds, the negotiations were not 
concluded, primarily because of a lack of harmonisation in negotiating position and policy 
amongst the SACU countries, and a reluctance on the part of SACU negotiators to enter into an 
FTA which would impact adversely on their developmental objectives. 178 The FTA talks were 
downgraded to trade and investment negotiations in 2006 which resulted in the signing of a Trade, 
Investment and Development Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) between the parties in July 2008, 
in which there appear to be no provisions that may impact negatively on access to treatment in the 
region at this stage.179 
 
2.6.2 The Emergence of ‘TRIPS Plus’ Measures Through the Enforcement and Anti-
Counterfeiting Regulations and Legislation 
 
Of greater consequence to countries in eastern and southern Africa is the emergence of heightened 
intellectual property enforcement through multilateral developments, regional arrangements and 
national legislation. Part III of the TRIPS Agreement contains general obligations, rules on civil 
and administrative procedures, provisional measures, special requirements related to border 
measures, and criminal procedures. 180 Article 41 of TRIPS in setting out the main principles 
regarding enforcement, requires that: 
                                                 
A third set of countries are negotiating the EPAs as an a central and southern African configuration and include the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
175 The SACU countries comprise of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
176 See ICTSD news article dated 9 March 2005 entitled ‘Southern African Countries Reject “TRIPS Plus” Demands 
in FTA Negotiation’[Online] Available: http://ictsd.org/i/ip/39047/   
177 Avafia T, (2004) ‘The Potential Impact of the Proposed US-SACU Free Trade Agreement on public health in 
southern Africa’ Tralac, working paper 6 at 17. 
178 See Business Day Report of 16 November 2006 ‘US all-or-nothing position derails free trade talks’ [Online] 
Available: http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6489  
179 A copy of the TIDCA is [Online] available at: http://www.sacu.int/docs/tidca/agreement.pdf  
180 See Tekeste Biadgleng E, and Munoz Tellez V, (2008) ‘The Changing Structure and Governance of Intellectual 
Property Enforcement’, Research Paper 15, South Centre, Geneva, page 2. 
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• procedures must be available under domestic laws to permit effective action against 
infringement of intellectual property rights; 
•  enforcement procedures must be applied in such a manner as to safeguard against abuse 
and to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade; 
• procedures must be fair and equitable and not unnecessarily complicated or likely to cause 
unwarranted delays; 
•  courts and administrators must base their decisions only on evidence available to all parties, 
and these should preferably be written and reasoned; 
• there must be some form of review for decisions handed down by first instance 
administrative or judicial agencies; and 
• Members are under no obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general.181 
 
The number of multilateral institutions that have been involved in policy and norm setting on 
intellectual property enforcement in recent years has grown and now includes the World Customs 
Organization (WCO), WIPO, the WHO, the WTO and Interpol.  The US and the EU have also 
taken steps to strengthen the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries through 
regional and bilateral trade agreements.182 There are efforts in various multilateral fora to enhance 
the levels of intellectual property enforcement to extend beyond the minimum standards as set out 
in the TRIPS Agreement. For example, there are initiatives to authorize ex officio actions by 
customs authorities to suspend goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights, as well 
as providing for seizure of goods intended not only for import, but for goods in transit and for 
export, which is not required by Article 51 of TRIPS.183 The EU chose to extend this requirement 
                                                 
181 Ibid Tekeste Biadleng and Munoz Tellez at 5. 
182 Ibid Tekeste Biadleng and Munoz Tellez.  
183 Sell S, (2008) ‘The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: the state of 
play’, Occasional Papers No 1, IQsensato, Geneva. [Online] Available: 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/development.research/SusanSellfinalversion.pdf.See also 
Tekeste Biadleng and Munoz Tellez (2008) as well as Tandon Y, (2008) Editorial: ‘WIPO, WCO, intellectual property 
and border guards.’ South Bulletin, 2008, Issue 15. South Centre, Geneva. According to Park, Article 51 requires 
countries to allow customs officials, upon the valid application of a right holder, to suspend suspected counterfeit 
trademark and pirated copyright goods from importation into the country. This obligation does not extend to export 
goods or goods in transit, and requires the affirmative application by the right holder through the proper judicial or 
administrative channels. 
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to goods in transit,184 which led to the seizure of at least 17 shipments of generic medicines from 
India in transit in the EU en route to a number of developing countries on the suspicion of being 
counterfeit medicines.185 It has transpired that none of the seized shipments were counterfeit 
despite their detainment and in some instances, return to the country of origin, India. These have 
led to the issue of counterfeit medicines being debated, without conclusion, at the WHO’s World 
Health Assembly and the TRIPS Council.  
 
Aside from the seizure of medicines in transit on the suspicion of being counterfeit, a number of 
countries in eastern and Southern Africa have either adopted or are in the process of drafting or 
adopting regional and national regulations on anti-counterfeiting, which could have a detrimental 
impact on access to generic medicines in the region. In the EAC region, Kenya passed an Anti-
Counterfeiting Act in December 2008.186 The Act was invalidated through a constitutional 
challenge 187 brought by three petitioners living with HIV in which the Court found that a number 
of provisions of the Act such as Section 2 relating to the definition of counterfeiting,188 Section 32 
dealing with offences and Section 34(1) which deals with the power to seize goods suspected of 
being counterfeit, exceed the minimum requirements of TRIPS.189 Ruling on the definition of 
counterfeiting in the Act, the High Court held that: 
                                                 
184 European Customs Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003. 
185 See Seuba X, (2009) ‘Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit’ Working Paper, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, [Online] Available: 
 http://www.iprsonline.org/New%202009/Seuba_Border%20Measures.pdf   
186 The Anti-Counterfeit Act 13 of 2008. 
187 See the case of Patricia Asero Ochieng and 2 others v. the Attorney General & Another, Petition N 409 of 2009, 
Judgment (2012). 
188 Section 2 of the 2008 Anti-Counterfeit Act defines counterfeiting as:  
“taking the following actions without the authority of the owner of any intellectual property right subsisting in 
Kenya or elsewhere in respect of protected goods- 
(a) the manufacture, production, packaging, re-packaging, labelling or making, whether in Kenya or elsewhere, of 
any goods whereby those protected goods are imitated in such manner and to such a degree that those other goods 
are identical or substantially similar copies of the protected goods; 
(b) the manufacture, production or making, whether in Kenya or elsewhere, the subject matter of that 
intellectual property, or a colourable imitation thereof so that the other goods are calculated to be confused with or 
to be taken as being the protected goods of the said owner or any goods manufactured, produced or made under his 
licence. 
(c) the manufacturing, producing or making of copies, in Kenya or elsewhere, in violation of an author’s rights or 
related. 
189 For a discussion of some of the more problematic sections of the Act, see Von Braun J, (2009) ‘New Enforcement 
Mechanisms Challenge the Legality of Generics in the Name of Public Health: the emergence of anti-counterfeiting 
legislation in Africa- the cases of Kenya and Uganda’ unpublished, on file with author. See also UNDP (2012) ‘Anti-
counterfeit Laws and Public Health: What to Look Out For’ UNDP Discussion Paper [Online] Available: 
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“It is incumbent on the state to reconsider the provisions of section 2 of the Anti-Counterfeit Act 
alongside its constitutional obligation to ensure that its citizens have access to the highest 
attainable standard of health and make appropriate amendments to ensure that the rights of 
petitioners and others dependent on generic medicines are not put in jeopardy (…)” 
 
 In 2014, an Amendment Bill was passed by the National Assembly190 ostensibly to resolve the 
misgivings the High Court had regarding the 2008 Act, but had not yet been signed into law by 
the President as of the end of October 2014. The Bill does not appear to significantly alter the 
definition of counterfeit which was found to be problematic by the 2012 High Court Decision. It 
remains to be seen what reaction the amendment of the Act will receive from treatment activists 
in Kenya and the region. 
  
A draft Counterfeit Goods Bill was also tabled before the Parliament in Uganda in 2008. As is the 
case with the Kenyan Act, it has been argued that the draft conflates the infringement of different 
categories of IP into the term “counterfeiting” although each of these categories is distinct under 
the TRIPS Agreement. In addition,  the border measures proposed in the draft extend to all 
violations of IP rights and to goods imported, exported, and in transit – despite the fact that Article 
51 of the TRIPS Agreement only requires border measures for counterfeit trademark goods and 
pirated copyright goods that are imported.191 Equating the term ‘counterfeit’ with all forms of 
intellectual property infringement while linking of public health concerns to issues of IP 
enforcement could have the unintended consequences of impeding the movement of legitimate, 
high quality generic medicines.  
 
During negotiations which led to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, the terms used in relation 
to counterfeits was limited to “counterfeit trademarks and associated pirated copyright goods”. 
This is because trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy can be determined with relatively 
                                                 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/hivaids/English/UNDP%20Discussion%20Paper%20-
%20(revised).pdf  
190 The Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendment) Bill of 2014. 
191 According to a meeting report of an expert discussion on the Uganda counterfeit goods Bill of 2009 and the Draft 
EAC policy on anti-counterfeiting, held in Entebbe, Uganda on 9-10 September 2009 on file with the author. 
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greater ease, whereas for patent infringements more complex mechanisms are required.192  For 
these reason, it is not clear whether the increase in intellectual property enforcement is likely to 
have the desired effect of stemming the availability of sub-standard medicines in Uganda. It would 
seem more important for public health goals, to differentiate between sub-standard and counterfeit 
medicines. As Park193 points out: 
 
“It is important to recognize that not including a specific definition of counterfeit medicine does 
not prevent countries from enacting appropriate criminal sanctions to ensure a safe medicines 
supply. India’s Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, for instance, does not use the term “counterfeit”, 
but nevertheless contains criminal provisions relating to drug mislabelling, adulteration, and 
spurious drugs, and prescribes up to a life sentence for importing, manufacturing or selling any 
spurious or adulterated drug that is likely to cause death or “grievous hurt”. 
 
Yet a further development in the region funded by the Investment Climate Facility for Africa194 
(ICF), has been the recent formulation of a draft EAC policy on anti-counterfeiting, anti-piracy 
and other intellectual property rights violations, in a process which has been ongoing since 
February 2008.195 A draft anti-counterfeiting Bill emerged in early 2010 which was updated in 
2011 and 2013. The Bill is regarded as an attempt to legislate the key elements of the draft Policy.  
According to the draft EAC policy, the lack of adequate legal framework is a challenge because 
the current EAC state laws on IPR protection and enforcement are too weak and/or not 
implemented. The proposed solution is to increase penalties and sanctions, including criminal, 
against persons in possession of and trade in goods that infringe any IPR. This measure is expected 
to have a deterrent effect. While little is presently known about the timetable for adoption of the 
draft policy and Bill, it appears to intend to harmonize and tighten rules with a view to detect 
counterfeiters, pirates and other intellectual property infringers.  
 
                                                 
192 UNCTAD ICTSD 2005, at 610.   
193 Park C, (2009) ‘Legal Aspects of Defining “counterfeit Medicines”, WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia, 
New Delhi. 
194 Information about the ICF is available on its website: www.icfafrica.org  
195 According to a 14 February 2008 Newsletter from the East African Business Council [Online] Available: 
http://eabc.info/files/newsflashfeb1408.pdf  
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The draft Bill and Policy would not have appeared to have taken into account the important 
implications on access to medicines and broader developmental concerns. Similarly, it is not clear 
that the policy and draft Bill were developed on the basis of empirical evidence taking into 
consideration relevant economic data. It remains to be seen whether the draft Bill and Policy will 
be adopted in their current state or whether further research to determine the impact of the draft 
Bill and Policy on access to medicines among other things, will be conducted.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
In re-tracing the development of international intellectual property norms from their origins in the 
nineteenth century to the present day “TRIPS plus era” this chapter has found that the ratcheting 
up of intellectual property protection and enforcement standards is an agenda being driven by 
industrialized countries who were and continue to be the largest beneficiaries of stronger 
intellectual property standards. This chapter also notes that, while safeguards and flexibilities were 
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement to provide a balance between incentivizing innovation on 
the one hand and the dissemination of the benefits of innovation on the other, attempts by 
developing countries to utilize these flexibilities and safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement to 
increase access to essential medicines were opposed by developed countries, particularly the US 
resulting in a number of these disputes being brought before the dispute settlement mechanism of 
the WTO.  
 
The chapter raises questions over the effectiveness of the mechanism created by the 30 August 
2003 Decision authorising the compulsory licensing and export of pharmaceutical technologies to 
supply patients in countries with insufficient manufacturing capacity. The chapter finds that the 
first hypothesis advanced in chapter one, namely, that the incorporation and use of public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities has not been needed to treat patients in eastern and southern African 
countries is supported by the gradual assent of countries in the region to the agreement to amend 
Article 31 of TRIPS and the large amounts of funding received by countries in the region from the 
GFATM and PEPFAR programmes. 
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Finally, by retracing the evolution of intellectual property to the present day, this chapter concludes 
that the implications of intellectual property protection on public health and access to medicines 
were not properly understood by eastern and southern African countries during the negotiations 
leading up to the creation of the TRIPS Agreement and that once the implications became clear 
with the onset of disputes on intellectual property and public health at the WTO together with the 
onset of public health crises in the region as discussed in chapter one, the African group of 
countries participated far more actively in debates on intellectual property at the WTO. Recent 
developments may result in the implementation of intellectual property enforcement standards 
which exceed the TRIPS Agreement and possibly jeopardising access to a sustainable supply of 
medicines in future. While in recent years, a few countries in eastern and southern Africa have 
attempted to use safeguards and flexibilities to secure a sustainable and affordable supply of 
essential medicines, the success of these attempts and some of the challenges faced by countries 
will be discussed in chapter three. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  Using Public Health Related TRIPS Flexibilities to Increase Treatment Access: 
Experiences from Eastern and Southern Africa 
 
 
“To be prepared is half the Victory” 
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Miguel de Cervantes 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
As discussed above in chapter two, countries in eastern and southern Africa had limited 
involvement in intellectual property norm setting before the launch of the Uruguay trade round in 
1986. However, once the implications of the TRIPS Agreement on public health became clearer 
by the late 1990s, the African Group whose membership comprises several eastern and southern 
African countries became increasingly involved in debates at the TRIPS Council in a bid to ensure 
that WTO Members could use public health related flexibilities found therein to address public 
health concerns.   
 
This chapter examines the extent to which key public health related TRIPS flexibilities have been 
incorporated into national legislation by countries in the region. Moreover, the chapter will analyse 
instances where public health related flexibilities were utilized by countries in the region as well 
as instances where countries threatened or attempted to use public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities, and what the implications for treatment access were. In so doing, this chapter will test 
the first two hypotheses advanced in chapter one, namely, that the incorporation of public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation of countries in eastern and southern Africa has 
not been a priority to date, and that there are capacity constraints within the relevant government 
departments in the region which explains the partial adoption and integration of public health 
related flexibilities. The more specific examples examined in this chapter include an analysis of 
the impact of legislation passed in South Africa to facilitate parallel importation of essential 
medicines as well as the use of competition law by civil society groups to increase generic 
competition.  In addition, the chapter will also analyse the orders for government use of patented 
ARVs by authorities in Mozambique and Zambia as well as Rwanda’s use of the WTO 30 August 
2003 Mechanism.  The chapter will also discuss the threat by the government of Kenya to issue a 
compulsory license in 2004 and the implications of this action on treatment access as a result. In 
conclusion, the chapter will assess whether the incorporation and use of public health related 
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TRIPS flexibilities has been successful in decreasing treatment costs, thus increasing access to 
treatment. 
 
3.2 The Use of Compulsory Licensing and Government use Orders 
 
Compulsory licenses are granted by executive, administrative or judicial authorities to third parties 
to exploit a patented invention without the consent of the patent holder while government use 
orders are compulsory licenses for use by government authorities. As observed by Mandich in 
chapter two, compulsory licensing has existed as a concept since the formal recognition of 
intellectual property protection, the rationale being that a patent is not an absolute right and can be 
revoked under certain circumstances. In the international level, compulsory licenses are regulated 
both by the Paris Convention,196 and Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, with the latter 
authorizing WTO Members to issue compulsory licenses for a variety of reasons. These include 
the lowering of high prices of health technologies,197 to counter anti-competitive practices,198 a 
failure or refusal by the patent holder to supply the market with sufficient quantities of health 
technologies or to meet a need caused by a situation of extreme urgency.199 It is widely agreed that 
Article 31 does not provide an exhaustive list of the grounds on which a compulsory license may 
be issued.200  
                                                 
196 Article 5A (2) of the Paris Convention notes that: 
“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory 
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights” conferred by the patent.” 
197 See for example, Martin G, Sorenson C, and Faunce T, (2007) “Balancing Intellectual monopoly privileges and 
the need for essential medicines” Globalization and Health  3:4, Ford N et al (2007) “Sustaining access to antiretroviral 
therapy in the less developed world: lessons from Brazil and Thailand” AIDS 21 (suppl4): S21-S29, and Nunn A, 
Fonseca E, Bastos F, Gruskin S, Salomon J (2007) “Evolution of antiretroviral drug costs in Brazil in the context of 
free and universal access to AIDS treatment.” PLoS Med 4(11): e305 [Online] Available: 
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305&ct=1.  
See also, Musungu S, and Oh C, (2005) ‘The use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They 
Promote Access to Medicines?’ Study 4C, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
(CIPIH), at 23 [Online] Available: http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf 
198 See Article 31(k) of TRIPS. 
199 An incident that was regarded to have constituted a situation of extreme urgency was the issuance of a compulsory 
license in Taiwan in 2005 for the production of tamiflu. The German Press Agency, Deutsche Presse-Agentur quoted 
the Taiwanese Secretary General of the Department of Health as saying that “Roche and Gilead insisted they can 
supply enough tamiflu if bird flu erupts in Taiwan. Our argument was: When there is a bird flu pandemic, millions of 
people will be hospitalized or dead, and some countries might confiscate Tamiflu or ban its export. We cannot gamble 
our people's lives on their unreliable promise.” See KEI Research Note 2007:2 (1) [Online] Available: 
http://keionline.org/content/view/41/1   
200 ICTSD-UNCTAD, (2005) at 462. 
Page | 75 
 
 
Article 31 of TRIPS does however contain a number of conditions to be met for a compulsory 
license to be issued. For instance, the license applicant is required to have undertaken negotiations 
or attempted to negotiate terms and conditions with the patent holder for a voluntary licence to be 
concluded on reasonable terms and conditions without success.201 This requirement may be waived 
in the event of a national emergency, a situation of extreme urgency or other instances where the 
license is granted for public non-commercial use. However, the TRIPS Agreement requires that 
the patent holder be informed as soon as practicably possible202 and should be paid “adequate 
remuneration”,203 although the remuneration to be paid may be subject to further legal review.204  
 
The requirement in Article 31 that has had the greatest impact on the ability of countries in eastern 
and southern Africa to issue compulsory licenses is Article 31(f) which requires that compulsory 
licenses be used to predominantly supply the domestic market.205 As discussed in chapter two, this 
has had the consequence of limiting the use of Article 31 to countries with a significant domestic 
pharmaceutical manufacturing base, to the exclusion of countries in the region with the exception 
of South Africa. There have been instances where Article 31(f) has limited the effective use of 
compulsory licenses issued by countries in eastern and southern Africa. A brief summary of the 
instances where countries in the region have either utilised or attempted to use TRIPS flexibilities 
to advance public health objectives and the outcomes of their actions follows below. 
                                                 
201 Article 31(b) which reads:  
“such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from 
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within 
a reasonable period of time.” As no guidance is provided by the TRIPS Agreement to determine what constitutes a 
“reasonable time”, WTO Members retain the discretion to further define this in national legislation or regulations. 
202 The relevant portion of Article 31(b) reads as follows: 
“In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, 
knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right 
holder shall be informed promptly.” 
203 According to Article 31(h), WTO Members retain the discretion to define what constitutes adequate remuneration. 
Several countries have referred either to guidelines developed by UNDP as part of its research into the 2001 Human 
Development Report, or to a tiered royalty method proposed by James Love. Both methods and approaches by patent 
offices from a number of jurisdictions including Canada and Japan can be found in Love J, (2005) ‘Remuneration 
guidelines for non-voluntary use of a patent on medical technologies’, WHO/TCM.1 [Online] Available: 
 http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf   
The Canadian Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), enacted to give effect to the August 30 2003 Decision has a 
similar scale used to determine compulsory licensing royalties based on a country’s ranking on the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI).  
204 Article 31 (i). 
205 Article 31(f). 
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3.2.1 Zimbabwe’s Government Use Order 
 
As an integral member of the African Group at the WTO, Zimbabwe became the first sub-Saharan 
African country to use Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement in a bid to reduce the costs of ART.  
Shortly after the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was concluded in November 2001, 
Zimbabwe amended its Patents Act206 to further incorporate public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities and inserted two key amendments regulating compulsory licensing and government 
use. Section 34 was amended to authorize the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 
to permit in writing, any department of the state or person to: 
 
“Make, use or exercise any invention disclosed in any specification lodged at the Patent Office for 
the service of the State in accordance with this section”. 
 
The broad wording of Section 34 authorized the government to issue a compulsory license without 
requiring negotiations with the patent holder as envisaged by Article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Section 35 enabled the Minister to give a third party or person:  
 
“The powers to make, use, exercise and vend the invention for any purpose which appears to the 
Minister necessary or expedient”. 207 
 
To give effect to Section 35, in May 2002, government authorities in Zimbabwe issued a 
Declaration of Emergency208 valid for six months. It is reported that the declaration of emergency 
                                                 
206 Statutory instrument 128 of 1996. 
207 Section 35 authorizes the non-voluntary used of a patented invention: 
“(a) for the efficient prosecution of any war in which Zimbabwe may be engaged; or 
(b) for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community; or 
(c) for securing a sufficiency of supplies and services essential to the well-being of the community; or 
(d) for promoting the productivity of industry, commerce or agriculture; or 
(e) for fostering and directing exports and reducing imports or imports of any classes, from all or any countries and 
for redressing the balance of trade; or 
(f) generally, for ensuring that the whole resources of the community are available for use, and are used, in a manner 
best calculated to serve the interests of the community; or 
(g) for assisting the relief of suffering and the restoration and distribution of essential supplies and services in any 
part of Zimbabwe or any foreign country that is in grave distress as the result of war”; 
208 The Declaration of Period of Emergency (HIV/AIDS) Government Notice 240 of 2002. 
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was only for six months because of concerns by the Ministry of Health that it could be challenged 
by originator pharmaceutical companies. Once it became clear that this was unlikely to occur, the 
Minister of Justice extended the period of emergency from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 
2008.209 This presented the government with the opportunity, either to import generic versions of 
ARVs under patent in Zimbabwe, or to authorize the local production of generic equivalents. In 
April 2003, the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs wrote a letter to a local 
pharmaceutical manufacturer Varichem authorising it to manufacture ARVs for the supply of the 
local market and to supply 75 percent of its medicines to state run health institutions.210 From its 
initial production of zidovudine and lamivudine in July 2003, Varichem went on to produce a 
number of first line ARVs including stavudine and nevirapine.  Before Varichem had begun 
producing ARVs, it was reported that the cost of ART per patient per year varied between US$ 
360 to US$ 600. By contrast, the combination of stavudine, lamivudine and nevirapine was being 
sold in October 2003 at US$ 12.80 for 60 tablets, which amounted to a month’s supply211 or as 
little as US$153.60 per patient per year.212 Without WHO pre-qualification or approval by the US 
FDA, local manufacturers remain ineligible to participate in treatment programs financed by the 
GFATM and PEPFAR which, as discussed in chapter one, impeded their ability to generate 
sufficient orders required to manufacture medicines cost effectively.  
 
In October 2010, Varichem obtained WHO pre-qualification for the ARVs it was producing, 
becoming only the fourth pharmaceutical company in Africa to have done so.213 In 2012, news 
stories emerged that Varichem had stopped producing ARVs because of it was not receiving any 
orders from health authorities in Zimbabwe.214 According to officials from the company, Varichem 
was not receiving any orders from the public sector as the large majority of medicines procured 
                                                 
209 According to a report from a Zimbabwean newspaper the Herald dated 20 January 2003 as reported by the United 
States Centre for Disease Control (CDC) New Brief of January 23 2003: 
http://www.thebody.com/content/art28934.html  
See also, Musungu and Oh (2005) 
210 Osewe P, Nkrumah Y, and Sackey E, (2008) ‘Improving Access to HIV/AIDS Medicines in Africa: Trade-related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Flexibilities’, World Bank, Washington DC. 
211 Ibid Osewe et al at 31. 
212 Musungu and Oh at 23, note that Varichem agreed to produce a combivir, a combination of zidovudine and 
lamivudine US$15 a month, or US$ 180 per patient per year. 
213 After Aspen Pharmacare and Sandoz in South Africa and Quality Chemicals in Uganda. 
214 See News Article from the Zimbabwe Herald of 7 March 2012 Varichem Stops Producing ARVs [Online] 
Available: http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/201203/msg00056.php  
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for public sector use were donor funded, and that donors did not procure locally manufactured 
medicines. This case serves as a stark reminder of how wholly donor funded treatment programmes 
may contribute to the decline of local pharmaceutical manufacturing industries, contrary to the 
desired outcomes of the policies being adopted at the sub-regional and regional levels to develop 
local pharmaceutical production capacity as discussed further in chapter six below. 
 
3.2.2 Compulsory licenses in Mozambique and Zambia in 2004 
 
If the government use order by Zimbabwean authorities is regarded as a successful example of 
how treatment costs were reduced through the use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities, then 
the compulsory licenses issued by government authorities in Mozambique and Zambia serve as a 
stark reminder of the challenges and complexities countries in the region can face when issuing 
compulsory licenses. Mozambique was the first of the two countries to act, issuing a compulsory 
license215 for the local production of a first line ART combination containing zidovudine, 
lamivudine and nevirapine in April 2004. The license was issued by the Deputy Minister of 
Industry and Commerce216and was the result of a proposal217 by a generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, Pharco Ltd218 to manufacture a cost-effective first line ART regimen. In September 
2004, the Zambian Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs followed suit, issuing a 
compulsory license219 for the same first line combination ART, to be manufactured in Zambia by 
a locally incorporated version of Pharco Ltd.220  
 
                                                 
215 Compulsory License no. 01/MIC/04. See Love J, (2008) ‘Recent examples of the use of compulsory licenses on 
patents’ KEI Research Note 2, [Online] Available: http://keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf . See  
216 An unofficial translated version of the license [Online] Available at:  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/mozambique/moz-cl-en.pdf   
217 This is according to a comment by James Love on 19 May 2004 on the list-serve e-drug. His full comments, which 
also assert that the license was effective from 29 March rather than 5 April are [Online] Available at: 
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200405/msg00031.php   
218 Pharco pharmaceuticals is an Egyptian generic pharmaceutical company established in 1987. Since then, the 
holding company Pharco Corporation has become the largest Egyptian pharmaceutical company with a workforce 
exceeding 5 700 employees with exports to 57 countries.  
219 Compulsory License No. CL 01/2004. 
220 The text of the Zambian compulsory license is [Online] Available at: 
 http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/zambia/zcl.html. The two licenses are almost identically worded with the 
significant difference being the royalty rates of remuneration. For the compulsory license issued by the government 
of Mozambique, royalty was established at 2 percent of turnover, which the Zambian compulsory license set a rate of 
2.5 percent. 
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Despite the issuance of compulsory licenses for the local production of the same medicine in both 
countries, and despite having presented a project proposal of how the ARVs were to be 
manufactured locally, no production of ARVs ever took place by Pharco. Various reasons have 
been advanced for this. It has been asserted by some, that the only way that Pharco Ltd was going 
to be able to offer a competitive price for the product in question, was to achieve an economy of 
scale by obtaining pre-qualification by the WHO, thus making it eligible for to compete for  Global 
Fund financed procurement contracts. Once it became clear that this was unlikely to happen,221 the 
endeavour to produce locally manufactured ARVs in both countries stalled. It later transpired that 
the medicines that were the subject of the compulsory licenses in Mozambique and Zambia were 
not actually patented in Zambia, while their patent status in Mozambique was unclear. 222  
 
As compulsory licenses are issued only where valid patents exist, there was actually no need for a 
compulsory license to have been issued in Zambia at all. In the case of Mozambique, a thorough 
search of the patent status for the three ARVs in question should have taken place to establish 
whether there were indeed valid patents in force, and whether it was necessary to issue a 
compulsory license to authorise generic production of the said medicines, or whether the absence 
of valid patents meant that generic production could have taken place without the issuance of a 
compulsory license. 
 
The compulsory licensing examples from Zambia and Mozambique illustrate some of the capacity 
constraints facing countries in the region in using public health related TRIPS flexibilities.   It was 
not clear that there were valid patents on any of the three ARVs in question in either country and 
whether as a result, there was a need to issue compulsory licenses to facilitate local manufacturing.  
                                                 
221A  report by the Forum for African Investigative Reporters (FAIR) entitled ‘The Indifferent Pharmaceutical  
Industry: Big Pharma, essential medicines and Africa’s sick’ (2008) is [Online] Available: 
http://www.fairreporters.org/portal/pdf/FAIR_proof_4.pdf, alleges that in the case of Zambia, Pharco Ltd was named 
as the local producer of ARVs because it the government was a shareholder in the company and that a conflict of 
interest prevented the government from appearing to promote a company it had a direct interest in, at the expense of 
being able to purchase more affordable ARVs from foreign generic manufacturers.   
222 According to an official from the then titled Patents and Companies Registration Office (PACRO) of Zambia. It 
remains unclear whether the medicines were ever patented in Mozambique although a search of the MPP patent 
database shows that while patents applications were filed and granted by ARIPO for several forms and combinations 
of lamivudine, zidovudine and nevirapine. There is no indication of whether patent authorities in Mozambique chose 
to not recognize these patents as is their prerogative under the Harare Protocol. 
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In most patent offices in eastern and southern Africa, it can be difficult to obtain access to accurate 
and current information on what patent applications have been filed and, if granted, whether they 
are being maintained. While Zambia has a local patent office with modest but increasing capacity 
to examine patent applications, Member States of ARIPO including Mozambique and Zambia 
mostly rely on the ARIPO Secretariat’s patent examiners223 to substantively examine 
pharmaceutical patent applications. While patent examiners employed by ARIPO conduct 
substantive patent examinations on behalf of  Member States, and in some instances, the observer 
countries,224 each Member State has a six month period from the granting of a patent by an ARIPO 
patent examiner to confirm or reject the application of the patent in its territory.  
 
There has been at least one instance where a patent was granted by an ARIPO patent without 
notification reaching a Member State due to difficulties in communication, thus resulting in the 
grant of a patent in an ARIPO Member State without the approval of the national patent office in 
question.225 Aside from the complexities that ARIPO membership may bring with it, the ability to 
check the validity of patents in countries like Mozambique and Zambia can be challenging. 
Obtaining accurate and up to date information in many developing countries is often difficult, due 
to the fact that patent offices in many African countries do not have electronic patent databases, 
which necessitates a manual patent search.226  
 
The absence of accurate and updated information on the patent status of key ARVs has, to some 
degree, been alleviated by availability of patent information through the online patent database 
maintained by the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), which provides periodical information on the 
patent status of key ARVs as verified by national and regional offices. However, this information 
                                                 
223 The Member States of ARIPO are: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
224  In addition to the 19 Member States, there are 12 observer countries which are regarded as potential ARIPO 
members. These are: Angola, Algeria, Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, South 
Africa and Tunisia. 
225 This was disclosed by a participant who prefers to remain unquoted at a meeting organized by UNDP, WHO and 
the University of Cape Town on the examination of pharmaceutical patents from a public health perspective in Cape 
Town in October 2008. 
226 For a lengthier discussion of some of the challenges facing developing country patent offices, see WHO (2004) ‘ 
Determining the patent status of essential medicines in developing countries’ Health Economics and Drugs, EDM 
series No.17. 
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is only periodically updated. Information on the MPP database pertaining to ARIPO was last 
updated in November 2013. The inability to obtain timely, accurate and up to date information on 
the patent status of key ARVs supports the second hypothesis advanced in chapter one regarding 
the capacity constrains facing countries in eastern and southern Africa in utilizing TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
 
Another aspect related to the capacity constraints facing countries in eastern and southern Africa 
is the failure of the relevant authorities to fully incorporate public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
into domestic patent legislation. As discussed by Matthews,227 developing countries in some 
instances may have simply lacked the requisite institutional capacity to effectively incorporate and 
use flexibilities effectively. This challenge would have been compounded by the provision of 
insufficient or inappropriate technical assistance from developed country and multilateral donors 
in some cases.228 
 
3.2.3 An effective compulsory licensing threat in Kenya 
 
With the passing of an Industrial Property Act in 2001229 enacted to comply with its obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement, Kenya incorporated key public health related TRIPS flexibilities into 
its domestic legislation including revised provisions on compulsory licensing. In addition to the 
new Industrial Property Law, the Kenyan government’s National Drug Policy230 remained 
supportive of the domestic pharmaceutical industry, easily the largest in the EAC comprising of 
up to 40 local pharmaceutical manufacturers.231 Between 1995 and 2003, up to six Kenyan generic 
manufacturers had attempted to negotiate voluntary licenses with the originator companies 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim to locally manufacture the first line ARVs 
                                                 
227 Matthews D, (2005) ‘TRIPs Flexibilities and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: The Problem with 
Technical Assistance and Free Trade Agreements’ EIPR Issue 11, 420-427. 
228 Ibid Matthews at 427. 
229  Industrial property Act 3 of 2001. 
230 The Policy which was adopted in 1994, recommends the granting of duty remissions for manufacturers and requires 
that intellectual property rules strike a balance between promoting local manufacturing and protecting consumers from 
excessive prices. [Online] Available: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s16443e/s16443e.pdf  
231 UNIDO (2010) ‘Pharmaceutical Sector Profile: Kenya’ [Online] Available: 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/Kenya_Pharma%20Sector%20profile_TEGLO0501
5_Ebook.pdf  
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zidovudine, lamivudine and nevirapine. However, the terms and conditions offered by both 
companies would have made local manufacturing impracticable.232 Shortly after the 30 August 
2003 Agreement was concluded, the Kenyan generic manufacturer Cosmos Pharmaceuticals 
announced its intention to begin producing generic versions of the first line ARVs for the east 
African market after winning a government tender to do so.233 This development prompted 
additional negotiations between Cosmos and GSK234 resulting in a licensing agreement in 
September 2004 between the two companies for the local production of zidovudine, lamivudine 
and the combination of the two, combivir by Cosmos.235  
 
Two developments hampered the production of the ARVs by Cosmos. First, it had only been able 
to negotiate a voluntary license to supply the five EAC Partner States.236 It was unclear whether 
this was a sufficiently large market at the time for local production to be cost effective. Second, 
after concluding the voluntary license with Cosmos, GSK subsequently reduced its prices for the 
ARVs in the Kenyan market, to make local production by Cosmos economically unviable.  While 
predatory pricing is recognised in many countries as anti-competitive behaviour,237 it went 
unchallenged by Cosmos, possibly because it did not constitute a ground for anti-competitive 
behaviour under applicable legislation in Kenya. While this was an unfortunate result for Cosmos, 
                                                 
232 Osewe et al at 33. 
233According to a BBC news report on 22 September 2004 Kenyan Firm to Make AIDS Drugs [Online] Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3680672.stm     
234 According to reports from the Kenyan Newspaper the Daily Nation dated 22 September 2004, the Ministry of 
Health ordered that generic drugs be produced while the Ministry of Trade and Industry under whose ambit the 2001 
was administered, refused to issue a compulsory licence. An electronic version of the story is available on the listserv 
Essential drugs at: http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200409/msg00027.php  
235  Ibid. It is not clear whether Boehringer Ingelheim was approached by any domestic manufacturers to negotiate a 
voluntary licence. However in 2007, the company declared that it would not seek to enforce any of its patents for 
nevirapine in 70 countries around the world including those classified by the World Bank as Low Income Countries 
(LICs), those classified by the UN as LDCs, and all countries in Africa regardless of their classification as a 
developing country, or Middle Income Country. The policy was extended to a second line ARV tipranavir, for 
which Bayer is also the patent holder. An electronic version of the policy is [Online] Available: 
http://corporateresponsibility.boehringeringelheim.com/content/dam/internet/opu/com_EN/document/01_news/05_
Media_Material/policy_paper_on_hiv_aids.pdf  
236 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. See Shiya (2005) ‘Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory 
Licensing of HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Experience of Kenya’ in ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation - 45 
Case Studies’, Cambridge University Press [Online] Available: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm#fnt41  
237 See for example, Maskus K, and Lahouel M, (2000), Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries. World Economy, 23: 595–611 for a discussion on predatory pricing. See also Abbott F, 
(2014) ‘Anti-Competitive Behaviours and the Remedies Available for Redress’  in UNDP, Using Competition Law 
to Promote Access to Health Technologies: A guidebook for low- and middle-income countries 58-95  
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the consumers appeared to have benefitted from lower ARV prices238 at least in the short term.  
Cosmos has not successfully completed the WHO’s prequalification program thus making it 
eligible to receive Global Fund funding. The company, while producing several types of first line 
ARVs has not become a large regional suppler. From the perspective of increasing treatment 
access, this case is an illustration of how the adoption and potential use of public health related 
TRIPS flexibilities can lead to reduced treatment costs even if it may not always result in increased 
local pharmaceutical production. 
 
3.2.4 The WHO-UNICEF “Paragraph 7” Model Letters 
 
As discussed in chapter two, the Doha Declaration, while re-affirming the rights of WTO Members 
to use key public health related TRIPS flexibilities, did not resolve the multiple challenges facing 
countries who attempted to use them. The ARIPO system of notifying Member States of decisions 
it reached after undertaking substantive patent examinations has created an environment where 
some of its Member States cannot always be certain of the patent status of key ARVs in their 
countries. Second, ARV procurement is a function which at the national level, occurs within the 
ministry of Health. Ministry of Health officials are even less likely to have current information on 
the patent status of ARVs they may be importing. A number of organisations involved in the 
procurement of ARVs became wary of the potential risk involved in importing ARVs whose patent 
status could not be verified. In a bid to mitigate this risk, the IDA Foundation239 which at the time 
was a large procurer of ARVs in Africa, developed a letter summarizing the various scenarios 
facing developing countries and LDCs. The letter240 requires that one of the following documents 
be supplied by importing countries before shipment would take place: 
 
                                                 
238 Avafia T, Berger J, and Hartzenberg T (2006) ‘The ability of select sub-Saharan African countries to utilise TRIPS 
Flexibilities and Competition Law to ensure a sustainable supply of essential medicines: A study of producing and 
importing countries.’ Tralac Working Paper No 12. Stellenbosch. 
239 The IDA Foundation is a not for profit organization established in 1972 by a small group of pharmacists and now 
supplies more than 3 000 different medicines and medical supplies to over 100 countries worldwide.  
240  See “Legal Possibilities to import Generic ARVs and OIs.” [Online] Available:  
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/Legal_importinggenericARVs.pdf. The letter erroneously refers to Zimbabwe as an 
LDC. 
Page | 84 
 
 A written statement from the local authorities (e.g. the Minister of Health) that none of the 
required generic drugs or active pharmaceutical ingredients are under patent in the 
importing country or; 
 A written statement from the local authorities of the importing country that they declare an 
emergency situation and/or authorize a government use license. 
 
The letter from the IDA Foundation was problematic for a number of reasons. First, it placed an 
obligation on the Ministry of Health rather than the government office responsible for the 
administration and management of intellectual property to determine the patent status of key 
medicines, which, as discussed above in chapter two, is a TRIPS-plus measure.  Second, the letter 
narrowed the scope of the Doha Declaration by requiring that a declaration of emergency be issued 
by a local authority, in contravention of Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration which re-affirms 
the freedom of WTO Members to determine the grounds under which they grant compulsory 
licenses. A third problem was the mistaken assumption in the letter that a sufficiently large number 
of patents were being filed, granted and maintained in sub-Saharan African countries to warrant 
the issuing a government use order as a precautionary or defensive measure. The letter from the 
IDA Foundation contradicted existing evidence regarding the number of patents that had been filed 
and granted in sub-Saharan African countries at the time.241 
 
In response to the IDA Foundation letter, a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa wrote letters 
ordering the government use of generic medicines.242 The legal status of these letters as 
compulsory licenses or government use orders remains unclear. There is also little evidence 
indicating that significant cost savings were achieved by importing generic ARVs through IDA as 
                                                 
241 See for instance, a report entitled ‘Patent Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals’ prepared for the 
WIPO Secretariat by the International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI) in 2000, which revealed a negligible level 
of patenting of ARVs in the large majority of sub-Saharan African countries. 
242 As most of these letters are direct correspondences between the relevant ministries of health and the IDA 
Foundation and therefore not available in the public domain, it is unclear how many governments wrote these letters.  
A letter written by the Ministry of Health in Lesotho to the IDA foundation dated 2 August 2004 is available online 
at: https://www.who.int/hiv/amds/IP_rightsBRT.pdf. Identical letters drafted by the Minister of Health Eritrea and the 
Ghanaian Minister of health available online at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/Eritrea.png and at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/Ghana.png   
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opposed to sourcing the medicines from for example, local pharmaceutical producers243 although 
the latter were often not WHO pre-qualified. 
 
3.3 Parallel importation 
 
In order to counterbalance the practice of differential pricing by originator pharmaceutical 
companies,244 the TRIPS Agreement enables WTO Members to parallel import medicines from 
countries where an originator company may have chosen to market the product at a more 
competitive price.  Parallel importation as a concept relies on the principle of exhaustion of rights, 
or the point at which the patent holder’s control over an invention placed on the market ceases. 
This termination of control is critical to the functioning of any market economy because it permits 
the free transfer of goods and services. Without an exhaustion doctrine, the original right holder 
could exercise control over the sale, transfer or use of a good or service for the duration of the 
patent term.245 The TRIPS Agreement affords WTO Members the discretion to elect a system that 
recognises national, regional or international exhaustion of rights.246 If a country recognizes a 
doctrine of “national” exhaustion, a patent holder’s right to control movement of a good or service 
is only extinguished by the first sale or marketing of a good or service within the territory of that 
country. If a country recognizes a doctrine of “regional” exhaustion, a patent holder’s right to 
control movement is extinguished when a good or service is first sold or marketed in any country 
of the region, thus allowing importation from the most affordable regional source. If a country 
recognizes a doctrine of “international exhaustion”, a patent holder’s right to control movement is 
extinguished when a good or service is first sold or marketed anywhere in the world,247 thus 
                                                 
243 Ibid Osewe et al at 44 where a graph indicates that in the case of Ghana, the cost differential between ARVs locally 
manufactured by Ghanaian generic manufacturer Danadams, and those imported by the IDA Foundation was 
negligible for lamivudine. There were however, significant cost savings for nevirapine.     
244 See Moon et al (2011) ‘A win-win solution?: A critical analysis of tiered pricing to improve access to medicines 
in developing countries’ Globalization and Health, 7:39 [Online] Available: 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/39  
245 UNCTAD-ICTSD, (2005) at 93. 
246 See Matthews D, and Munoz-Tellez, V (2007) ‘Parallel Trade: A User’s Guide’ In “Intellectual Property 
Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices” (eds).  Krattiger A, Mahoney R, 
Nelsen L, et al.). MIHR: Oxford, UK for An extensive discussion of the concept of parallel importation and the three 
doctrines of exhaustion. The authors conclude that developing countries should retain as much policy space as 
afforded by the TRIPS Agreement by incorporating the principle of international exhaustion of rights into national 
legislation. 
247 According to Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement:  
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allowing importation from the most affordable global source where the patented product is being 
sold.  
 
3.3.1 The Dispute over Parallel Importation in South Africa  
 
The international impact of the South African government’s decision to pass the Medicines and 
Related Substances Act248  has been discussed above in Chapter two.  The purportedly broad 
phrasing of Section 15 (C) authorized a minister of state to “prescribe conditions for the supply of 
more affordable medicines in certain circumstances” was interpreted by several originator 
pharmaceutical companies as an enabling clause for the Minister of Health to issue compulsory 
licenses and to authorize parallel importation where necessary. Because the South African 
government had, through existing common law, recognized the international exhaustion of rights 
and since there was no indication that the parliament intended to change this rule when it amended 
the Patent Act to implement TRIPS, it is unlikely that Section 15C of the Medicines Amendment 
Act broke new ground, except perhaps to provide regulatory authority to the Health Minister.249 
Initially, the USTR threatened to impose unilateral trade sanctions in retaliation against the South 
African government, a threat which was withdrawn once the full impact of the public relations 
implications of the Court case became clear.250 
 
For reasons noted above in chapter two, The US government elected to not initiate WTO Dispute 
Settlement proceedings and eventually withdrew support for the Court case in South Africa. 
Nonetheless, the US had placed South Africa on its 301 Special Watch List and employed 
persistent diplomatic pressure to urge repeal of the Act.  Because of growing criticism, the US 
                                                 
“For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in 
this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”   
248 Act 90 of 1997. This Act outlines mechanisms for the Medicines Control Council to regulate the quality, safety, 
and efficacy of medicines in the country. The amendments that took place included the an acceptance of the WHO’s 
Essential Drugs List  
249 Ibid UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 111. See also Wilson K, (2009) ‘A Manufactured Solution? The Technology 
Transfer to Developing countries for the Local Production of Affordable Antiretrovirals: Case Studies From Tanzania 
and South Africa’ Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Pharmacy, University of Toronto from 174-179 for a detailed discussion 
of the Medicines and Related Substance Act as well and the Court case [Online] Available:  
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/17841/1/Wilson_Kinsley_R_200906_PhD_Thesis.pdf  
250 Wilson at 176. Several international NGOs including Act Up, MSF, Oxfam, Health Gap as well as political leaders 
like Nelson Mandela heavily criticized the pharmaceutical industry for charging excessive prices for medicines. MSF 
also launched a campaign entitled “drop the case which led to more than 300 000 people signing a global petition.  
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recanted this pressure, and President Clinton adopted an Executive Order preventing the USTR 
from interfering with African countries TRIPS-compliant efforts to ensure access to AIDS 
medicines.251 The South African government maintained during the course of the Court case that 
Section 15(C) was only ever going to be used for parallel importation, and claimed victory once 
the case was dropped. Some question whether the South African government could claim victory 
given its narrow interpretation of the Act and the fact that to date, Section 15(C) has not been used 
to parallel import medicines.252As will be elaborated upon in chapter five, the South African 
Department of Health has negotiated some of the lowest ARV prices in the world and if follows 
from this that the need has not arisen for the government to use Section 15(C). However, as will 
also be discussed in chapter five, the cost of new and emerging health technologies required to 
treat HIV and co-infections such as TB and hepatitis as well as NCDs like cancer may eventually 
require the South African government to make use of Section 15(C) and other flexibilities present 
in patent, medicines and competition legislation.  
 
 3.3.2 Kenya’s interpretation of Parallel Importation 
 
As noted earlier, the passing of an Industrial Property Act in 2001 afforded the Kenyan government 
the opportunity to provide for parallel importation, a flexibility that was not available under its 
previous intellectual property legislation with the result that Kenya had become a segmented 
market controlled by patent holders.253 In addition to Section 58 of the 2001 Industrial Property 
Act254 which provides for the international exhaustion of rights, Clause 37 of Kenya’s Intellectual 
Property Regulations255 elaborates on Section 58 by noting that it applies to: 
                                                 
251 Executive Order 13155. 
252 Hassim A, Heywood M, and Berger J, (2007) “Health and democracy: A guide to human rights, health law and 
policy in post-apartheid South Africa.” Siber Ink, Cape Town. 
253 Nyaga J, (2009) ‘Implementing Parallel Importation and Licensing Mechanisms to Increase Access to Medicines 
in Kenya’, Master’s Thesis, Stanford Law School at 41,[Online] Available: 
 http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/dissertations_theses/diss/JacklineNyaga-tft2009.pdf  
See also Lettington R, and Munyi P, (2004)  ‘The Willingness and Ability to use TRIPS Flexibilities: Kenya Case 
Study’ Access to Medicines Issues Paper, DFID Health Systems and Resource Centre [Online] Available: 
http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/publications/atm/Lettington2.pdf   
254 Section 58(2) notes that:  
“The rights under the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put on the market in Kenya 
or in any other country or imported into Kenya.”  
255 The Minister of Trade, is authorized under Section 119 of the Industrial Property Act, to create regulations as 
necessary to further implement the Act. In 2002, the Minister passed drafted regulations to complement Section 58 of 
the Industrial Property Act. 
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 “…articles that are imported from a country where the articles were legitimately put on the 
market”.  
 
The wording of the regulation subsequently permits the importation of a medicine placed on the 
market by a generic company in the event that no domestic patent protection existed. It has 
therefore been argued that the provision also applies to medicines produced, for example, under a 
compulsory license, as the recipient of the compulsory license would have been authorized by 
government authorities to use the invention. Since Kenya’s change of legislation, the provision 
has been used to import a range of generics that were still under patent protection in the country.256 
Until now, there has not been an incident to prompt the challenging of this interpretation of 
international exhaustion of rights. The High Court of Kenya, in a recent ruling chose not to address 
the issue of parallel importation in a case that was largely concerned with trademark infringement 
although one of the parties had alleged a right to import generic medicines manufactured in India 
on the basis of Section 58 of the Industrial Property Act.257 
3.4 Competition Law as a Public Health Related TRIPS Flexibility 
 
Competition law remains one of the least discussed and used public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities despite the fact that certain flexibilities may enable government officials to circumvent 
some of the administrative requirements found in Article 31 of TRIPS.258 Other relevant provisions 
in the TRIPS Agreement relating to competition include Article 6, the more generally applicable 
Article 8, authorizing countries to take appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of right by patent 
                                                 
256 Ibid Shiya at 41.  
257 In the case of Lords Healthcare Limited v Salama Pharmaceuticals Limited (2008) Kenyan Law Reports, the 
plaintiff, a locally registered importer and distributer of generic pharmaceuticals has successfully won a tender from 
state hospitals to supply an asthma inhaler manufactured in India by generic company Cipla. The plaintiff registered 
a trademark for the product in Kenya and successfully won a few tenders from state hospitals. Upon failing to win a 
tender, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant, a competing distributer, had been selling the same product, under 
the plaintiff’s same trademark. Upon being sued for trademark infringement, the defendant countered that its actions 
were permissible under parallel importation provisions of the Industrial property Act. The Court dismissed the 
application of the plaintiff company without addressing the substance of the defendant’s contention.  
258 Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement waives the restriction under Article 31(b) of TRIPS that pharmaceutical 
products manufactured a compulsory license must be predominantly for domestic use.  Unlike compulsory licenses 
issued under Articles 31 (b) and (f), compulsory licenses granted as a remedy for anti-competitive behaviour require 
no prior negotiations with the patent holder. 
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holders259 and the more specific Article 40 which authorizes WTO Members to regulate the 
restrictive practices that may be employed by patent holders to stifle competition.260 While 
intellectual property provides the patent holder with exclusive rights to control and manage an 
intellectual asset, competition law seeks to avoid market barriers and benefit consumers by 
encouraging competition among a multiplicity of suppliers of goods, services and technologies. 
Dealing with such a relationship may pose challenges for policymakers.261   
 
The issue of treatment access highlights the importance of focusing on complementary linkages 
between competition law and policy one the one hand and intellectual property law on the other.  
The fact that both can be employed to increase access to various commodities, stimulate 
innovation, enhance consumer welfare and prohibit actions that could harm the consumers’ interest 
are increasingly recognized.262 While competition laws in most developing countries are relatively 
new, the number of countries that have passed legislation between the 1990s and 2000 number are 
50 in number with the majority being developing countries.263 The scope and extent to which 
intellectual property issues are addressed by competition legislation remains at the discretion WTO 
Members. A strong indication of the ‘standardizing’ of competition policy and legislation in recent 
years has been the development of the UN Set of Principles on Competition which recognize the 
development dimension of competition law and policy, provide rules for the control of anti-
competitive practices and a framework for international operation and exchange of best 
                                                 
259 Which provides that: 
“Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to 
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.” 
260 Keeling D, (2003). Intellectual Property Rights in the EU Law: Free Movement and Competition Law, 
Volume 1, Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
261 Kovacic W, and Reindl A, (2005) ‘An Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Policy’ Fordham International Law Journal 28:1062-1090. For a more detailed discussion of 
competition related TRIPS flexibilities, see Correa C, (2014) in UNDP, “Using Competition Law to Promote Access 
to Health Technologies: A Guidebook for Low- and Middle-Income Countries”, United Nations Development 
Program, New York.  
262 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued by the US Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, April 6, 1995, §1.0,[Online] Available:  
 www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf   
263 Correa C, (2007) ‘Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploring some Issues of Relevance to Developing 
Countries’ International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 21 at 1. See Flynn S, (2008), 
‘Using Competition Law to Promote Access to Medicines’, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property 
[Online] Available: 
http://www.ggp.up.ac.za/human_rights_access_to_medicines/syllabus/2009/day3/3FlynnUsingCompetitionLawtoPr
omoteAccesstoMedicin.pdf  
Page | 90 
 
practices.264 However, the likelihood of a multilateral competition agreement under the framework 
of the WTO has decreased in recent years after the WTO Singapore Ministerial265 in 1996 resulted 
in the creation of a Working Group in 1997 to further examine the linkages between competition 
policy and trade, because, in part, of reservations266 about the benefits of such an agreement for 
developing countries, and an attempt by WTO Members to narrow the issues subject to negotiation 
to increase the likelihood of completing of the Doha Round. The ‘July Package’ adopted by the 
WTO General Council in August 2004 agreed that competition issues: 
 
“will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work 
towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha 
Round.” 267 
 
The absence of progress in agreeing to a multilateral agreement on competition does not prevent 
individual members from using relevant provisions in the TRIPS Agreement to increase access to 
health technologies. Government authorities in South Africa for instance, have passed a 
competition Act for a range of purposes, including the promotion of “the efficiency, adaptability 
and development of the economy” and the advancement of social and economic welfare.268 
 
3.4.1 Using Competition Law in South Africa to Reduce the Cost of Treatment 
 
The use of competition law by treatment activists in South Africa can be attributed to various 
factors. These include a progressive constitutional framework,269 a competition Act endowed with 
                                                 
264 See UNCTAD (2001), The United Nations Set of Principles on Competition, Geneva [Online] Available: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf  
265 See Paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration at WT/MIN(96)/DEC  
266 According to Hoekman B, and Mavroidis P, (2002) ‘Economic Development, Competition and the WTO’, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2917, Washington DC [Online] Available:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636279  
An agreement along the lines proposed by WTO Members will create compliance costs for developing countries while 
not addressing the anticompetitive behaviour of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. 
267 Paragraph 1(g) the Decision Adopted by the WTO General Council on 2 August 2004 at, WT/L/579. 
268 Sections 2(a) and (c) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998.   
269 In the case of Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 
available at: http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm#cases, The Court held that sections 27(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution require the government to implement a program to combat mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV. 
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several enabling provisions,270 a vibrant and assertive civil society with comparatively strong legal 
resources, who, as discussed in detail by Mathews,271 were able to effectively frame debates about 
intellectual property and competition law under the Bill of rights which included a constitutional 
right to health.272 The factors also include a Competition Commission with the institutional 
capacity to enforce a progressive Act, and the political will of its officials to tackle complaints 
related to health-care in general.273  
 
Motivated by a need to increase the levels of HIV treatment in the early 2000s, activists began to 
use competition law as a tactic to stimulate generic competition in ARVs.274 Acting under section 
49(2) (b) of the Competition Act, which permits ‘any person’ to ’submit a complaint against an 
alleged prohibited practice’, complainants in the case of Hazel Tau and Others v GlaxoSmithKline 
and Boehringer Ingelheim argued that the two companies were acting in violation of competition 
law by charging excessive prices for some of their ARVs to the detriment of patients.275 The 
complainants argued that even when provision was made for R&D costs, higher profits and 
licensing fees, the prices of these patented medicines remained excessive. The complaint was 
                                                 
270 Chapter two of the Competition Act contains a number of provisions that could be used to challenge anticompetitive 
practices in the health sector broadly and in the pharmaceutical sector in particular.  The chapter deals with ‘prohibited 
practices’ in two parts: ‘Restrictive Practice’” in Part A and ‘Abuse of a Dominant Position’ in Part B.  In Part A, the 
Competition Act prohibits certain restrictive horizontal practices, such as price fixing between competitors, as well as 
certain ‘restrictive vertical practices’, such as agreements between a supplier and a customer relating to minimum 
resale prices.  Part B deals with four main categories of prohibited abuse of dominance. 
271 See Matthews (2011) “Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social 
Movements” Edward Elgar, Publishing Ltd, UK which contains a lengthy discussion of civil society groups in 
Brazil, South Africa and India in advocating and litigating for increased access to treatment. 
272 Three civil society groups, the Aids Law Project (ALP), Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and MSF are 
predominantly responsible for efforts to competition law to reduce ARV prices in South Africa. 
273 See, for example, National Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers and Others v Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (Competition Appeal Court, case no: 29/CAC/JUL03, 18 February 2005, dealing with interim relief in a 
matter considering vertical agreements between pharmaceutical manufacturers and exclusive distributors. 
274 See Avafia et al for a more comprehensive discussion of the complaint submitted to the Commission. See also 
Nguyen T, (2010) “Competition Law, Transfer of Technology and the TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing 
Countries” Edward Elgar Limited from 184-188 for a discussion of the Hazel Tau complaint as well as two subsequent 
complaints filed by the TAC against Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2005 and Merck in 2007. 
275 In addition to the TAC, the complaint was lodged by the ALP on behalf of a number of people living with HIV, 
health care workers treating people living with HIV and a number of trade unions. 
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accompanied a strategic public relations campaign which included the publication of materials, 
including the booklet276 numerous press releases, fact sheets and advertisements.277 
 
After a year-long investigation, the Competition Commission had found sufficient evidence of 
excessive pricing and two additional grounds (both linked to the failure of GSK and Boehringer 
Ingelheim to license generic manufacturers) to support the referral of the complaint to the 
Competition Tribunal. By early December 2003, within two months of the Commission's referral 
announcement, both companies had entered into separate settlement agreements with the 
complainants and the Commission with the result that more competitors were able to enter the 
market, pay lower royalties to the patent holders and sell their products throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa.278  
 
A little more than a year after the settlement agreements had been concluded, the ALP wrote a 
letter of demand On 15 February 2005 to the originator pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (BMS) in which it threatened to bring an excessive pricing complaint against BMS for 
excessive pricing of amphotericin B, a medicine used to treat cryptococcal meningitis, a common 
cause of death among people living with HIV in Africa.  While the medicine in question was no 
longer under patent, BMS still had a de facto monopoly for its product in South Africa for which 
it charged high prices in comparison to other countries including some developed country 
markets.279 Mindful of the finding of the Competition Commission complaint in the matter of 
Hazel Tau, the ALP demanded that BMS reduce its prices to match those being charged in 
                                                 
276 See Beresford B, (2003), ‘The Price of Life: Hazel Tau and Others v GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim’ 
[Online] Available:  
http://www.alp.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=222 at 41. 
277 See the TAC advertisement captioned ‘Support Legal Action against GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim!’ 
that appeared in a daily South African newspaper. The advertisement is available online at: 
http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/Pamphlets/TACBUSDAYAD.jpeg.   
278 The terms and conditions agreed to in the settlement agreements are available at: 
http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns10_12_2003.htm. See also Wilson Kinsley R, (2009). At the time that the 
complaint was lodged, both companies had negotiated voluntary licences with the South African generic 
pharmaceutical company Aspen Pharmacare albeit with conditions which restricted competition. The license 
concluded between GSK and Aspen for example, restricted the latter to the public sector market and required percent 
royalty fees to be paid to GSK.  The settlement agreement extended sales to the private sector, authorised Aspen to 
supply all sub-Saharan African countries and capped the royalty rate at no more than percent.  By the end of June 
2007, four generic companies were selling generic zidovudine in South Africa, given the expiry of GSK’s patent in 
2006. 
279 According to the letter of demand, generic amphotericin was being sold in Brazil for a fraction of the South African 
price.  The same product was also available in the UK at less than 30 percent of the public sector price in South Africa. 
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developing countries similar to South Africa such as Brazil. A little more than two months later, 
the prices of amphotericin B had dropped by 80 percent in the public sector and 85 percent in the 
private sector.280   
 
The South African Competition Act was used a third time by treatment activists in November 2007 
to reduce the cost of efavirenz, a first-line ARV patented in South Africa by Merck Sharp and 
Dhome (MSD), the local subsidiary of the multinational pharmaceutical company Merck. MSD 
had concluded a voluntary license in 2004 with the South African generic manufacturer 
Thembalami Pharmaceuticals281 to bring stand-alone efavirenz products to the market and granted 
a second license to the South African generic company Aspen Pharmacare in 2005 on similar terms 
and conditions after Thembalami ceased operating.282  While a third license was negotiated with 
the local generic company Adcock Ingram in August 2007, The ALP acting on behalf of the TAC 
asserted that MSD had refused to grant more voluntary licenses, noting that robust competition for 
efavirenz,283 which accounted for up to a third of the national HIV treatment tender costs as late 
as 2008284 remained unlikely. As with the other complaints, the matter was settled between the 
parties with MSD agreeing to conclude voluntary licenses with four generic companies to supply 
efavirenz on a royalty free basis within South Africa, and to 10 other countries in the region.285  
 
                                                 
280  Ibid Avafia et al. See also, Kudlinski A, ‘Harmonizing policies for health care, the pharmaceutical industry and 
intellectual property: the South African experience’ in Abbott F, Correa C, and Drahos P, (2013) “Emerging 
Markets and the Patent World Order”, Edward Elgar Publishing (ltd) at 280. While Kudlinski argues at 279 that the 
cases brought by treatment activists against BMS, GSK and Boehringer Ingelheim were disputable for various 
reasons including the absence of compulsory licensing remedies in the competition Act and possible difficulties that 
may have been faced in establishing marketing dominance by the originator companies in question, he concedes that 
the eventual outcome was a resulting price reduction of both patented and off-patent medicines used to treat HIV.  
281 Thembalami pharmaceuticals was a joint venture between the South African generic company Adcock Ingram 
and the Indian company Ranbaxy. The joint venture collapsed before Thembalami sold any generic efavirenz on the 
South African market. 
282 An information note issued by the TAC observed that at the time of the complaint in late 2007, Aspen products 
had not received marketing approval from the South African Medicines Control Council (MCC). 
283 The Statement of complaint is [Online] Available at: 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/complaint.pdf. The TAC information note is [Online] available at: 
http://www.tac.org.za/community/node/2127  
284 Ibid Kudlinski at 278. 
285 Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
Details of the settlement agreement can be found in an information note developed by the TAC dated 1 June 2008 
[Online] Available at: http://www.tac.org.za/community/node/2329  
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The implications of the complaint against MSD on efavirenz prices are less clear. Kudlinski286 has 
argued that efavirenz still accounted for a large portion of the 2008 national ARV tender while the 
TAC has noted that the cost differential between the lowest international price Merck sold a year’s 
supply of efavirenz for was approximately US$ 237 per patient per year while the lowest generic 
price at the time was US$ 150 per patient per year.  
 
In 2012, a complaint was received by the Competition Commission by MSF concerning an alleged 
incident of anti-competitive behaviour in the form of an agreement concluded between two generic 
manufacturers Mylan (Inc.) to Aspen Pharmacare, for the sale and supply of APIs in the country. 
MSF alleged in its complaint that the agreement, valid until 2016, essentially made Aspen the 
exclusive supplier of FDCs in the country, and prevented Mylan from selling the APIs in the South 
African market, and from supplying any other pharmaceutical manufacturers in the country with 
the same API.287 In September 2014, the Competition Commission concluded that the agreement 
did not constitute a violation of the Competition Act. It also found that the agreement between 
Aspen and Mylan did not prevent Aspen’s competitors from sourcing similar products elsewhere, 
nor did it constitute market allocation, a specific ground under the Act of anti-competitive 
conduct.288  
 
 
 
 
3.5  The August 30 2003 Agreement 
 
As discussed above in chapter two, the August 30 2003 Agreement, concluded after two years of 
divisive negotiations at the WTO TRIPS Council is a temporary waiver to resolve the problem that 
WTO Members with insufficient domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity faced because 
                                                 
286 Ibid at 278. 
287 See document DAF/COMP/WD (2014)68  from the South African government to the Competition Committee of 
the Department for Financial and Enterprise Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) dated 19 May 2014 for more information on the complaint.  
288 See ‘Commission non-refers complaint by Doctors Without Borders’ in an October Newsletter  [Online] 
Available: 
http://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/export/sites/cdh/en/news/publications/2014/competition/downloads/Competiti
on-Alert-1-October-2014.pdf   
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of the limitations of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. As previously noted, the Agreement 
includes a number of administratively onerous requirements for importing and exporting countries 
to meet before the exportation of medicines manufactured under compulsory license 
predominantly for export can take place. The fact that it took several years since the Agreement 
was concluded for a country to attempt to use the mechanism at a time when ART prices were still 
relatively expensive justifies the criticism levelled by civil society organizations and others, 289 
about the practicability of the Decision. It is also noteworthy that more than a decade after the 
Agreement was concluded, it remains a temporary waiver because it has not been ratified by two-
thirds of WTO Members.  
 
3.5.1 Rwanda and Canada’s use of the August 30 2003 Agreement 
 
The process behind Rwanda’s use of the 30 August 2003 Agreement dates back to the amendment 
of Patent Act in Canada in 2004.290  With the passing of enabling legislation in Canada, MSF, 
which had an HIV treatment centre in Rwanda, persuaded Apotex, Canada’s largest generic 
manufacturing company to produce Apo-Triavir®, then a new FDC of zidovudine, lamivudine and 
nevirapine.291 Interested in determining the practicability of the Mechanism, MSF indicated that it 
would attempt to use the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) to place an order for the 
Apotex product for use in one or more of its AIDS treatment projects in the field.292 Apotex 
produced Apo-Triavir® which was duly granted marketing approval by Health Canada and 
approved by the WHO’s pre-qualification program in 2006. Even though it had encouraged the 
                                                 
289 See for instance an MSF Press Release on 11 September 2003  at the WTO Cancun Ministerial [Online] Available: 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msf09112003.html  
According to a News story by the Wall Street Journal of 2 September 2003 entitled ‘WTO Drug Pact Lifts Trade Talks 
– Landmark Deal Provides Medicines to Poor Nations’, Even the then EC Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy offered 
little more than a  cautious endorsement at the time noting: 
“We all have to be very modest. We have solved about 10 percent of the problem of access to medicines by developing 
countries.  
290 An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act (Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa), S.C. 2004, c. 23, 
[Online] Available: www.canlii.org/ca/as/2004/c23/. Regulations to give effect to the 2004 Act were passed in 2005. 
See Use of Patented Products for International Humanitarian Purposes Regulations, S.O.R. 2005/243; Food and 
Drugs Regulations (1402 — Drugs for Developing Countries), S.O.R 2005/141; Medical Devices Regulations 
(Developing Countries), S.O.R. 2005/142, all in the Canada Gazette (Part II), Vol. 139 (No. 11), June 1, 2005, all 
available via http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2005/20050601/html/index-e.html. 
291 Elliott R, (2008) ‘Delivery past due: global precedent set under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime’ HIV/AIDS 
Policy & Law Review Vol. 13(1) at 2 [Online] Available: 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=1345  
292 Ibid Elliott at 2. 
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development of a product, MSF initially struggled to persuade eligible importing WTO Members 
to use the Mechanism, which prompted increase criticism over its effectiveness. 
 
After interventions by the Clinton Foundation’s HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI),293 the government 
of Rwanda 294 became the first country to notify the WTO Secretariat295 of its intention to use the 
Mechanism created by the August 30 Agreement296 noting that: 
 
 “Based on Rwanda's present evaluation of its public health needs, we expect to import during the 
next two years 260,000 packs of Triavir.” 
 
The notification concluded that because Rwanda is classified as an LDC, the government would 
not enforce any patent rights that may have been granted within Rwanda’s territory regarding   the 
product. This notification prompted Apotex into attempting to reach a voluntary licensing 
agreement on reasonable terms and conditions with the Canadian patent holders of zidovudine, 
lamivudine and nevirapine, namely: GSK, the Wellcome Foundation, Shire Biochemical, and 
Boehringer Ingelheim. The negotiations for a voluntary license were protracted, with Apotex 
alleging that the patent holders were intentionally stalling the negotiations, a claim the patent 
holders denied.297 After weeks of negotiations with no agreement between Apotex and the patent 
holders, Apotex applied for a compulsory license298 which was granted on 19 September 2007. 
The license authorised Apotex to produce and export the quantity notified by Rwanda which 
amounted to 15.6 million tablets over a maximum period of two years.299 In October 2007, the 
                                                 
293 Ibid Elliott. See also Webber A, and Mills L, (2010) ‘A One Time Only Combination: Emergency Medicine Exports 
Under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, Health and Human Rights Journal, Volume 12, 1 [Online] Available: 
http://www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/209/303   
294 More specifically, the Centre for treatment and Research on Aids (TRAC). 
295 On 17 July 2007. 
296 Government of Rwanda, “Notification under Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of August 30 2003 on the 
implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, Document 
IP/N/9/RWA/1, 19 July 2007. 
297 Tsai G, (2009) ‘Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory Licensing Schemes’ Virginia 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 49:4 at 1064. 
298 See Apotex,  “Application pursuant to Section 21.04 of the Patent Act,” 4 September 2007 [Online] Available:  
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/jcpa/p4-e.html.  
299 Commissioner of Patents (Canadian Intellectual Property Office), “Authorization Under Section 21.04 of the Patent 
Act,” 19 September 2007. Available at: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/jcpa/p4-e.html  
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Canadian WTO representative notified the WTO Secretariat that the compulsory license had been 
issued.300  
 
The export process was then delayed by the Rwandan government issuing a government tender for 
the purchase of Apo Triavir® (a measure required by Rwandan law for government procurement 
orders). The tender was opened in October 2007, inviting interested parties to submit bids for the 
supply of the ARVs. The tender closed at the end of November. Apotex then had to out-compete 
other generics manufacturers vying for the contract.301 In order to do so, it submitted a bid to the 
Rwandan government quoting a price of US$0.195 per tablet which amounted to US$146 per 
patient per year, lower than the then lowest publicly reported generic price of US$176 per patient 
per year.302 A further five months elapsed before, on 7 May 2008, Apotex announced that it had 
won the government tender and that the Rwandan government had taken a decision to purchase its 
product.303 The first shipment to Rwanda was made in late September 2008, with a second 
shipment following a year later on 18 September 2009.304 While this importation by the 
Government of Rwanda to some degree, constitutes a success, many questions remain unanswered 
about the effectiveness of the mechanism in general, and the CAMR in particular. According to 
Tsai: 
 
“CAMR is a paradigm example of legislation that gives developed countries—precisely those with 
the means of production—a tool to alleviate the global health crises plaguing much of the least 
developed world. By learning from the mistakes of CAMR, other developed nations may pass 
legislation that utilizes the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in a more 
effective manner.”305 
                                                 
300 Government of Canada, “Notification under paragraph 2(C) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the 
implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” WTO Doc. 
IP/N/10/CAN/1, 5 October 2007. 
301 Ibid Tsai at 1078. 
302 See MSF, (2007) ‘Untangling the Web of Price Reductions (10th ed.) [Online] Available: 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/main/hiv-aids/price-guide-to-aids-drugs . 
303According to a press release by the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network entitled “Canada finally poised to deliver 
on promise of affordable medicines to developing countries?” 7 May 2008 [Online] Available: 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/media  
304 See Press Release by Apotex Inc. “Second Shipment of Life saving aids Drug Leaving for Africa” 18 September 
2009 [Online] Available: 
http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090918.asp  
305 Ibid at 1096. 
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According to Elliott,  
 
“Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime must be fixed so that it can be used in future to export 
lower-cost, generic drugs to countries dealing with the AIDS pandemic and other public health 
problems…. Unnecessary red tape has been suffocating this law since it was passed in 2004.”306 
 
The government of Rwanda has never offered a public assessment of its experience in using the 
mechanism including the five month delay caused by the government procurement process despite 
subsequent discussions at the WTO Council for TRIPS on the workability of the Agreement. The 
absence of information has made it difficult to determine whether capacity constraints at the 
national level or the administrative requirements of the Agreement were the primary impediment 
in the use of the Mechanism which remains unused since. 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
As examined above, there have been several attempts by countries in eastern and southern Africa 
to use public health related TRIPS flexibilities to decrease treatment costs, some more successful 
than others. Table 1 below documents instances where public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
were used to reduce prices of essential medicines: 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The Use of Public Health Related TRIPS Flexibilities in Eastern and Southern  
   Africa 
 
      
                                                 
306 According to a press release by the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network Groups Rally on Parliament Hill for 
Access to Life Saving Medicines dated 29 September 2010 [Online] Available: 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadDocumentFile.php?ref=1094  
For a comprehensive list of statements, research and submissions led by the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network to 
reform the CAMR, refer to: http://www.aidslaw.ca/EN/camr/index.htm  
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TRIPS 
Flexibility 
Country, 
Year 
Antiretroviral Patent Holder Royalty  Price 
Impact 
Government use 
 
Zimbabwe 
2003 
zidovudine, 
lamivudine and 
combivir 
GSK unclear Yes 
Government use Mozambique 
2004 
zidovudine, 
lamivudine and 
nevirapine 
GSK, Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
2% net sales No 
 
Government use 
 
Zambia 
2004 
zidovudine, 
lamivudine and 
nevirapine 
GSK, Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
2.5% net sales No  
Competition law 
 
South Africa 
2002 
zidovudine, 
lamivudine and 
nevirapine 
GSK, Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
Up to 5%  Yes  
Competition law 
 
South Africa 
2005 
amphotericin B BMS n/a Yes 
August 30 2003 
Mechanism 
Rwanda 
2007 
zidovudine, 
lamivudine and 
nevirapine 
GSK, Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
 
0.5% 
 
Yes 
 
The table does not include instances discussed above in this chapter where the threat to use TRIPS 
flexibilities either by government officials may have resulted in reduced prices as occurred in 
Kenya in 2004. Even with this consideration, the table does not contain many instances where 
government authorities successfully used public health related TRIPS flexibilities to increase 
treatment access. Public health related TRIPS flexibilities will become more important as 
multilateral funding declines and treatment programmes require the greater use of more expensive 
new-generation ARVs. 
 
An obvious conclusion from Table 1 must be that the majority of attempts to reduce treatment 
costs in the region have centred around three ARVs: zidovudine, lamivudine and nevirapine. This 
is explained by the fact that at the time, these three ARVs constituted the most regularly used 
medicines in the region and formed the core of the recommended regimen in the WHO 2003 
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treatment guidelines.307 For reasons of increased adherence, the 2013 WHO treatment guidelines 
recommend the use of a single tablet ARV regimen comprising of tenofovir and lamivudine and 
one of either emtricitabine or efavirenz.  While most sub-Saharan African countries pay among 
the lowest prices for ARVs in the world over time, more patients will require second, and 
eventually, third line treatment, both of which are distinctly more expensive than first line 
treatment.  
 
The first hypothesis advanced in chapter was that the incorporation and use of public health related 
TRIPS flexibilities has not been needed to treat patients in eastern and southern African countries 
because most patients on ART in the region predominantly are still on first-line ART regimens, 
which are both affordable, and presently funded by bilateral and multilateral donor institutions 
such as the GFATM and PEPFAR. However, public health related TRIPS flexibilities will become 
more important as multilateral funding declines and treatment programmes require the greater use 
of more expensive new-generation ARVs increasingly being patented in countries with significant 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. This hypothesis is supported by the cost of treatment of 
newer generation ARVs used in second and third line treatment.  
 
The second line treatment recommended by WHO is a combination of zidovudine, lamivudine and 
lopinavir with ritonavir or atazanavir and ritonavir. At the end of 2012, the median price for this 
recommended regimen was US$ 451 per patient per year in lower-middle-income countries and 
US$ 442 in upper-middle-income countries, but with significant price variations depending on the 
country.308 There are a growing number of instances where second line treatment has failed in 
patients on ART, thus necessitating third line treatment which is drastically more expensive, with 
combinations containing raltegravir, etravirine or boosted darunavir costing more than US$2 000 
                                                 
307 Other first line ARVs included stavudine, which was eventually removed from the WHO list of recommended 
ARVs because of its high levels of toxicity, and efavirenz, which was under patent in most countries, and remained 
as a consequence comparatively expensive. The 2003 WHO Treatment Guidelines are [Online]  available at:  
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/en/arvrevision2003en.pdf?ua=1  
308 See WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS (2013) Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Results, Impacts and Opportunities, 
Geneva at 99 [Online] Available: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2013/20130630_treatment_repo
rt_en.pdf 
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per patient per year in select low income countries,  approximately 18 times the lowest price for 
first-line regimens.309   
 
The first hypothesis is further supported by the degree of multilateral funding countries with high 
burdens of AIDS have received over the past year. Around the time the first government use order 
in the region was being issued, Zimbabwe had just started receiving its first AIDS grant from the 
GFATM. In a little more than a decade, US$ 450 million in AIDS funding has been disbursed to 
Zimbabwe from the GFATM. Zimbabwe now has one of the world’s largest national ART 
programmes with an estimated 670 000 people on ART. The two countries who next attempted to 
issue government use orders in 2004 were Mozambique which is home to approximately 500 000 
people on ART and Zambia which has approximately 530 000 patients on ART. Since 2003, 
Mozambique has received almost US$ 450 million and Zambia US$ 675 million in AIDS funding 
from the GFATM.    
 
The role of the GFATM, and PEPFAR in reducing ART costs, and by consequence, removing the 
need for countries in the region to self-finance their AIDS responses by, inter alia, the greater use 
of public health related TRIPS flexibilities should not be under-estimated. Once countries in the 
region began consistently accessing multilateral funding to sustain treatment programmes, the 
need to use TRIPS flexibilities evaporated, at least in the short term. This assertion is supported 
by the fact that since Rwanda’s use of the 30 August 2003 Decision in 2008, no other country in 
eastern and southern Africa has attempted to use public health related TRIPS flexibilities to 
increase treatment access.  
 
An inadvertent consequence of the multilateral funding institutions playing such a key role in 
shaping the ARV market in the region must be the its negative impact on local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in the region despite efforts by regional and local authorities to promote local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing as discussed below in chapter six. The issuing of compulsory 
licenses and government orders did not have the desired consequence of stimulating local 
pharmaceutical production in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia and Mozambique. If anything, the 
inability of a local pharmaceutical company like Varichem which successfully managed to 
                                                 
309 Ibid WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS. 
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navigate the WHO pre-qualification process in order to compete with Indian generic manufacturers 
on price, coupled with the failure of governments to support local producers through domestic 
financing have resulted in a number of pharmaceutical manufacturers in the region being excluded 
from supplying the market. 
 
The second hypothesis advanced in chapter one is that there are capacity constraints within the 
relevant government departments in eastern and southern Africa which hinder the full integration 
of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the relevant national legislation and the use of these 
flexibilities when needed. This hypothesis is affirmed by the clear challenges faced by the 
government authorities in Zambia and Mozambique in attempting to employ non-voluntary 
licenses to introduce locally produced ARVs into their markets. First, there is unreliable patent 
information at the national level which makes it difficult to establish which patents are valid. This 
situation is exacerbated by a lack of coherence between regional parent examiners at ARIPO and 
national patent offices. Further incoherence between countries in the region and ARIPO through 
the substantive examination of patents will be discussed in the next three chapters. 
 
Another conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that competition law depending on the national 
context can be an important remedy in reducing treatment costs. First, it enables non-government 
actors to act in a way that patent legislation cannot, given the functions and responsibilities 
specifically conferred on government officials in the latter. The relative ease in the use of 
competition law in south Africa stands in contrast to Rwanda’s use of the August 30 2003 
Mechanism.  Although a substantial portion of the delay in using the August 30 2003 Mechanism 
in Rwanda was as a result of an internal government procurement process, the fact that the 
Mechanism depends on the regulations of an exporting country, as was the case with CAMR 
should be a cause for concern for other eastern and southern African governments, particularly as 
the provisions in India’s Patents Amendments Act giving effect to the mechanism remain untested. 
 
Because Rwandan government officials have not offered an assessment of whether the challenges 
faced in using the August 30 2003 Mechanism were caused by capacity constraints at the national 
level, an assessment in this regard is not possible. The larger question, as raised in chapter two, 
remains whether the August 30 2003 Decision in its current form is an appropriate solution for 
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countries without sufficient manufacturing capacity or whether the African Group and other 
countries with insufficient local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity should prioritise efforts 
to re-open the negotiations to find an alternative to the problem posed by Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
The country studies which will form the next two chapters will explore in more detail whether the 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities have been fully incorporated within the legislations of 
Tanzania, and South Africa and will further test the three hypotheses advanced in chapter one.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Industrial Property and Related Legislation Relevant to Treatment Access in the 
United Republic of Tanzania  
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I am sometimes a fox and sometimes a lion. The whole secret of government lies in knowing when 
to be the one or the other. 
 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
4.1 Tanzania:  A Unification of Two Territories  
 
The United Republic of Tanzania as the name suggests, is a union of two territories with distinct 
histories. Mainland Tanzania came under German rule in the late nineteenth century with the 
occupation of modern day mainland Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda, which were merged into 
German East Africa. After World War I, German East Africa was placed under the trusteeship of 
the UK with the exception of a relatively small territory ceded to Belgium, now modern day 
Burundi and Rwanda. Tanganyika became independent in 1961 following a relatively peaceful 
transition to independence. 
 
Zanzibar by comparison has had a more turbulent modern history. After centuries of occupation 
by Persian, Arab and Portuguese rulers, Zanzibar came under the ownership of the Sultan of Oman 
in 1898 and was primarily known as a transit hub for the slave trade and for the production of 
cloves. Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890310 and was ruled by a succession of 
governors until its independence in December 1963 when it became a constitutional monarchy 
under the leadership of the Sultan of Zanzibar.  A mere few weeks after independence, a bloody 
revolution occurred resulting in the deaths of several thousand citizens of Indian and Arab origin. 
On 26 April 1964, the newly installed Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and Pemba311 united 
with Tanganyika312 to become known as the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, a name 
that was later shortened to the United Republic of Tanzania.313 Reasons offered for the unification 
                                                 
310 With the conclusion of the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890. 
311 Pemba being a small Island to the north-east of Zanzibar. 
312 Tanganyika had become independent on 9 December 1961 from UN Trusteeship administered by the UK. 
313  See the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act 22 of 1964. The revision of the name took place on 29 October 
1964.  
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have ranged from the geographical proximity and close ties between the two countries, to shared 
political ideologies and the prevailing spirit of Pan-Africanism at the time.314  
 
As part of the unification agreement with Tanganyika, the former Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar retained a significant degree of autonomy and is directly responsible for affairs not listed 
in the articles of Union315 including the Zanzibar Registry of Trade Marks and Patents316 and the 
Zanzibar Food and Drugs Board. Mainland Tanzania on the other hand relies on the Business 
Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA) situated within the ministry of Trade and Industry 
to regulate industrial property issues while the competent drug regulatory authority is the Tanzania 
Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA). Given the presence of more than one regulatory authority 
overseeing the administration of health technologies and intellectual property, this chapter will 
examine the legislative frameworks of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar separately. For the 
purposes of this chapter, where the term ‘Tanzania’ is used, it refers the combination of mainland 
Tanzania and Zanzibar. 
 
This chapter tests the first hypothesis advanced in chapter one, namely that the incorporation and 
use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities has not been needed to treat patients, but will 
become more important as multilateral funding declines and treatment programmes require the 
greater use of more expensive new-generation ARVs, by following the process of intellectual 
property related law reform in both Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar and assessing the outcomes 
and examining the extent to which the flexibilities are reflected in national legislation. In testing 
the second hypothesis advanced in chapter one, namely that capacity constraints within the 
relevant government departments in eastern and southern Africa which hinder the full integration 
of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the relevant national legislation and the use of these 
flexibilities when needed, this chapter examines the national institutions whose mandates relate to 
                                                 
314 See Musa A, (2005) ‘The Union Between Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Legality of Matters Outside the Articles of 
Union’ [Online] Available at: http://www.zanzinet.org/files/legality_union.pdf    
315 Matters initially governed by the Union include Constitutional issues, external affairs, defense, police, emergency 
powers, citizenship, immigration, external trade and borrowing, the public service, income tax, corporation tax, 
customs and excise duties and harbors, civil aviation, posts and telegraph.  
316 The Registry of Trademarks and Patents is housed within the Ministry of Justice and  
Constitutional Affairs. 
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the implementation of public health related TRIPS flexibilities and assesses some of the capacity 
constraints they face.  
 
Finally, the chapter examines the existing legislative and regulatory framework in assessing 
whether the third hypothesis advanced in chapter one, namely that a significant degree of policy 
incoherence in the form of national level legislation exists, which, if not addressed by law reform 
and increased co-ordination, could undermine the incorporation and use of TRIPS flexibilities at 
the national level. The chapter also explores the incoherence which exists between national 
intellectual property related objectives aimed to facilitate access to treatment and regional 
intellectual property policies and practices, particularly ARIPO and draws conclusions on how 
some of this misalignment could be addressed. 
 
4.2 The Public health Situation in Tanzania and Access to Essential Medicines 
 
Tanzania was estimated to have a population of approximately 45 million people as of mid-2012, 
317with an estimated 1.5 million people living with HIV at the end of 2012 and an estimated adult 
HIV prevalence of 5.1 percent.318 While the level of HIV infection has decreased from levels of a 
few years ago, approximately 80 000 people lost their lives in 2012 alone.319 The Ministry of 
Health and Social Services with extensive assistance from the international community320 has 
established care and treatment services across the country. While an estimated 1.3 million people 
living with HIV in Tanzania were in need of ART according to the WHO 2013 treatment 
guidelines,  only a reported 399 000 people were receiving ART as of the end of 2012.321 
Tanzania’s AIDS response, including treatment and prevention programmes are almost 
exclusively dependent on multilateral funding, primarily from the GFATM and PEPFAR which 
together, accounted for approximately 95 percent of the foreign funding of the HIV response in 
                                                 
317 According to the National Bureau of Statistics in its 2012 report “Tanzania in Figures” [Online] Available: 
http://www.nbs.go.tz/nbs/takwimu/references/Tanzania_in_figures2012.pdf    
318 See UNAIDS Tanzania country website [Online] Available: 
 http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/unitedrepublicoftanzania/  
319 Ibid UNAIDS. 
320 See USAID Tanzania HIV/AIDS Health Profile of 2010 [Online] Available:  
 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/Countries/africa/tanzania.pdf  
321 See UNAIDS (2013). The Global Fund which contains more timely updates of estimated HIV prevalence levels 
notes that approximately 440 000 people are on ART in Tanzania as of June 2014. 
Page | 107 
 
Tanzania in 2010.322 Since its inception in 2002, the GFATM is reported to have spent in excess 
of US$ 582 million on HIV prevention and treatment programmes in Tanzania,323 while PEPFAR 
has spent US$ 1.9 billion on AIDS programming in Tanzania between 2004 and 2011.324  ARVs 
appear to be affordable, with the median cost per patient per year less than US$ 100 per patient 
per year for first line ART, which at this stage, constitutes the vast majority of patients in Tanzania. 
Recent studies appear to suggest that the number of patients on second and third line ART in 
Tanzania is less than five percent of patients on treatment.325 
 
As with most countries, HIV and TB co-infection is on the increase in Tanzania, where 
approximately 80 000 people are living with TB in 2010, of which 37 percent tested HIV 
positive.326 As noted above in chapter one, Tanzania is an LDC with a comparatively low industrial 
base and nascent local pharmaceutical industry. It is a net importer of health technologies, a 
situation unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The country is a member of both the EAC 
and SADC, each with different regional initiatives on intra-regional co-operation treatment access. 
 
4.2.1 A Profile of the Pharmaceutical Industry of Tanzania 
 
As noted above in chapter one, the vast majority of ARVs in use in eastern and Southern Africa 
are produced by Indian generic manufacturers. The question of capacity development for the 
promotion of local manufacturing is one that has resulted in different approaches over time.  In the 
1970s and 1980s, local pharmaceutical production in sub-Saharan Africa was encouraged by 
governments and international organisations because it was seen as an important yardstick to 
determine economic self-sufficiency, to reduce imports and loss of foreign exchange, to create 
employment and to gain national prestige. However, from the late 1980s, as unfavourable studies 
                                                 
322 Ibid USAID 2010.   
323 According to information obtained from the GFATM website on 19 June 2014 [Online] Available: 
http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/en/Country/Index/TZA  
324 According to the PEPFAR Tanzania country profile [Online] Available: 
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/199593.pdf  
325  See Ramadhani H, et al (2014) ‘Association of First-line Antiretroviral Therapy Adherence with Adherence to 
Second-line Antiretroviral Therapy Among HIV-infected Patients in Tanzania’ Open Forum Infectious Diseases 
Advance Access, Oxford University Press. 
326 See WHO (2011) Tuberculosis Profile of the United Republic of Tanzania [Online] Available: 
https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=Replet&name=%2FWHO_HQ_Reports%2FG2%2FPROD%2FEXT%2FT
BCountryProfile&ISO2=TZ&outtype=html  
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on the feasibility and potential for local production in developing countries emerged, optimism on 
the part of donors and international organisations cooled significantly.327 The recent increase in 
regional initiatives promoting local pharmaceutical production as will be discussed below in 
Chapter six are an indication that the pendulum has swung again in favour of local pharmaceutical 
production.  The World Bank has categorized pharmaceutical companies in LMICs as follows:328 
 
(i) Subsidiaries of multinational originator companies operating in the region; 
(ii) Large generic companies, predominantly based in India with an extensive portfolio of 
products that comply with international standards including the WHO Good 
Manufacturing Practice (GMP) operating in the region through local subsidiaries;329 
(iii) Locally registered generic companies aiming to supply the domestic market with some 
exports, usually to neighbouring countries with some compliance with WHO GMP 
standards; and 
(iv) Small scale local manufacturers who have modest operations supplying local and 
occasionally, regional markets with the majority of their medicines not meeting GMP 
standards.  
 
A 2010 study found that Tanzania imported about 70 percent of its national drug requirements 
while local production accounted for about 30 percent, 330 a number that had reportedly declined 
to approximately 20 percent of market share in 2013.331 As of 2008, out of the 3388 drugs 
registered for sale by the Tanzania Food and Drugs Administration (TFDA), 269 products were 
                                                 
327 See Losse K, Schneider E, Spennemann C, (2007) ‘The Viability of Local Pharmaceutical Production in Tanzania.’  
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn [Online] Available: 
http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-local-pharmaceutical-production-tanzania-2007.pdf  
328 See Seiter A, (2005) A ‘Pharmaceuticals: Local Manufacturing’ HNP Brief No 3, World Bank  [Online] 
Available:http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-
1109774792596/HNPBrief_3.pdf  
329 Chaudhuri S, (2008) ‘Indian Generic Companies, Affordability of Drugs and Local Production in Africa with 
special Reference to Tanzania’ IKD Working Paper 37, Open University. Chaudhuri notes in his paper that Indian 
companies have set up some manufacturing plants in Africa primarily through joint ventures with local companies – 
Cipla in South Africa, Uganda and Morocco, Cadila in Ethiopia, Ajanta Pharma in Mauritius, and Ranbaxy in Nigeria 
and South Africa. 
330 Mhamba R, and Mbiringenda S, (2010). The Pharmaceutical Industry and Access to Essential Medicines in 
Tanzania. http://www.equinetafrica.org/bibl/docs/DIS83TZN%20medicines%20mhamba.pdf.  
331 Wangwe S, et al (2014) ‘Reversing Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Decline in Tanzania: Policy Options and  
Constraints’ Brief 43 [Online] Available: http://www.repoa.or.tz/documents/REPOA_BRIEF_43.pdf  
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registered by Tanzanian local generic manufacturers.332 Tanzania imports medicines from as many 
as 40 other countries, which accounts for the remaining 92 percent of registered products.  
 
Figure 1: Number of Medicines Registered by TFDA 
 
 
 
Source: TFDA 
 
None of the Tanzanian local manufacturers have the capacity to produce the APIs required for 
medicines formulation. The APIs are imported from traditionally large manufacturers of APIs 
based in India and China. The largest pharmaceutical company in Tanzania and one of the largest 
and fastest growing in the EAC is Shelys pharmaceuticals Ltd, which would fit into the third 
category of World Bank classification. Established in 1984 in Dar es Salaam, with a portfolio 
which includes exporting pharmaceutical products to neighbouring countries including Kenya, 
Uganda and Zambia,333 Shelys accounts for approximately 21 percent of the local market334 and 
manufactures more than 90 products including anti-malarial medicines, antibiotics. More recently, 
ARVs following an investment in the local manufacturing facility by the South African generic 
                                                 
332 Ibid Chaudhuri at 7. 
333 Losse K, Schneider E, and Spennemann C, (2007) ‘The Viability of Local Pharmaceutical Production in Tanzania’ 
GTZ, Eschborn. [Online] Available: http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/07-0300.pdf  
334Ibid Chaudhuri 2014. 
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manufacturer Aspen which initially acquired 60 percent of Shelys share capital335 and later 
acquired the remaining shares.336 The completion of the new manufacturing facility in Tanzania 
allowed Shelys to double its production levels.337  
 
In general however, the past several years have not been kind to local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in Tanzania. Chaudhuri catalogues the closure or demise of several local companies 
in recent years. A case in point is that of Tanzania Pharmaceutical Industries (TPI) Limited, based 
in the northern Tanzanian town of Arusha. Initially founded in the 1970s by the Tanzanian 
government with support from the government of Finland, TPI ran into financial difficulties and 
ended up being shut down in the mid-1990s only to be privatized a few years later under the co-
ownership of various Tanzanian entrepreneurs as well as Tanzanian Investment Funds.  Since the 
mid-2000s, TPI had started producing three fixed-dose combinations ARVs338 with financial 
assistance from the EU 339 and with technical support from German NGO Action Medeor340 and 
know-how from scientist, Krisana Krasintu of Thailand who transferred the technology required 
to manufacture the ARVs to TPI.341 In 2009, TPI was the second largest pharmaceutical company 
in Tanzania, accounting for 17 percent of the value of pharmaceutical production. A scandal 
around the production of falsified ARVs led to the cessation local ARV production by the TFDA. 
The Ministry of Health subsequently cleared TPI of any wrong-doing noting that the falsified 
medicines contained a counterfeit trademark of TPI’s.342  
                                                 
335 See Press release ‘Shelys Africa Limited’ dated 6 May 2008 [Online] Available: 
 http://www.aspenpharma.com/southafrica/hot/aspen_060508.htm  
336 According to its website [Online] Available: http://www.shelysafrica.com/  
337 East African Community Regional Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan of Action (EAC RPMPoA) 2011-2016 at 
169. 
338 The manufacturing of ARVs commenced with the manufacturing of lamivudine, stavudine and nevirapine, a 
commonly used first line treatment. Abacavir was added to the list of ARVs afterwards. 
339 According information obtained from the presentation of Christine Häfele-Abah, Head of Quality Assurance, 
Action Medeor, during a presentation made at a conference on local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa, in Cape 
Town available at: http://www.localpharma-africa.info/ChristineHaefele2_05-04-11.pdf, the EU had invested a grant 
of approximately 6.2 million Euros. 
340 Ibid Mhamba and Mbirigenda  who note that the partnership local manufacturing capacity building takes place 
through a contractual arrangement which specifies that ARVs produced will be made available to the public health 
sector at low cost for 40 months, after which the facility was to be handed over to TPI. 
341 Ibid Losse et al at 24. 
342 See for example, a newspaper article from the Tanzanian paper The Guardian of May 13 2013 entitled Govt 
Clears Arusha firm in ARVs Scam [Online] Available: http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Govt-clears-Arusha--firm-
in-ARVs-scam/-/1840392/1850724/-/id8ljf/-/index.html.   
Chaudhuri (2014) at 3 cites a number of cases where local pharmaceutical producers have closed in the past few 
years. These include Keko which was established as early as 1968 and was as late as 2009, the third largest local 
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4.2.2 Challenges Facing Local Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: The Role of Industrial 
Policy and Intellectual Property Related Laws 
 
While Tanzania’s local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, has received both foreign direct 
investment from the private sector and overseas development assistance, it remains modest and 
relatively fragile. In addition, local manufacturers face a number of challenges ranging from an 
insufficient number of qualified experts, unreliable infrastructure including an inconsistent supply 
of electricity, and high production costs.343  
 
One of the largest challenges facing the local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry remains that 
of medicines quality. While ARVs manufactured by Shelys have complied with the GMP 
standards required by the TFDA, and have obtained marketing approval, no local company has as 
yet, managed to retain pre-qualification approval from the WHO or from the US FDA, which 
prevents either company from participating in GFATM or PRPFAR financed treatment 
programmes. This situation leaves Tanzanian manufacturers to compete for local or regional 
government tenders handled by the Tanzanian Medical Stores Department (MSD)344 which are 
miniscule in comparison to the level of funding available through the GFATM and PEPFAR.345 
Attempts are underway to strengthen the technological capacity of local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to be able to manufacture newer generation ARVs primarily though the investment 
in Shelys by Aspen Pharmacare. Shely’s was the first local manufacturer to obtain WHO pre-
qualification but lost that status. TPI had been intending to establish a WHO GMP compliant plant 
for ARVs, including second-line ARVs346 before the scandal concerning the falsification of ARVs 
                                                 
producer accounting for up to 15 percent market share. Other companies in recent years that have also ceased 
operations include Interchem and Tanzinsino. 
343 Some of these challenges are discussed in more detail by Losse et al, Mhamba and Mbirigenda as well as Wilson 
Kinsley R, (2009).  
344 The MSD is an autonomous government department affiliated to the Ministry of Health. Established by the Medical 
Stores Department Act 13 of 1993, it operates on a commercial, self-sustaining basis, with a governance structure 
separate from the Ministry of Health.  
345 Given the increase in the number of patients requiring treatment, Tanzania’s Ministry Health and Social Welfare 
increased its medicines budget from US$ 6.6 million in 2003 to US$ 98.7 million in 2008. 
346 TPI is compliant with GMP standards imposed by the TFDA but not those of the WHO, whose prequalification 
standards generally requires a large investment in upgrading or building new facilities as well as financing for the 
lengthy application process. According to Wilson Kinsley at 147, WHO prequalification of products can take between 
12 and 24 months and can cost a firm up to US$200,000. Product dossiers submitted for pre-qualification must include 
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prompted its shut-down. In the meantime, the challenges around the ineligibility of the industry to 
compete for donor financed ARV tenders remain. 
  
Another significant challenge facing local manufacturers remains the affordability of their 
products. No Tanzanian pharmaceutical manufacturers has the capacity to produce APIs, which 
leaves them at a price disadvantage to larger foreign companies from India and South Africa, who 
have the capacity to manufacture their own APIs. Aside from being a technologically sophisticated 
industry, API manufacturing can account for as much as 65 percent and 90 percent of the total 
costs of a pharmaceutical product.347 A study by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 
2008 found for instance, that the cost of manufacturing a 100 unit container of analgesics, a basic 
painkiller, in Tanzania was 25 percent more than India and 15 percent more than South Africa.348 
While it might have been hoped that local manufacturers would offset some production cost by 
not having to factor in transportation costs that foreign companies would have to, the same report 
found that freight costs comprise only 4 percent of the 25 percent production cost difference 
between Tanzanian manufacturers and Indian generic manufacturers.349  
 
Traditionally, developing country governments offer fiscal incentives to local pharmaceutical 
companies to incentivise local production and Tanzania is no exception. The 1991 National Drug 
Policy lists among its aims: 
 
 “Promoting the national pharmaceutical industries (parastatal and private), with a view to 
become self-reliant in the formulation of drugs from imported raw materials” 
                                                 
clinical data and bioequivalence studies for fixed dose combinations and each individual pharmaceutical product. This 
requires not only the appropriate facility and equipment, but also the necessary trained human resources. The total 
development cost of a single oral dose was estimated by industry informants to be from US$800,000 to US$1 million, 
excluding any required plant modifications and labour costs. These costs increase if a more technologically complex 
second-line ARV is developed. 
347 Pinheiro E, Antunes O, and Fortunak J, (2008) ‘A survey of the syntheses of active pharmaceutical ingredients for 
antiretroviral drug combinations critical to access in emerging nations.’ US National Library of Medicine, National 
Institute of Health 79 (3)143–165. 
348 International Finance Corporation (2008) ‘The Business of Health in Africa: Partnering with the Private Sector to 
Improve People’s Lives’ IFC, World Bank Group, Washington DC [Online] Available: 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/healthinafrica.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/IFC_HealthinAfrica_Final/$FILE/IFC_HealthinAfr
ica_Final.pdf  
 
349 Ibid IFC at 78. 
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The policy also notes that its long term objective is to:  
 
“…support the gradual development of self-sufficiency in the production of intermediary and raw 
materials on such chemical entities, where Tanzania has a comparative advantage in production. 
Where feasible, regional joint production of both finished products and raw materials will be 
promoted.”350 
 
In discussing other incentives provided by the government to stimulate local production 
Chaudhuri351 notes that there are no import duties on raw materials, components and machinery 
and no value added tax or excise for domestic formulations. Another significant policy is the 15 
percent price advantage given to local manufacturers for procurements undertaken by the MSD of 
Tanzania.352 While this is an important incentive, it does not negate the possibility of anti-
competitive behaviour from larger foreign generic manufacturers, who may opt to engage in 
predatory pricing by tendering at marginal cost to win tenders and drive local producers out of the 
market. For Tanzanian policy makers, the tension between providing domestic support as part of 
Tanzania’s industrial policy objectives (in the form of preferential price advantages, and more 
direct subsidies) will have to be balanced with the urgent need to sustain and scale up national 
treatment programmes. It should be noted that while Tanzania is unlikely to become ineligible to 
receive funding from the GFATM in the short to medium term, multilateral funding mechanisms 
increasingly expect countries to co-finance their AIDS, TB and malaria responses.353  
 
                                                 
350 See WHO (2003) ‘A short Information Manual on the Tanzania National Drug Policy, The Master Plan for the 
Pharmaceutical Sector 1992-2000 Tanzania Mainland, A summary, Hospital Therapeutic Committees’ [Online] 
Available: http://collections.infocollections.org/whocountry/en/d/Jh4335e/2.3.4.1.html#Jh4335e.2.3.4.1  
351 2007 at 18. 
352 Chaudhuri notes that the 15 percent is added to the cost plus freight price of international suppliers. That price is 
compared with the price quoted of local manufacturers, and the tender is awarded to the latter if its price is lower than 
or equal to the international supplier’s 15 percent mark-up. 
353 A precursor of that is a recent move by the Global Fund in introducing counterpart financing where all countries 
who receive funding from the GFATM are required to commit a minimum share of funds to match funds provided 
through GFATM. As a low income country, Tanzania at this stage is only required to invest 5 percent of GFATM 
investment. This amount increases to 20 percent for lower-middle income countries, 40 percent for upper middle 
income countries and 60 percent for high income countries. 
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Given that the source of first-line ART continues to be Indian generic companies,354 the 
sustainability of treatment depends on the degree to which public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
discussed above are found in the relevant legislation of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. The 
remainder of this chapter will examine the extent to which public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
have been incorporated into the various laws of Tanzania and what further amendments might be 
required to retain the necessary intellectual property policy space. This includes a brief definition 
of the regulatory organisations concerned, which will follow next. 
 
4.2.3 Drug regulatory authorities in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar: a Profile 
  
(a) The Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority 
 
The TFDA is a semi-autonomous body established in 2003 under the Ministry of Health, and 
Social Welfare,355 and is the drug regulatory authority responsible for controlling the quality, 
safety and efficacy of food, conventional and traditional medicines, cosmetics and medical devices 
in mainland Tanzania. Its activities are governed by the Tanzania Food, Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act356 and include the evaluation and the registration of pharmaceuticals ensuring that all products 
on the market have been licensed in accordance with the requirements of the relevant legislation, 
conducting regular inspections of manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers. With a staff of 
approximately 170 as of 2011,357 the TFDA is also responsible for the control of pharmaceutical 
imports in and exports out of mainland Tanzania and the constant monitoring of products on the 
market to ascertain their safety. 
 
The second hypothesis advanced in chapter one of this thesis was that there are capacity constraints 
within the relevant government departments in eastern and southern Africa which hinder the full 
integration of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the relevant national legislation and the 
                                                 
354 See WHO global price reporting mechanism  website [Online] Available: http://apps.who.int/hiv/amds/price/hdd/   
See also, Waning, B et al (2010) which found that more than 80 percent  of adult ARVs and up to 90 percent of 
paediatric ARVs used in developing countries originate from India. 
355 Additional information on the functions and scope of the TFDA is available on its website: 
http://www.tfda.or.tz/function.php  
356 No. 1 of 2003. 
357WHO (2011) Pharmaceutical Sector Country Profile Questionnaire: United Republic of Tanzania. 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/m/abstract/Js19870en/  
Page | 115 
 
use of these flexibilities when needed. The challenges around capacity in Tanzania extend beyond 
the integration of flexibilities in national legislation and in some instances impede the ability of 
the TFDA to undertake its regulatory functions and effectively perform its statutory functions, 
particularly that relating to the compliance of pharmaceutical products with local GMP standards. 
A number of manufacturers produce pharmaceutical products affordable to most Tanzanians, but 
not in accordance with GMP. Chaudhuri cites at least one example of a large, reputable Indian 
pharmaceutical company having withdrawn from the Tanzanian market on the basis that the TFDA 
was unable to prevent the sale of sub-standard or falsified pharmaceuticals in the market.358 Other 
large companies like Cipla and Ranbaxy have adopted strategies such as product branding to 
distinguish their products from potentially sub-standard or falsified medicines.359  
 
In recent years, the Ministry of Health has adopted some innovative measures to address the 
challenge of sub-standard medicines. For instance, the Ministry of Health developed a database of 
unregistered medicines and used it to check the sales of certain pharmaceutical products at various 
outlets. Inspectors invited pharmacies found to be selling unregulated medicines to co-operate with 
the authorities’ efforts to track the source of such products. Those who refused faced well-
publicized closures.360 In 2010, the TFDA’s quality control laboratory was accorded the status of 
a WHO prequalified laboratory; one of a handful of quality control laboratories in Africa to be 
awarded this status by the WHO.361 
 
The TFDA has a history of working closely with and being largely supportive of the local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and has assisted several companies to phase in national 
GMP standards. It regularly provides local pharmaceutical manufacturers with guidelines relating 
to the construction of manufacturing plants and the packaging of products, and gives local 
producers a slight pricing advantage by charging them slightly lower registration fees in 
                                                 
358 Ibid Chaudhuri (2014) at 15. 
359 Ibid. 
360  Refer to: See http://www.msh.org/seam/country_programs/3.1.4b.htm#top as cited in Oxfam (2011) ‘Eye on the 
ball: Medicines Regulation- not IP Enforcement can best Deliver Quality Medicines’ Briefing paper 143 [Online] 
Available: https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/eye-on-the-ball-medicine-regulation-020211-en.pdf    
361 See the 28th edition of Prequalification programme,  December 2009 [Online] Available: 
 http://apps.who.int/prequal/lists/PQ_QCLabsList.pdf  
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comparison to foreign pharmaceutical companies, who are also required to pay a 2 percent tax on 
the value of imports into mainland Tanzania, that local companies are exempted from.362 
 
b) Zanzibar Food and Drugs Board 
 
The Zanzibar Food and Drugs Act 363established the Food and Drugs Board in 2007 as a semi-
autonomous structure under the Ministry of Health for the registration of medicines and to control 
the quality control of health technologies in the territory. The Zanzibar Food, Drugs and Cosmetics 
Board (ZFDB) is established, and depends on a separate government laboratory facility for drug 
quality control. In addition to the Act, a National Drug Policy364 regulates pharmaceutical products 
in Zanzibar. The capacity constraints facing drug regulatory authorities in Zanzibar are more acute 
than those in Mainland Tanzania. For instance, registration of pharmaceuticals is only partly done 
in Zanzibar because there are insufficient registration facilities and an insufficient number of 
qualified personnel. This exposes the market in Zanzibar to the infiltration of sub-standard and 
counterfeit products.365 As a safeguard, the ZFDB which had a staff of 63 employees as of the end 
of 2011, rubber-stamps the approval of many of the pharmaceutical products registered by the 
TFDA in mainland Tanzania. Aside from product registration, several of the elements required to 
maintain assure the quality of pharmaceuticals are missing in Zanzibar. According to the National 
Drug Policy: 
 
“The laboratory capacity to test products is currently limited by the severe financial constraints 
and inadequate skilled human resources. Currently laboratory testing of pharmaceutical products 
are carried out by using Mini lab kit. Conditions for distribution and storage of medicines are 
often inadequate leading to premature deterioration and waste of sensitive items. Post-marketing 
surveillance capacity is strictly limited by human resources and logistical constraints.” 
 
The second hypothesis advanced in chapter one pertaining to the capacity constraints facing 
national institutions in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar will be further tested below. 
                                                 
362 Ibid Wilson Kinsley, at 139. 
363 No.2 of 2006. 
364 Zanzibar National Drug Policy, on file with author.  
365 Zanzibar National Drug Policy page 15.   
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4.3 Tanzania’s Industrial Property and Related Legislation and Institutions: To What 
Extent are TRIPS Flexibilities Reflected and Implemented? 
 
4.3.1 A brief Background of Intellectual Property Legislation in Tanzania and of Relevant 
Institutions 
 
Intellectual property law has a long history in Tanzania dating back decades before independence. 
The formal introduction of intellectual property laws in eastern and southern Africa was initiated 
by European colonial powers in the late nineteenth century, after the 1884 Congress of Berlin. 366 
In the case of Tanganyika, the first patent law, the Patents (Registration) Ordinance was 
promulgated in 1931. The Ordinance, modelled after the British Patents, Designs and Trade Marks 
Act of 1883, was directly linked with the UK patent system. 367 In a move meant to extend the 
rights of British inventors to colonial territories, a patent granted in the UK would be automatically 
valid for registration in Tanganyika. Conversely, any inventor or innovator based in Tanganyika 
was compelled to file a patent application in the UK to have a patent registered in Tanganyika.368 
This relationship with the UK patent law was kept with the passing of the Patent (Registration) 
Ordinance (Chapter 217 of Tanganyika, passed after independence in 1962, and was only removed 
with the passing of the Patent Act of 1987,369 cited as a motivating factor behind the enactment of 
new legislation.370  
 
In addition to the Patent Act which is applicable in mainland Tanzania, a recently adopted 
industrial property Act is in force in Zanzibar. As will be discussed below, significant capacity 
constraints have affected the effective operation of both pieces of legislation. 
 
                                                 
366 Deere C, (2008) at 35. 
367 Mwalimu U, (2003) ‘The Implications of WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) on Tanzania: A focus on pharmaceuticals,  Working Paper Series no. 4, Economic and Social Research 
Foundation (ESRF), Dar es Salaam, at 12. [Online] Available: 
 http://www.esrf.or.tz/global/output/WPS04_Mwalimu_TRIPS.pdf  
368 Ibid Mwalimu at 12. 
369 Act 1 of 1987 as amended by Acts 13 and 18 of 1991. 
370 Ibid Mwalimu at 13. The second reason cited was the adoption of a science and technology policy in 1986, which 
anticipated the promotion of innovation for the facilitation of technology transfer through, inter alia, the grant and 
regulation of patents. 
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The Patent Act applicable to mainland Tanzania is administered through the Business Registration 
and Licensing Agency (BRELA), the semi-autonomous government agency charged with the 
administration and implementation of laws and regulations relating to intellectual property among 
other functions.371 BRELA operates with significant human resource constraints. While 62 staff 
members were employed at BRELA, in 2012, only 10 worked in the Industrial Property Division 
of which one had pursued an advanced degree specialising in intellectual property. The other 
institution with a mandate and capacity to administer industrial property including patents relating 
to science and technology is the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology 
(COSTECH)372 which drafts patent documents, files patent applications and undertakes patent 
searches. As of 2012, COSTECH’s capacity on intellectual property matters was limited with only 
one employee having a post-graduate degree with a specialisation in intellectual property. Neither 
institution currently undertakes substantive patent examinations, relying instead on the ARIPO 
Secretariat to undertake this important function. The implications of the enabling ARIPO 
instruments and examining procedures on treatment access in Tanzania and other countries in the 
region are discussed in more detail in chapter six.  
 
Mainland Tanzania has been in the process of patent law reform for several years dating back to 
at least 2006.373 A number of initiatives by various UN, inter-governmental and foreign Aid 
agencies to support the amendment of industrial property legislation in mainland Tanzania374 have 
                                                 
371 BRELA’s divisions include those tasked with the implementation of Administrative law, Commercial law, 
Intellectual Property (headed by a Deputy Registrar) and Industrial Licensing Division (headed by a Deputy 
Registrar).  
372 COSTECH was established by Parliament by Act 7 of 1986 and is a parastatal responsible for the co-ordinating 
and promoting research and technology development activities in Tanzania, and is tasked specifically with facilitating 
national, regional and international cooperation in scientific research and technology development and transfer. 
373 A draft copy of an Industrial Property Act for Mainland Tanzania as prepared by WIPO in 2006 is on file with 
the author.  
374 From 24-28 July 2006 for instance, a workshop was organized by UNDP, TWN and the WHO to incorporate more 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the draft Industrial Property Act. According to the then Chief Executive 
Officer of BRELA, Mr. E. Mahingila, there was a need for mainland Tanzania as an LDC to amend its industrial 
property legislation to take advantage of the LDC exemption available to WTO Members. In December 2007, UNDP 
and the EAC organised at meeting in Arusha Tanzania to disseminate the findings of a study on how intellectual 
property legislation in the individual EAC countries could be amended to incorporate TRIPS flexibilities and to 
facilitate pooled procurement of essential medicines. Also in 2007, the German technical agency GTZ released a study 
on local pharmaceutical production in Tanzania which also contained recommendations on the amendment of patent 
legislation. In 2008, the EAC held a workshop in Arusha, Tanzania, for trade and pharmaceutical experts in its Partner 
States on the “Review of Essential Medicines Related Patent Laws and WTO TRIPS Flexibilities” [Online] Available: 
 http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_totip/docs/tot_ip_0005_en.pdf  
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taken place over the past few years. It is highly unlikely that the advice provided to officials from 
BRELA and other institutions has been uniform in nature,375 given the variety of entities with 
different perspectives on intellectual property have provided mainland Tanzania with technical 
assistance on various aspects of its industrial property legislation in recent years.376 A number of 
years after the review of the industrial property law reform commenced, Tanzania submitted a 
request to WIPO to assist with the development of an IP strategy.377 Work on the draft industrial 
property Act has been suspended pending the development of an IP strategy.378  
 
The capacity constraints facing BRELA support the second hypothesis advanced in chapter one of 
this thesis, namely that capacity constraints within the relevant government departments in eastern 
and southern Africa hinder the full integration of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the 
relevant national legislation and their use when needed. A 2012 draft National IP strategy prepared 
by WIPO also identifies limited capacity constraints within BRELA and as well as an incoherent 
approach to intellectual property administration.379Mainland Tanzania also has a Fair Competition 
Act administered by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which has a number of provisions that 
could be used to prevent anti-competitive behaviour by originator or generic manufacturers. Thus 
far, however, it appears that the competition Act has only been used by brand name manufacturers 
of goods to prevent the introduction of products with counterfeit trademarks from entering the 
local market.380 
                                                 
Several workshops have also been held by WIPO on a broad range of intellectual property matters, some of which are 
listed on the WIPO website [Online] Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/archive_meeting.jsp?meeting_country=176  
375 Musungu S, (2005) ‘Rethinking innovation, development, and intellectual property in the UN: WIPO and Beyond’ 
TRIPS Issue Paper 5, QUNO, Geneva at 27, lists several UN agencies whose mandate touches on intellectual property. 
These include, Specialised Agencies such as the international Labour Organisation (ILO) , Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO), United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), UNIDO, UNCTAD, UNEP, UNDP and others. Other key providers of technical 
assistance include WIPO and the WTO. There are also several developed countries who provide technical assistance 
to LMICs on intellectual property related matters including the US, EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, and Germany.  
376 Ibid Matthews (2005) who notes that some of the technical advice and capacity building activities in developing 
countries may not necessarily be tailored to meet the national policy objectives. 
377 A draft Strategy developed by a WIPO consultant is [Online] Available: http://www.brela-tz.org/htmls/NIPS-1.pdf  
378 According to an official from BRELA. 
379 WIPO (2012) at 13 and 23.  
380 The US government has been providing technical assistance to competition authorities in Tanzania in this regard 
with a number of trainings to local officials on how intellectual property enforcement can be enhanced through the 
use of competition law. See for example, Kisyombe M, (2012) ‘Emerging Issues in Consumer Protection: 
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As is the case with drug regulatory institutions and legislation, the adoption of its Constitution381 
has spurred authorities in Zanzibar on to enact copyright382 and industrial property legislation.383 
As will be discussed in more detail below, Zanzibar’s enactment of a new Industrial Property Act 
in 2008 has allowed it to incorporate significantly more public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
into its national legislation. The Act is administered by the Registrar General’s Office in Zanzibar, 
which is also responsible for the registration and issuance of certificates of vital events, companies 
and business names as well as trademarks and patents. The Registrar General’s office has limited 
capacity with regards the administration of industrial property and relies on ARIPO and WIPO for 
capacity development activities. 384 
 
The extent to which public health related TRIPS flexibilities are found in the mainland Tanzania’s 
Patent Act as well as Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act will be discussed below. In the case of 
mainland Tanzania, the law does not incorporate a number of public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities given that there has been no significant revision of the law since the WTO was 
established.  Tanzania has also ratified the WIPO Convention385 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT)386 and is a Member State ARIPO, having ratified the Agreement on the Creation of ARIPO 
in October 1983. The next section contains a detailed analysis of mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar’s current patent and industrial property legislation and the degree to which it reflects the 
flexibilities embodied in the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
 
                                                 
Complementarities and areas of tension’, Paper given at UNCTAD Expert Group on the Interface between 
competition policy and consumer welfare [Online] Available: 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/ciclp2012_EMCP_S3_Kisyombe_Discussion_en.pdf  
381 Constitution of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar was adopted in 1984 and subsequently amended in 
1990, 1992 and 2002. 
382 Copyright Act 14 of 2003. 
383 Industrial Property Act 4 of 2008. 
384 A 2007 draft of the Industrial Property Bill prepared for the Registrar General by WIPO is on file with the author. 
The draft contains a number of TRIPS plus elements and had not incorporated many of the public health related 
flexibilities which were eventually integrated into the Act after two workshops in 2007 organized by UNDP and 
TWN. 
385 Applicable in Tanzania since 30 December 1983. 
386 Applicable since 14 September 1999. 
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4.3.2 Tanzania’s Intellectual Property and Related Legislation: To What Extent are Public 
Health Related TRIPS Flexibilities Reflected? 
 
This section contains an extensive discussion on the most beneficial policy for mainland Tanzania 
would examine the extent to which the following flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement have been 
incorporated into Mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act. 
  
(a) Transition periods  
Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement provides exemption periods exempting WTO Members from 
complying with the TRIPS Agreement upon accession to the WTO387 while Article 66 exempted 
LDC Members of the WTO from having to comply with the TRIPS Agreement with the exception 
of Articles 3,4 and 5 for a 10 year period which ended in 1 January 2006.388 The LDC waiver was 
extended in November 2005389 until 1 July 2013 and further extended in June 2013 to 1 July 
2021.390 In addition to these waivers which exempt LDCs from intellectual property obligations, 
WTO Members also agreed to grant a waiver specific to pharmaceutical products in paragraph 7 
of the Doha Declaration until 1 January 2016, subject to further extension. The potential 
importance of these waivers for Tanzania can’t be overstated, as they allow countries to control 
the circumstances under which pharmaceutical patents can be granted and to some degree, 
revoked, thus facilitating generic competition.391 
The consequences of the debate over whether LDCs may suspend existing patents for 
pharmaceutical products that were already granted, is diminished by the fact that generic 
competition predominantly from Indian generic manufacturers has resulted in extremely 
                                                 
387 Article 65.1 obliges developed counties to comply with the TRIPS Agreement within a year of joining WTO, while 
Article 65.2  and 65.3 entitled developing country Members  and economies in transition to delay the implementing 
the TRIPS Agreement for a five year period from accession to WTO. Article 65.4 provides developing countries 
obliged to extend product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable in its territory before joining the 
WTO with an additional five year exemption period. The latter expired for all developing countries that joined the 
WTO in 1995. 
388 Except as regards the obligation to respect the basic non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-
favoured nation treatment contained in Articles 3, 4 and 5. 
389 As per WTO document IP/C/40. 
390 See WTO document IP/C/64. 
391 The latest waiver does not contain a “no roll back clause” which was present in the 2005 waiver, which 
effectively prevented LDCs from rolling back the levels IP protection to meet specific domestic policy objectives.  
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competitive pricing of first line ARVs in Tanzania in recent years.392 However, mainland Tanzania 
may wish to make use of the LDC waiver to regulate the patenting of newer generation ARVs393 
and those still in the innovation pipeline where competition from generic manufactures is likely to 
be more limited than in the past because of increased patenting of originator products in India and 
in other countries with significant pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 
 
While this important flexibility has been available for almost two decades, mainland Tanzania’s 
Patent Act still provides for the patenting of both pharmaceutical products and 
processes.394Spennemann,395 in debating whether the decision by an LDC like Tanzania to take 
advantage of the LDC waiver would have any positive implication in stimulating innovation and 
local pharmaceutical production, notes that: 
 
“From a policy perspective, it is questionable whether the non-enforcement of existing IPRs is an 
appropriate way of promoting local production of pharmaceuticals. Tanzanian firms intending to 
manufacture medicaments against HIV or tropical diseases will in any case need to rely on the 
importation of a number of pharmaceutical ingredients and thus collaboration with foreign patent 
holders. Such collaboration, normally through the negotiation of voluntary licenses, will not be 
encouraged if foreign investors see their vested rights not enforced.” 
The larger question is whether a sufficiently sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 
in Tanzania can be foreseen in the future, which might merit a decision by the government to use 
intellectual property protection as a means to incentivise foreign direct investment by originator 
companies, to develop the domestic industry.   Several authors have extensively discussed the 
                                                 
392 A spreadsheet for instance from the WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GRPM) of 2013 shows that the 
WHO recommended first-line treatment FDC of efavirenz, tenofovir and emtricitabine was available at a median price 
of US$ 157 per patient per year.  
393 According to the GPRM, the cost of medicines used in third-line treatment regimens is still extremely expensive 
even in LDCs like Tanzania. According to the database, in 2013, darunavir was sold at US$ 2,667 per patient per year, 
while etravirine cost US$ 359 per patient per year and raltegravir, cost US$ 553 per patient per year amounting to a 
total of more than US$ 3500 per patient per year. 
394 Section 7(1) of the Act notes that: 
“ For the purposes of this Act, "invention" means a solution to a specific problem in the field of technology and may 
relate to a product or process” 
Section 7(2) which lists a number of exemptions to Section 7(1) does not include pharmaceutical products or 
processes. 
395 UNCTAD (2006) ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Investment and Access to Medicines: the United Republic of 
Tanzania’ UNCTAD Secretariat Geneva (on file with author). 
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factors which determine the success of technology transfer agreements in the pharmaceutical 
industry.396  As Maskus397 notes: 
 
“The various means by which IPRs influence FDI are subtle and complex. Moreover, it must be 
emphasized that strong IPRs alone are insufficient for generating strong incentives for firms to 
invest in a country. If that were the case, recent FDI flows to developing economies would have 
gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. In contrast, China, Brazil, and other high 
growth, large-market developing economies with weak protection would not have attracted nearly 
as much FDI if investment were heavily dependent solely on IPRs.” 
 
Other factors that should influence impact on a policy adopted by authorities in Tanzania include 
the government’s longer term industrial policy objectives, fiscal policy, investment regulations, 
production incentives, trade policies, and competition rules.398 Given that at present, very few 
companies in Tanzania locally produce ARVs, and that the largest one, Shelys is entirely owned 
by a foreign investor, it follows that the adoption of an intellectual property regulation that 
facilitates imitation rather than innovation would be more advantageous to mainland Tanzania. 
This rationale is reinforced by developments in the region such as the investment of the Indian 
manufacturer Cipla in a Ugandan generic company, Quality Chemicals,399 and in co-operation with 
the East African Community’s plans to harmonize intellectual property legislation among its 
Partner States to facilitate regional co-operation on pharmaceutical products. The implications of 
not using the LDC waiver are that local generic pharmaceutical manufacturers would be required 
to determine the patent status of APIs and attempt to negotiate voluntary licenses for health 
                                                 
396 See for instance, Correa C, (2005). “Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries?” in Maskus K, and Reichman J, (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Moon S, (2008) ‘Does 
TRIPS Art. 66.2 Encourage Technology Transfer to LDCs? An Analysis of Country Submissions to the TRIPS 
Council (1999-2007) Policy Brief No 2, UNCTAD- ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development. Geneva. 
397 Maskus K, (1997) ‘The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer’ Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 109-161, at 128-129.  
398 Ibid Maskus at129. 
399 According to the Quality Chemicals website, upon request by the Government of Uganda, Cipla agreed to extend 
technical assistance to Uganda through a joint venture with a local partner Quality Chemicals Ltd to enable Uganda 
locally manufacture ARVs and anti-malarial drugs under Cipla brand names. In January 2010, the WHO prequalified 
the facility as a contract manufacturing plant for Cipla, India. As of 2013, Quality Chemicals portfolio of ARVs 
included zidovudine, lamivudine, nevirapine and efavirenz, with the latest FDCs approved by the WHO scheduled for 
local production shortly. [Online] Available: 
http://www.qcil.co.ug/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=12&Itemid=62  
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technologies  on which patents exist, failing which, a request for a compulsory license could be 
made to the relevant authorities. 
 
Another challenge that would be negated by the adoption of the LDC exemption is the challenge 
of how to ascertain the patent status of key ARVs as discussed above in chapter three. It remains 
a challenge to easily and accurately determine the patent status of key ARVs in several countries 
in east and southern Africa, including Tanzania as illustrated by the unnecessary compulsory 
licenses issued by authorities in Zambia in 2004. While the MPP database has played an important 
role in alleviating the most difficult challenges in obtaining relevant patent information, the 
database is not always current. Information is periodically updated from the relevant patent offices 
and may become outdated.400  
 
As may be expected, given its more recent enactment, Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act makes 
more effective use of the transition periods. The Act excludes new uses patents of known forms of 
products and processes, including pharmaceuticals patents.401 It also explicitly excludes402 the 
patenting of inventions necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and or health, which may 
be interpreted to include pharmaceutical patents. Importantly, the Act403  explicitly excludes 
pharmaceutical products and processes from patentability until 1 January 2016 or such time as 
subsequently agreed by the WTO Council for TRIPS. 
 
The exclusion of pharmaceutical patents from patentability is supplemented by a provision 
providing a transition period for the protection of pharmaceutical test data, the latter to apply only 
when pharmaceutical patents eventually are granted in Zanzibar.404 As there is no local 
pharmaceutical industry in Zanzibar,405 and there are no plans to develop one in the foreseeable 
future, the inclusion of a transition period into Zanzibar’s legislation is a pro-public health 
                                                 
400 In the case of ARIPO, the latest updates occurred in November 2013. 
401 Section 3(1)(v). 
402 Section 3(1)(ix). 
403 Section 3(1)(x). 
404 Section 75(5)(h) reads as follows: 
“undisclosed test data and other data relating to pharmaceutical products shall be protected in Zanzibar in 
accordance with (a) to (g) of this sub-section, after 1 January 2016, or such period of extension agreed upon by the 
World Trade Organization Council for TRIPS, this paragraph shall apply to marketing approval requests that will be 
pending on that date as well as to those filed on or after that date.  
405 As confirmed by the Zanzibar Drug policy. 
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measure, the effectiveness of which may have been reduced by the adoption of a section on the 
protection of pharmaceutical test data, as discussed below. Authorities in Zanzibar have also 
included a provision406 establishing a patent mailbox upon expiry of the transition period as 
provided for under Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement.407 The implications of a patent mailbox 
for Zanzibar may be minimal in practice, as the Registrar General’s office relies on ARIPO to 
conduct pharmaceutical patent examinations. In addition, scholars have asserted408  that the 
wording of Article 70.8 of TRIPS which requires the establishment of a mailbox is only applicable 
to those countries who did not provide patent protection as of the date of entry into force of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  By virtue of legislation which was replaced in 2008,409 Zanzibar had provided 
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical patents, provided they were filed in the UK. The 
question therefore, is whether the authorities in Zanzibar did not need to establish a patent mailbox 
system, or to grant exclusive marketing rights as required by Article 70.9 of TRIPS,410 and whether 
the mailbox can be revoked. 
 
(b) Patent Opposition and Revocations 
While the TRIPS Agreement does not directly regulate the issue of patent oppositions, a number 
of countries411 provide an opportunity for parties to oppose the granting of a patent or to request 
                                                 
406 According to the relevant portion of Section 10(8): 
“ …immediately after the commencement of this Act, with regard to pharmaceutical products and process, the 
Industrial Property Office shall receive patent applications and shall maintain such applications pending their 
application as of 1st January 2016, or such period of extension agreed upon by the World Trade Organization Council 
for TRIPS.”   
407 The requirement that developing countries implement a patent mailbox was affirmed in the WTO Appellate Body 
Report of, India–Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, (WT/DS50/AB/R, 1997). 
In confirming its interpretation of the mailbox, the Appellate Body found that India did not provide mailbox and 
exclusive marketing rights for foreign holders of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product patents, as required 
by Article 70.8 and 70.9 respectively. 
408 Correa C, (2002) ‘Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health’, World Health 
Organization, Health Economics and Drugs Series, No 12. 
409 Cap 157 of 1932. 
410  Article 70.9 reads: 
“Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive 
marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining 
marketing approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that Member, whichever period 
is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed 
and a patent granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in such other Member.” 
411 See for instance, Section 25 of the Indian Patents Amendment Act of 2005, which lists several grounds for the 
invalidation of a patent including: wrongfully obtaining the invention; evidence of a prior claim in the country; prior 
public knowledge or public use in India; obviousness and lack of inventive step; not qualifying as an invention under 
the Act; or insufficient description of the invention 
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its invalidation by filing an opposition with the competent government authority. While a study 
conducted by the US Federal Trade Commission in 2002 found that in 104 patent litigation cases 
determined by US Courts, generic companies prevailed in 73 percent of cases,412 patent litigation 
can be lengthy and costs on average, almost 62 percent more expensive than other forms of civil 
litigation in the US.413 Furthermore, relying on generic companies to litigate is unlikely to be an 
effective solution for an LDC like Tanzania, where because only a handful of local pharmaceutical 
companies, of comparatively modest means even have the capacity to manufacture ARVs.   
 
Countries have the flexibility to provide for patent opposition or revocation proceedings before or 
after the grant of a patent.414 According to Kapczynski,415 countries with high levels of patent 
protection have traditionally preferred post-grant oppositions or have removed the possibility of 
patent oppositions on substantive grounds altogether.  Despite this trend, scholars note that pre-
grant oppositions are more likely to result in invalidation of questionable patents than post-grant 
patent oppositions.416  
 
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of pre-grant patent oppositions and revocation 
proceedings filed by treatment activist or consumer groups, in India, Thailand and Brazil. In 
Thailand in 2001, treatment activists filed a post-grant opposition in the Thai Central Intellectual 
Property and International Trade Court417 against a patent granted by the Thai intellectual property 
office to the originator company BMS for the ARV didanosine. The legal challenge was grounded 
in the premise that the patent on didanosine included an unlawful amendment that effectively 
                                                 
412 See US Federal Trade Commission (2002) ‘Generic Drugs Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study’ pages 
12-14 [Online] Available: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf  
413 See Lee E, and Willging T, (2010), Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis 8 (Federal Judicial 
Center). Reasons for the higher cost of patent litigation given include the large amount of money under dispute, 
electronic discovery requests, greater case complexity and the involvement of large law firms. 
414 India’s Patents Amendment Act of 2005 provides a third opportunity for a patent to be revoked, authorising 
opposition proceedings that may be initiated before the Intellectual Property Appeal Board or via a counterclaim in 
an infringement suit. 
415 Kapczynski A, (2009) ‘Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's 
Pharmaceutical Sector’, California Law Review, Vol. 97, p 1571 at 1598. Kapczynski notes that for instance, Germany 
and Japan abandoned pre-grant systems for post-grant systems in 1981 and 1994 respectively. See also Kesan J, (2002) 
‘Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System’, Berkeley Tech. L.J. Vol 17, 763 at 781–82. 
416 For example, Kesan at 777, notes that pre-grant oppositions may also be more favourably viewed by the patent 
office as the patent office would not be forced to reverse a decision to grant a patent.  
417 AIDS Access Foundation et al. v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Company and Department of Intellectual Property, Central 
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, Black Case No. Tor Por 34/2544, Red Case No. 92/2545 (2002) 
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broadened the scope of the patent over all dosage strengths. The Court found that BMS had 
attempted to assert exclusive ownership of the ARV beyond the dosage range originally specified 
in the patent registration, by deleting the limiting phrase “from about 5–100 mg per dose” from its 
patent claim.418 This ruling led to another challenge against the patent on the grounds, inter alia, 
that, the requirement of novelty had not been met as the ARV had been available on the market 
before the patent was granted to BMS. The dispute was eventually settled with BMS choosing to 
“dedicate” the patent to the people of Thailand rather than risk a negative precedent.419 
 
The provision in India’s 2005 patent legislation authorizing patent oppositions is broadly worded, 
and authorizes “any person” including generic companies, patient groups or other members of civil 
society. Kapczynski identified as many as 200 pre-grant patent oppositions that had been filed in 
India’s patent offices between 2005 and mid-2007. A large number of oppositions were filed on 
the basis that the patent application does not meet the criteria required by Section 3(d) of the India 
Patents Act. Brazil’s intellectual property legislation420 enables third parties to make observations 
regarding the examination of patents. On this basis, patent authorities have seen a small number 
of pre-grant patent oppositions filed by treatment advocates on important ARVs including 
successful a mid-2008 opposition of the tenofovir disoproxil fumarate patent, filed by the 
originator pharmaceutical company Gilead421 following a successful challenge in India by 
treatment activists in 2006. Gilead’s patent application was rejected by the Brazilian Patent office 
(INPI) in September 2008,422 with a confirmation of the decision in June 2009.423   Wide ranging 
pre-grant and post-grant patent opposition proceedings could provide a country like Tanzania with 
                                                 
418 A more detailed summary of the case and the findings by the Court is available at UNAIDS, (2006) ‘Thailand: 
people living with HIV challenge company's patent on antiretroviral drug. In Courting Rights: Case Studies in 
Litigating the Human Rights of People Living with HIV. Geneva, 92-94. 
419 See Wibulpolprasert S, Chokevivat V, Oh C, and Yamabhai I, (2011) ‘Government use licenses in Thailand: The 
power of evidence, civil movement and political leadership.’ Globalization and Health 2011, 7:32 [Online] Available: 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/32  
420 Law 9279 of 1996.  
421 The opposition against the tenofovir patent opposition was filed in June 2008 by the Brazilian Aids Advocacy 
Group ABIA (Brazilian inter-disciplinary Aids Association) as documented by a press Release issued by MSF 
[Online] at: http://www.msfaccess.org/content/abia-and-sahara-joint-press-release-patent-opposition-tenofovir. The  
422 See MSF Press Release ‘Brazil Rejects Patent on an Essential Medicine’, of 2 September 2008, [Online] available: 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=3067  
423 However, Article 26 of law 9279/96 allows the patent applicant to make divisional patent applications before a 
final ruling from the patent office, which Gilead did, through the filing of a divisional application on 31 March 2009, 
leading to a final rejection of the divisional patent in May 2011.   
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an important opportunity to reduce ever-greening, thereby increasing the likelihood of obtaining 
affordable treatment for newer generation ARVs.  
 
While Section 63 of mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act424 provides for post-grant patent opposition, 
there is no provision for pre-grant oppositions. This is an significant omission, given the potential 
role of treatment activists and civil society groups in a number of LMICs,425 the increasing 
influence of national and regional treatment groups within the EAC such as the recent successful 
challenge of the 2008 Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act by treatment activists426 as well as efforts by 
Ugandan treatment activists to advocate for in further inclusion of public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities into draft Industrial Property Legislation.427  Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act on the 
other hand provides for pre-grant patent oppositions428  but is silent on post-grant oppositions. As 
both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar rely on the ARIPO Secretariat to examine pharmaceutical 
patents applications,429 provisions providing for pre-grant patent oppositions through the Harare 
Protocol may be of more consequence than at the national level.  
 
(c) Patentability Criteria and Exclusions from Patentability 
 
With the exception of the transition period available to LDCs, the most impactful pre-grant TRIPS 
flexibility available to WTO Members who are net importers of pharmaceutical technologies, must 
be Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement which articulates the criteria for patentability and contains 
                                                 
424  Section 63(1) reads as follows:  
“Any interested person, may, in proceeding instituted by him against the owner of a patent or in proceedings instituted 
against him by the said owner, request the court to invalidate the patent.” 
425 See for instance, a discussion of how treatment activists in South Africa, India and Brazil used the premise of 
access to medicines being a human right to assert the right to health in various intellectual property disputes, see 
Matthews D, (2011) ‘Where Framing Meets Law: Using Human Rights as a Practical Instrument to Facilitate Access 
to Medicines in Developing Countries’, The WIPO Journal, Thompson Reuters, Volume 3, Issue 1 at 113 [Online] 
Available: http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/wipo_journal/pdf/wipo_journal_3_1.pdf  
426 Patricia Asero Ochieng and 2 others v. the Attorney General and Another.  
427 For instance, in late 2011, a letter, on file with the author, was written to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs by the Center for Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD) with specific proposals to incorporate 
public health related TRIPS Flexibilities into the draft Industrial Property Bill 5 of 2009.   
428 Under Section 10(7)(a). 
429According to Section 1 of the Harare Protocol: 
“The African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) is empowered to grant patents and to register 
utility models and industrial designs and to administer such patents, utility models and industrial designs on behalf 
of Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, through its Secretariat…” 
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a list of subject matter that WTO Members may exclude from patentability. According to Article 
27.1: 
 
“Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and 
whether products are imported or locally produced.” 
 
Article 27.1 does not provide any further guidance on how the patentability criteria should be 
applied. As Correa notes, if a country adopts a low standard of novelty, a lower bar for what 
constitutes an inventive step, and broadens the concept of utility or what can be classified as 
industrially applicable, the likelihood of a patent office granting a higher number of patent 
applications increases.430 As the discussion in Chapter two regarding the question of whether the 
increase in pharmaceutical patents has created a sufficient enough incentive to stimulate 
pharmaceutical innovation concludes, evidence does not indicate that a higher number of patents 
necessarily stimulates innovation even in countries with an established pharmaceutical base. 
Recent years have seen a gradual decline in the number of chemical entities.in both LMICs and 
high income countries. 
 
Figure 2: Drug Approvals up to 2013 by the US FDA  
 
Source US FDA431 
 
                                                 
430 See Correa (2007) ‘Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health 
Perspective’, WHO-ICTSD-UNCTAD working paper, [Online] Available:  
http://www.ictsd.org/themes/innovation-and-ip/research/guidelines-for-the-examination-of-pharmaceutical-patents  
431 As presented in an article appearing on Forbes entitled ‘The Most Important New Drug of 2014’ [Online] 
Available: http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2014/12/30/the-most-important-new-drug-of-2014/  
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According to a report by the US National Institute for Health (NIH), from 1989 to 2000, only 15 
percent of all new drug approvals were for medicines that provide a significant clinical 
improvement. 432 At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the number of patents being 
granted over simple changes in chemistry or formulation of existing pharmaceuticals (e.g. 
polymorphs, combinations, dosage forms, isomers).433 If anything, experts argue  that the granting 
of patents for incremental improvements to existing products stifles innovation rather than 
enabling it.434 
 
For a country like Tanzania, with no originator pharmaceutical industry and a relatively small local 
industry that exclusively manufactures generic ARVs, there may be even less motive to prioritize 
pharmaceutical patent protection. Another factor that may be considered by policy makers in 
determining patentability criteria could be the number of local patent applicants in comparison to 
foreign applicants. The majority of patents being granted at the ARIPO Secretariat are to 
foreigners.  For instance, in 2008, of 435 patent applications received by the ARIPO Secretariat, a 
                                                 
432 National Institute for Health Care Management (NIH), (2002) Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
NIHCM Washington D.C. page 3. [Online]  Available at: http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf 
433 Correa C, (2011), ‘Pharmaceutical innovation, incremental patenting and compulsory licensing’, South Centre, 
research Paper 41. 
434 See Branstetter (2004). 
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mere 11 or approximately 2.5 percent were from residents of ARIPO Member States.435  Between 
2009 and 2013, 2614 patents were filed and the vast majority came from applicants not residing in 
the ARIPO Member States. Similarly, the top nine patent applicants according to the WIPO patent 
database PATENTSCOPE, are multinational originator pharmaceutical companies. Consequently, 
in order to prevent patent barriers from impeding access to treatment in mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar, it follows that a policy that enables patents to be granted only where genuine 
contributions to the state of the art are made would be the most desirable. It also follows that the 
success of patent claims that relate to incremental innovation (formulations, salts, ethers and 
combinations for instance), second indications of pharmaceutical products and selection patents 
on a narrow gap of molecular compounds should be minimised.436  
 
In countries in optimising the policy space afforded to them by the TRIPS Agreement have opted 
to define the concept of novelty in a variety of ways. The requirement of novelty usually means 
that the information relating to the patent application must not have been available to the public 
prior to the original application date (the priority date).437 In most European and developing 
country jurisdictions, this refers to information obtained by whatever means438 thereby placing a 
higher threshold on information being disclosed by the applicant to be genuinely new. The 2011 
America Invents Act which simplified the pre-existing rules on novelty in the US,439 notes that a 
person shall be entitled to a patent unless: 
 
“ (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; 
or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued [to another] . . . or in [another’s] 
                                                 
435 As per information obtained from WIPO’s statistical database in Marongiu, A (2011) ‘Non-Resident Patent 
Applications in the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization’ Mile 11 Thesis, World Trade Institute, Berne 
[Online] Available:  
http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/wti.org/1_masterprogramme/pdfs/Masters_thesis_Alessandro%20Maron
giu.pdf  
436 See Correa (2011) 22-23. Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Act of 2005 is regularly cited as an example of how a 
country can use patentability criteria effectively to meet public health concerns. See also Kapczynski (2009) and 
Basheer S, and Reddy P, (2008) ‘Ducking TRIPS in India: A Saga Involving Novartis and the Legality of Section 
3(d)’, National Law School of India Review, volume 20, No. 2. 
437 UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) page 359. 
438 Ibid UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005)359. 
439  Merges R, (2012) ‘Priority and Novelty under the AIA’ Berkeley Law Technology Journal, Vol 27, 1023 
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application for patent [that is] published . . . [and that] was effectively filed before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention.”440 
 
 Mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act, in defining what constitutes prior art441 refers to the disclosure 
of information written or oral made anywhere in the world, which is a comparatively speaking 
high standard. The reference to a combination of disclosures oral, or written, made anywhere in 
the world would further raise the standard of novelty, in the public health interest of Mainland 
Tanzania. Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act in defining novelty442  explicitly refers to prior art 
which comprises of “everything that can be derived from a combination of patents. Because 
Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act already excludes pharmaceutical products from patentability 
until 1 January 2016, or a later date agreed to by the Council for TRIPS, the implications of this 
provision on the patentability of pharmaceuticals, will not be immediately known. 
 
The next opportunity for countries to further define patentability criteria is the requirement of 
inventive step, which defines the level of technical contribution required for a valid patent to be 
granted.443 The flexibility provided to WTO Members to define inventive step can be employed to 
reduce the likelihood of incremental inventions being patentable. In several European and 
developing country contexts the requirement is that of inventive step, whereas the US has a 
requirement of non-obviousness.444 As Barton noted, this lower standard of inventiveness applied 
in countries like the US has led to the granting of several patents, often with minor or trivial 
modification.445 A lower standard of inventiveness can also be used to artificially extend the 
duration of patent protection and to block generic competition. It may therefore be in the interests 
                                                 
440 See Section 102 of the Act which also contains a number of exceptions to this rule including disclosures made a 
year of less before the filing date and disclosures made in patent applications. 
441 According to Section 9(2):  
“Everything made available to the public anywhere in the world by means of written disclosure (including drawings 
and other illustrations) or by oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other non-written means shall be considered prior art 
provided that such making available occurred before the date of the filing of the application” 
442 Section 4(2)(a) reads: 
“An invention shall be new if it is not anticipated by prior art, or where a theoretical person, who is highly skilled in 
the area, could not derive the invention from a combination of publications” 
443  Correa (2007) at 4. 
444 Which is why, footnote 5 of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement equates inventive step with non-obviousness, as 
noted in UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) page 360.  
445 Barton, J (2000) Reforming the patent system, Science Volume 287, 17, 1933-1934. 
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of countries with high burdens of disease such as Tanzania to facilitate competition by adopting a 
high level of inventive step.  
 
The requirement of inventive step also determines what a person skilled in the art (such as a person 
trained and experienced in pharmaceutical formulation) could consider obvious in the light of such 
prior art. According to Correa, having a requirement for an inventive step: 
 
‘…implies that the “person skilled in the art” should be deemed to have some specialized 
knowledge and not simply somebody with very general or ordinary knowledge in the relevant 
technical field. A person skilled in the art is not just an expert in his technical field but a person 
who should have some degree of imagination and intuition. He should not only rely on the 
documents found in the novelty search, but apply his experience and his knowledge. Such an 
examiner should be particularly strict when examining the inventive step.’ 446 
 
Mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act in further defining an inventive step,447 notes that for the 
requirement of inventive step to be met, an invention “would not have been obvious to a person 
skilled in the art on the date of the filing of the application.” Zanzibar’s Act448 on the other hand 
considers a patent application as having passed the inventive step test if it would not have been 
obvious to a person “highly skilled in the art”. As discussed in chapter five, the implications of 
Zanzibar’s threshold of ‘highly skilled’ are that fewer patents are likely to be granted by a person 
with more expertise in the field of technology than a person who is ordinarily skilled. 
 
Another important flexibility available to patent authorities in Zanzibar is an extremely broad 
provision in the Act which depending on how it is interpreted, provides for the exclusion of “new 
uses or forms of known substances" from patentability.449 This flexibility in essence, can be used 
to support a policy position that only genuinely innovative products, as opposed to those with 
incremental modifications are subject to patent protection, and is extremely broad in its wording 
without the types of qualifications that have been applied in a similar provision found in India’s 
                                                 
446 Ibid Correa (2007), 
447 Section 10. 
448 See Section 4(3). 
449 Section 3(1)(v). 
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Patent Act of 2005. Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Amendments Act prevents the patenting of 
new uses and new forms of known substances, but with the qualification that these new uses of 
forms do not enhance efficacy.450 
 
Both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar Acts provide protection for utility models even though the 
TRIPS Agreement does not explicitly require this.451 The provisions on utility models are as a 
result of Tanzania’s membership of ARIPO. The Harare Protocol provides for utility models as 
long as they meet criteria of novelty and industrial applicability.452 Utility models have 
traditionally been used to offer a limited period of exclusivity for inventions that would not 
otherwise be protected by patents or other forms of intellectual property and can be a way of 
encouraging innovation among local inventors. Statistics from a number of countries in east Asia 
who made use of  utility models suggest that, combined with a relatively weak intellectual property 
protection system which encourage the transfer of technology, utility models can encourage 
technological learning.453  
 
While there is no internationally accepted definition of a utility model, it has been noted that they 
confer an exclusive right to the inventor that novelty is a criterion for protection and that utility 
models relate to the technical character of the invention, with the duration of protection varying 
between six and 25 years.454  Mainland Tanzania provides for 7 years of protection from the 
moment of filing455 without the possibility of renewal for ‘Utility Certificates’ as they are referred 
                                                 
450 Section 3(d) reads: 
“the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known 
efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere 
use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at least one 
new reactant.” An explanatory clause notes that for the purposes of the Section, efficacy will be the key factor in 
determining whether incremental modifications involving “salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, 
particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance” are 
patentable.  
451 Suthersanen notes that it may be arguable that Article 2(1) of the TRIPS Agreement recognises all relevant 
provisions of the Paris Convention provisions which recognises utility models. See Suthersanen U,  (2006) ‘Utility 
Models and Innovation in Developing Countries’, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 
Geneva [Online] Available: http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf   
452 See Section 3(2) of the Harare Protocol. Rule 18(2) of the Harare Protocol notes that the normal rules of novelty 
and inventive step ass agreed by the Contracting Parties of ARIPO shall apply to utility models. 
453  Kumar N, (2002) ‘Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian Countries’ Commission of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Study Paper 1(b) London [Online] Available:  
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp1b_kumar_study.pdf  
454 Ibid Suthersanen at 2. 
455 As per Section 74(5). 
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to under the Act, and requires that an invention be new and industrially applicable.456  There is no 
requirement for the applicant to demonstrate an inventive step, which, as discussed above is an 
important way to safeguard against the granting of protection for incremental innovations as 
opposed to genuine inventions. In the interests of increasing the likelihood of generic entry into 
the market, for stricter criteria should be implemented in Tanzania’s legislation, especially for 
novelty, failing which could allow originator companies to obtain seven years of exclusivity for 
minor variations on existing inventions, thereby stifling competition. Zanzibar’s Act confers 10 
years of protection for utility models.457 On the matter of criteria for protection, Zanzibar’s Act 
not only requires novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, but has strict criteria for 
protection. Novelty is destroyed if it has been disclosed anywhere in the world, by written or oral 
disclosure, or use, prior to the filing date. The requirement of inventive step is not as stringent as 
in the Patent Act, requiring only that the invention does not result in a common manner “from the 
prior art to a person having ordinary skill in the art”. This could be altered to refer to a person 
highly skilled in the art. 
 
Other countries have explored innovative ways to safeguard against intellectual property being 
used as an unnecessary entry barrier to generic pharmaceutical competition. The Brazilian 
authorities enacted an intellectual property law458 to implement to the TRIPS Agreement with 
specific reference to Article 27.2 which provides grounds for the exclusion of certain subject 
matter from patentability. A few years later they introduced the concept of prior consent, which 
requires that even after pharmaceutical patent applications are reviewed and approved by the INPI, 
they should be sent to the Ministry of Health’s surveillance agency (ANVISA) for ‘prior consent’ 
before a patent is granted. Even though the principle of prior consent has been both praised 459 and 
criticised,460 Shadlen461 notes that when it was initially introduced, the INPI, which, with the 
passing of a new law faced a flurry of pharmaceutical patent applications it may not have had the 
expertise to examine, may have welcomed ANVISA’s role which resulted, according to sources 
                                                 
456 Section 74(1). 
457 Section 24(1). 
458 Lei de Proprieadade Industrial, LPI, passed in 1996, which entered into force in 1997. 
459 See Drahos P, (2010) “The Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, UK.  
460 Kunisawa V, ‘Patenting Pharmaceutical Inventions on Second Medical Uses in Brazil’ (2009) 12 Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 297. 
461 Shadlen K, (2011) ‘The rise and fall of “Prior consent” in Brazil’, The WIPO Journal: Volume 3, Issue 1, 103. 
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in approximately 5 percent of pharmaceutical patents applications granted by INPI being 
rejected.462 The active consultation by BRELA officials of the TFDA or experts in pharmacology 
before the ratification of ARIPO granted pharmaceutical patents may be a mechanism that 
countries like Tanzania with its two patent authorities may wish to investigate further as a way of 
reducing ever-greening. 
 
d) Duration of Patent, Terms, Disclosure,  Exhaustion of Rights and Exceptions to Patent 
Rights 
 
The minimum duration of patent terms prescribed by Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement, is a 20 
year period that commences from the time a patent application is filed.463 Despite the LDC 
exemption being applicable to Tanzania, the patent legislation of both Mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar currently provide for patent protection on various subject matter. Zanzibar’s Industrial 
Property Act provides for 20 years of patent protection 464while Mainland Tanzania provides for a 
10 year patent term,465 both applicable from the date of filing. For Zanzibar, the patent term is not 
applicable for pharmaceutical products or processes given their exclusion from patentability as 
discussed above. As mainland Tanzania does not take advantage of the transition period and grants 
pharmaceutical patents, the 10 year patent term is a way to safeguard public health priorities, as 
there are no Tanzanian companies are involved in pharmaceutical innovation. However, the 10 
year patent term currently available in mainland Tanzania is in conflict with the 20 year period of 
patent protection granted by the Harare Protocol, another example of the policy misalignment that 
exists between the Harare Protocol and the enabling legislation of ARIPO Member States.  
 
One of the key principles present in most modern patent laws is that of disclosure.  As part of the 
social contract between an inventor and society, the inventor is required to disclose how the 
                                                 
462 Shadlen K, (2009) ‘The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico’, Journal of Comparative politics, 42 
(1). p 41-58 [Online] Available:  
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27051/1/politics_of_patents_and_drugs_in_Brazil_and_Mexico_%28LSERO%29.pdf   
463  Article 33 reads: 
“the term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing 
date.” The meaning of Article 33 was confirmed in the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel report of Canada- Term of 
Patent Protection. See WT/DS170/R, paragraph 6.103.   
464 Section 13(1)(a). 
465 Section 39(1). 
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invention is carried out so that society may use the invention once a period of exclusive use of the 
invention granted to the inventor elapses.466 In addition to this requirement of disclosure, some 
countries, including the US place an additional requirement on the inventor to provide the best 
mode of invention.467 The disclosure requirement with an option to require the best mode of 
invention are reflected in the TRIPS Agreement in Article 29 of TRIPS which reads:  
“1. Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art and 
may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the priority date of the application. 
2. Members may require an applicant for a patent to provide information concerning the 
applicant's corresponding foreign applications and grants.” 
As an accommodation of the US law, Article 29 provides WTO Members with the option to require 
that the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor at 
the filing date. This clause, meant to facilitate the transfer of technology from the inventor to 
society, presents an important opportunity for eastern and southern African countries interested in 
providing enabling legal environments to encourage local pharmaceutical industries. While 
mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act requires disclosure of the best mode of carrying out the 
invention,468  Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act also in requiring disclosure of the best method 
known to the patent applicant at the time of application also requires that the disclosure of the 
invention shall be in a manner “sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out 
by a person having ordinary skill in the art.469 It could be argued that this places an additional 
                                                 
466 This was first articulated in the landmark case of Liardet versus Johnson [1778] 1 WPC 52 at 54 where  Lord 
Mansfield stated that:  
“the law relative to patents requires, as a price the individual should pay the people for his monopoly, that he should 
enroll, to the very best of his knowledge and judgment, the fullest and most sufficient description of all the particulars 
on which the effect depended, that he was at the time able to do.” 
467 35 U.S.C. No. 112, paragraph 1 (1984) provides that the patent specification should contain a written description 
of the invention, the manner and process of invention in full, clear and exact terms to enable any person skilled in the 
art pertaining to the invention to make and use the invention, and to provide the best mode known to the inventor. 
468 Section 35(2)(a). 
469 See Section 6(4) (a). Section 6(4)(d) describes a person having ordinary skill in the art as a citizen of Tanzania and 
who carries out his profession in Zanzibar, having acquired an average expertise and experience in the technical field 
of the claimed invention. 
Page | 138 
 
obligation on the inventor to disclose the invention in a way that local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers without highly specialized training, would be able to understand how to carry out 
the invention. The Act explicitly identifies technology transfer as a goal in authorizing the 
Registrar to adapt the description in foreign patent applications to the ordinary skill in the art of 
the citizens of Tanzania residing in Zanzibar.470 
 
Another potential opportunity to reduce the cost of treatment for HIV, particularly where 
medicines are under patent in countries with significant generic pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity is parallel importation. For the purposes of being able to import patented medicines from 
the most affordable global source, the international exhaustion of rights doctrine would be most 
suitable for Tanzania. Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act provides for parallel importation with the 
adoption of an international exhaustion of rights doctrine.471 This important flexibility is not 
available in the legislation of mainland Tanzania, which provides for national exhaustion of 
rights.472 The issue is regulated in the Tanzania Food Drugs and Cosmetics Act473 which reads 
that: 
 
“the Authority may if it is in the public interest so to do, authorise parallel importation of any 
drug.” 
 
Limiting parallel importation only to instances where is considered to be in the public interest is 
unnecessary. The Patent law could be amended to explicitly provide for international exhaustion 
of rights. 
 
e) Exceptions to Patent Rights, Compulsory Licensing and Government use 
 
Another important opportunity available within the TRIPS Agreement to balance the rights of the 
patent holder with those of the consumer lies in Article 30.474 The wording of Article 30 provided 
                                                 
470 Section 6(4)(e). 
471 Section 12(4)(a)(i). 
472 Section 38(2). 
473 See Section 73(2) of Act 1 of 2003. 
474 Article 30 reads: 
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WTO Members with the policy space to determine circumstances under which exceptions will be 
provided to exclusive patent rights. Reasons to limit patent rights range from non-commercial use 
by the public sector to facilitating the generic entry of a competing product as soon as the patent 
term expires by applying for marketing authorisation before the expiry of the patent term.475 WTO 
Members are expected to comply with a three step test in applying Article 30 exceptions: 
 
(i) The extent to which the patent-holder’s rights are curtailed should be limited;476 
(ii) The exception to patent rights should not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent;477 and 
(iii) The exception should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent holder.478 
For the purposes of increasing access to health technologies, the Article 30 exception of greatest 
significance is the bolar exception, as when correctly employed, it facilitates generic entry as soon 
as practicably possible, upon expiry of a patent.  A 2010 study found that of 95 countries surveyed, 
56 percent had incorporated the bolar exception into national legislation, although there is a large 
disparity (72 percent of OECD countries and13 percent of African countries had incorporated the 
bolar exception into national legislation).479 Mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act does not provide for 
a bolar exception, which may constitute an important omission, especially if industrial policy seeks 
to promote generic competition. Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act contains a clause on the bolar 
                                                 
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions 
do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” 
475 See UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 430. This is referred to as the Bolar exception as discussed in the US case of Roche 
Products v Bolar Pharmaceuticals, 733 F.2d. 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The exception had been introduced into US law 
in 1984 to permit the testing of generic medicines to obtain bioequivalent certificates required to obtain marketing 
approval before the expiration of a patent. 
476 UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 434, referred to EC-Canada Panel report in concluding that it would be justified in 
reading the text literally, focusing on the extent to which legal rights have been curtailed, rather than the size or extent 
of the economic impact. 
477  This is language that dates back to the Berne Copyright Convention, see Article 9(2).  
478 According to the EC-Canada Panel Report at Paragraph 7:69  
“To make sense of the term “legitimate interests” in this context, that term must be defined in the way that it is often 
used in legal discourse – as a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are “justifiable” in the sense 
that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.” 
479 WIPO (2010), Patent related flexibilities in the multilateral legal framework and their legislative implementation 
at the national and regional levels, CDIP/5/4. Geneva [Online] Available:  
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=19686 
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exception.480 Mainland Tanzania’s patent Act does not specify but implies that all forms of 
scientific research are included in its limitation of rights clause, 481 while Zanzibar’s Industrial 
Property Act explicitly notes that the research exception applies to both scientific and commercial 
research.482  
 
Mainland Tanzania’s compulsory licensing provisions can be made more public health sensitive 
in a number of substantive and procedural ways. The Patent Act does not mention anticompetitive 
behaviour by the patent holder as a ground under which a compulsory license can be issued, despite 
the presence of flexibilities available under Article 31(k). Second, even though Article 31(b) 
removes the requirement for prior negotiations in the event of a national emergency or situation of 
extreme urgency, mainland Tanzania does not take advantage of this flexibility, opting only to 
waive the requirement for prior negotiations in the event of public non-commercial use.483 An 
amendment to the Act could increase this policy latitude. The final substantive point concerns the 
role of the courts. Mainland Tanzania’s Act makes extensive reference to the role of the courts in 
the granting and administration of compulsory licenses. For instance, the courts must be satisfied 
that, there had been an attempt to negotiate a voluntary license,484 the courts have the right to award 
a compulsory license, to determine the terms and conditions associated with the license,485 the 
transfer 486 and the cancellation487 of compulsory licenses. 
 
The next point is one of procedure. The Act does not prescribe any guidance as to what constitutes 
a reasonable amount of time for negotiations for a voluntary license to be undertaken before an 
application for a compulsory license can successfully be brought.488 What constitutes a reasonable 
time for negotiations to be conducted may vary depending on the subject matter of the license, 
                                                 
480 Section 12(4)(a)(v). 
481 Section 38(1) notes that patent rights shall not apply for acts done for scientific research. 
482 Section 12(4)(a)(iii). 
483 Under Section 62(2), public non-commercial use is the only ground for which the requirement of prior negotiations 
is waived.  
484 Section 56. 
485 Section 57. 
486 Section 58. 
487 Section 59. 
488 Article 56(a) provides that a compulsory licensing application can only be successful if the applicant satisfies the 
court that: 
“… he has asked the owner of the patent for a contractual licence but has been unable to obtain such a licence on 
reasonable terms and within a reasonable time.” 
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with the reasonable time for voluntary negotiations involving essential medicines likely to be 
shorter than for instance, licenses for the manufacture of garden furniture. With this distinction in 
mind, any future amendments of the law could distinguish between what constitutes a reasonable 
period of time for the negotiation of voluntary licensing agreements involving essential and non-
essential commodities, with the former being allotted a shorter period of time, and the 
classification of what is considered an essential commodity.  
 
Zanzibar’s recently drafted Patent Act has incorporated several of the flexibilities missing in 
Mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act. For instance, anti-competitive behaviour such as the abuse of 
exclusive rights is a ground for which a compulsory license application may be brought.489 Also, 
the Act waivers the payment of a royalty fee for compulsory licenses issued on the basis of anti-
competitive behaviour,490 and removes the need for prior negotiations with the patent holder.491The 
Act also specifies what constitutes a reasonable amount of time thus further defining Article 31(b) 
of the TRIPS Agreement. On one hand, if a request to negotiate a voluntary license has not resulted 
in the agreement of a licensing agreement on reasonable terms and conditions within 90 days, a 
compulsory license may be issued.492 However a second provision authorizes a request to be made 
to the relevant authority to issue a compulsory license within 45 days from the request for a 
contractual license, if the parties are unable to reach agreement on reasonable terms and 
conditions.493 Finally, Zanzibar’s compulsory licensing provisions are far less likely to be delayed 
by legal disputes.  The primary authority entitled to issue a compulsory license is the minister 
responsible for industrial property matters, with occasional guidance (in the limited circumstances 
around determining what constitutes anti-competitive behaviour) from administrative or judicial 
bodies.494  
 
Consideration must also be given to the 30 August 2003 Agreement and the 2005 Decision to 
Amend Article 31 of TRIPS, as discussed in chapter two. Although this decision awaits the 
ratification by at least two-thirds of WTO Members to come into effect and questions continue to 
                                                 
489 Section 14(1)(a) (ii) and (iii). 
490 Section14(1)(b). 
491 Section 14(6)(b). 
492 Section 14(1)(a)(vi). 
493 14(6)(a). It is unclear whether the 90 day or 45 day period is applicable. 
494 Section 14(1)(a)(ii). 
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be raised by several WTO Members as to the effectiveness of the mechanism to resolve the 
problem posed to countries without sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the 2003 
Agreement entitles countries to use the temporary waiver, without necessarily ratifying the 
amendment to Article 31. The waiver can be incorporated into national legislation to facilitate its 
use. United Republic of Tanzania has not ratified Article 31bis amendment and Mainland 
Tanzania’s legislation pre-dates the 30 August 2003 Agreement and is thus not reflected into the 
Patent Act. Zanzibar on the other hand has chosen to incorporate the Decision into its Patent Act.495 
Although Zanzibar has no domestic manufacturing capacity, this provision allows the authorities 
to re-export any quantity of medicines received under the 30 August 2003 Mechanism, under, 
hypothetically for instance, a pooled procurement agreement that the EAC Partners or SADC 
Member States may have used to purchase essential medicines, which is a potentially important 
pathway to the sustainability of treatment programmes in the country. 
 
f) Provisions relating to Intellectual Property Enforcement 
 
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement regulates the minimum standards on intellectual property 
enforcement, required of WTO Members. These relate to remedies and procedures of both an 
administrative and judicial nature. A general principle that is applicable to part III of the TRIPS 
Agreement is the requirement that all rules and procedures be fair and equitable.496 This principle 
is applicable not just to right holders but all stakeholders including generic companies, government 
authorities and consumers. Additional principles may be of interest to Mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar. First, intellectual property enforcement procedures should not constitute a legitimate 
barrier to trade;497 Second, decisions on the merits of a case shall be made expeditiously, and only 
on the basis of evidence which the parties were offered an opportunity to be heard.498Third, any 
                                                 
495 Section 14(1)(b) of the Act waives any remuneration due to a patent holder if a compulsory license under the 30 
August 2003 Agreement results in the importation of a product into Zanzibar.  Section 14(7) complies with the 
requirement of Article 31(f) that a compulsory license shall be predominately for domestic use, but then explicitly 
lists any exports that take place under the 30 August 2003 Agreement, as being exempt from the requirement of 
predominantly domestic use. 
496 According to Article 41.2 of TRIPS, the procedures should not be unnecessarily complicated, costly, or entail 
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted time delays. 
497 See Article 41.1. 
498 See Article 41.3. 
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decisions made by administrative or judicial authorities on intellectual property enforcement 
should be subject to review.499 
 
An essential component of the TRIPS Agreement in the context of countries being able to rely on 
generic medicines to sustain national treatment programmes is the definition of “counterfeit,” 
which refers to a specific form of trademark infringement.  Article 51 of the TRIPS Agreement,500 
defines trademark counterfeiting as referring to: 
 
“Any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which 
is identical to a trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which 
cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which 
thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law 
of the country of importation.” 
 
The second key provision of the TRIPS Agreement in relation to access to health technologies is 
Article 61, which requires criminal sanctions in the event of:  
 
“wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale” 
 
Another relevant section of the TRIPS Agreement under the enforcement chapter relates to the 
rules of evidence which enable a judicial authority to order both parties to provide evidence to 
substantiate their assertions when a proceeding on intellectual property enforcement is taking 
place,501 and to make preliminary or final determinations on the basis of what evidence is provided, 
in the event a party to the proceeding refuses or fails to provide evidence within a reasonable period 
of time.502  
 
                                                 
499 Article 41.4 reads: 
“Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of final administrative decisions 
and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Member’s law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal 
aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case.” 
500 Footnote 14(a), in particular. 
501 See Article 43.1 of TRIPS. 
502 See Article 43.2 of TRIPS. 
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In general, the Patents Amendment Act applicable in Mainland Tanzania does not refer to most of 
the provisions in chapter III of the TRIPS Agreement, which it need not, given its LDC status. 
However, Section 70 of Patents Registration Act of Mainland criminalises patent infringements, 
even introducing the possibility of a lengthy custodial sentence which is certainly not required by 
the TRIPS Agreement.503 The criminalization of intellectual property infringement for anything 
other than for the wilful trademark infringement and copyright piracy on a commercial scale could 
be have unintended and negative consequences. The South African Judge Harms, has noted several 
reasons why the criminalisation of intellectual property infringements could be problematic. Some 
of these include the reminder that a large number of patents are revoked during litigation and that 
patent invalidity is often a defence to allegations of infringement, that patents can sometimes cover 
more than one invention, that most criminal courts are not qualified to handle patent litigation and 
that it can be almost impossible for customs and law enforcement officials to determine whether a 
product the right holder alleges is infringing on a patent, is actually doing so.504 Criminalising 
patent infringements in such a broad manner could result in the use of limited state resources to 
enforce what are private rights. Considering that the majority of patent applications at the ARIPO 
Secretariat pertain to pharmaceutical products, it is not difficult to foresee examples where this 
might occur. 
 
Another key shortcoming of the existing legislation in Mainland Tanzania lies outside of the scope 
of the Patent Act. In 2008, regulations to supplement the Merchandise Marks Act of 1963505 were 
enacted 506 and contain a definition of counterfeit,507 which, if broadly interpreted could exceed 
the narrow reference to trademarks contained in the TRIPS Agreement and include generic 
medicines. Given the conflation between counterfeit and generic medicines within the EAC in 
                                                 
503 According to Article 70.1 of the Patents Registration Act: 
“Any person who intentionally infringes a patent shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction be liable to a 
fine not exceeding five hundred thousand shillings or to a term of imprisonment of five years or to both that fine and 
imprisonment and forfeiture of the goods made through that patent.” 
504  Harms L, (2007)  The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights by Means of Criminal Sanctions: An 
Assessment,  WIPO/ACE/4/3, page 15, [Online] Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_4/wipo_ace_4_3.pdf 
505 Cap 85 of 1963. 
506 As per Government Notice 89 enacting the Merchandise Marks Regulations  
507 For instance, Section 2 of the Merchandise Marks Regulations defines a counterfeit as: 
“the manufacturing, producing, packaging, re-packaging, labeling or making whether in Tanzania or elsewhere, of 
any goods, where those protected goods are imitated in such a matter and to such a degree, that those other goods 
are identical or substantially similar copies of the protected goods.”  
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recent years as discussed in chapter two and the detention of legitimate generic medicines 
predominantly manufactured in India, and detained in various European transit hubs en route to a 
number of African and Latin American countries, any definition of the term counterfeit that could 
be broadly interpreted to negatively impact on generic medicines could be problematic and should 
be narrowed accordingly.  
 
(g) Test data protection 
 
As noted above in chapter two, Article 39.1 and 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement require WTO 
Members to the protection undisclosed information508 against unfair commercial use and entitles 
natural and legal persons to prevent the disclosure, acquisition or use of information in a manner 
contrary to honest commercial practice where the information: 
 
 (a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of 
its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control 
of the information, to keep it secret. 
 
Article 39.3 requires the protection of undisclosed test or related data required for the marketing 
approval of pharmaceutical products, the generation of which involved a considerable effort, from 
unfair competition.509 Many authors argue that this requirement to protect undisclosed test data 
refers only to originator data for new chemical entities and that Article 39.3 does not apply where 
for instance, marketing approval is granted by the TFDA or ZFDB, relying on the existence of a 
prior registration elsewhere.510 As noted in chapter two, there is no precedent on the interpretation 
                                                 
508 Regarded as a form of intellectual property under Article 1.2 of TRIPS. 
509 An important clarification to Article 39 is provided in footnote 10 found in the TRIPS Agreement: 
“For the purpose of this provision, “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” shall mean at least practices 
such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of 
undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices 
were involved in the acquisition.”  
510 See UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 530. 
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of Article 39 of TRIPS beyond the dispute between the US and Argentina on the interpretation of 
Article 39.511 For LMICs, particularly those with high burdens of disease, an interpretation which 
prevents the drug regulatory authority from making use of information available to it, including 
information in the files of competitors such as an originator company to determine the safety, 
quality and efficacy of generic medicines would be time consuming and wasteful. Also, given the 
high level of reliance of Tanzania on generic medicines, an interpretation that favours the earliest 
entry of generic products with a corresponding increase in competition could be the priority of the 
authorities in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar.512   
 
Yet, Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act 513appears to require a minimum period of 5 years during 
which time generic pharmaceutical companies would be precluded from relying of test data 
submitted by an originator company to the TFDB. This may produce a period of exclusivity where, 
despite the availability of several public health related TRIPS flexibilities in the Patent Act, a 
period of test data exclusivity may prevent generic competition.514 The period of test data 
exclusivity is somewhat moderated with the inclusion of a sub-section515which prescribes that, 
upon agreement of “adequate compensation” by the originator and generic company, or where 
there is a failure to agree, then upon the payment of an amount set by the ZFDB, the originator’s 
test data may be relied upon by a generic company on a limited number of grounds516 These include 
circumstances where the obtaining of the test data resulted in the “suffering of humans and 
animals”, in situations of extreme urgency, failure to commercialize the originator product within 
a reasonable period of time after the obtaining of marketing approval or where the data concerns 
a product for which a compulsory license has been issued, subject to the payment of a payment of 
adequate remuneration that also takes into account the commercial value of the test data. The Act 
                                                 
511 Argentina- Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Protection for Agricultural chemicals (WT/DS171/1) 
512 See Correa C, (2002) ‘Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals. Implementing the 
Standards of the TRIPS Agreement’, South Centre, Geneva 
513 Section 72(5) (a) and (b). 
514 Section 78 of the Act also provides for a range of remedies in the event a court rules that unfair use of test data 
occurred in terms of Section 72 of the Act, which includes the authority to order the court to cancel the marketing 
approval of the infringer, payment of damages by the government authority to the originator company for unauthorized 
disclosure of test data, or the payment of adequate compensation to the originator.  
515 Section 72(5)(c). 
516516 Section 72(5)(c)(i),(ii)(iii) and (iv). 
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also notes that pharmaceutical test data shall only be protected after the expiration of the LDC 
waiver.517 
  
While these attempts to mitigate data exclusivity may be useful safeguards, the larger question to 
be asked is why authorities in Zanzibar opted to provide for five years of test data exclusivity, 
considering that the origins of a five year data exclusivity proposal are from the business 
communities of developed countries.518 The fact that data exclusivity has been agreed to by several 
LMICs through intellectual property chapters contained in Free Trade Agreements involving 
developed countries,519 and the mounting evidence as discussed in chapter two which shows that 
data exclusivity may impede generic competition 520  support the argument that Zanzibar should 
not be providing for data exclusivity in its Industrial Property Act. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Despite the discussion of the TRIPS flexibilities available to Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar and 
the appraisal of the extent to which they have been incorporated into enabling legislation and 
regulations, it is important to remember that neither Mainland Tanzania or Zanzibar are currently 
required to provide any level of intellectual property protection because of the LDC waiver.  
Although the likelihood of further waivers being available to LDCs like the United Republic of 
Tanzania exists, both territories already have long standing legislation on various aspects of 
intellectual property that impacts on access to treatment. A blanket rejection of intellectual 
property legislation because a country is entitled to do so, is not necessarily in the developmental 
interest of even an LDC like Tanzania. There may be some aspects of intellectual property 
regulation that may be within its advantage to adopt, such as a regime on access and benefit sharing 
and the regulation of bio-prospecting.  
 
                                                 
517 Section 72(5)(h). 
518 As per the “Statement of views of the European, Japanese and the United States Business Communities” noted in 
UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 523. 
519 See for instance, Article 15 of the Free Trade Agreement between the US and the CAFTA countries, Article 15.10 
of the US Morocco FTA and Article 4 of the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement. 
520 As noted above, a 2007 draft of the Industrial Property Bill of Zanzibar on file with the author, prepared by 
WIPO contained a lengthy data exclusivity clause.  
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The first hypothesis advanced in chapter one is supported by fact that Tanzanian authorities to 
date, are heavily reliant on donor support to sustain national HIV treatment programmes. This may 
account for the lack of urgency in comprehensive legislative reforms. While Zanzibar passed 
patent legislation in 2008, mainland Tanzania is yet to do so, and as demonstrated above, the 
country is still heavily reliant on foreign donor assistance to fund its national treatment 
programmes for HIV, TB and malaria. Another factor has been the role of various bilateral and 
multilateral providers of technical support in giving what is unlikely to be consistent advice to 
national institutions responsible for the administration of intellectual property. As noted by a 
government official, mainland Tanzania’s failure to pass draft legislation on industrial property 
can also be attributed to the decision to first finalise an IP strategy with assistance from WIPO, 
which it is believed, would better inform legislation in the country’s best interests.  
 
The fact that a comparatively low number of staff employed both at BRELA and COSTECH have 
the significant expertise on intellectual property issues highlights the capacity constraints facing 
Tanzania, a fact under-scored by the provision of technical assistance by a plethora of institutions 
which may not necessarily align with the country’s objectives around the maintenance of 
sustainable national treatment programmes.  
 
The third hypothesis advanced in chapter one, namely that a significant degree of policy 
incoherence in the form of national level legislation and regional initiatives, which if not addressed 
by law reform and increased co-ordination could undermine the incorporation and use of TRIPS 
flexibilities in the national and regional level, thus bringing the sustainability of treatment 
programmes into question is validated by the country example of Tanzania in a number of ways. 
First, although it is one country, intellectual property matters continue to be dealt with separately 
between the territories of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, each with their separate pieces of 
legislation each containing different degrees of public health related TRIPS flexibilities. This has 
the potential to generate complications when attempts are made to use public health related 
flexibilities. In this regard, Zanzibar’s Act, because it was only enacted more recently, contains 
significantly more public health sensitive provisions such as the LDC exemption on 
pharmaceutical patents, provisions on pre-grant patent oppositions, provisions to facilitate the use 
of the 30 August 2003 Mechanism, the exclusion of various subject matter from patentability, the 
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inclusion of principle of the international exhaustion of rights, the inclusion of important Article 
30 exceptions, and relatively streamlined and user friendly compulsory licensing provisions.  
 
For a territory of a little more than a million people and no local pharmaceutical manufacturing 
industry like Zanzibar, a regulatory environment that supports the importation of pharmaceutical 
products, as well as the regional co-operation in their procurement and re-exportation is essential. 
The opportunity exists to further improve the legislative framework in Zanzibar by removing all 
references to test data exclusivity, which if left in its current state, could constitute a key 
impediment to treatment access particularly as multilateral funding for national treatment 
programmes declines. Mainland Tanzania by virtue of its older Patent Act has far fewer public 
health related flexibilities. Mainland Tanzania’s patent legislation requires significantly more 
reform to fully incorporate flexibilities and to remove provisions around intellectual property 
enforcement that exceed the minimum requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. With a small but 
growing local pharmaceutical industry and as a country heavily reliant on generic medicines, the 
existence of legislation that may limit the availability of generic competition could have serious 
implications on the long term sustainability of treatment programmes. Ultimately, the political 
question regarding the utility and practicability of operating two patent systems in an LDC, should 
be addressed if policy coherence is to be addressed.  
 
The other aspect of policy incoherence relates to the compatibility of mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar’s legislation with the Harare Protocol of ARIPO. At present, Tanzania’s membership of 
ARIPO, and the latter’s implementation of certain provisions of TRIPS such as Article 27, 
arguably places even more intellectual property obligations on it than the TRIPS Agreement may 
require of developing countries. It should also be remembered that even if the laws of Zanzibar 
and mainland Tanzania are reformed to incorporate more public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
than they currently contain, the fact that pharmaceutical patents are examined and granted by the 
ARIPO Secretariat may continue to result in the granting of patents that are not be in the public 
health interests of the country. Two solutions present themselves to this dilemma: first, there 
should be greater substantive scrutiny of patents that are granted by the ARIPO Secretariat by 
BRELA and the Zanzibar Registry of Patents to determine whether it is in the national interest that 
patents be granted in Tanzania. Second, there may be a need to reform the rules and procedures of 
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the Harare Protocol to better represent the strategic objectives of its members. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter six. 
 
It should be noted that flexibilities which appear in Zanzibar’s law regulatory environment but are 
absent in mainland Tanzania’s include remedies in intellectual property legislation for anti-
competitive conduct. An opportunity exists to increase the remedies available to authorities for 
anti-competitive behaviour in Zanzibar’s Act and to draw a clearer nexus between competition law 
and access to treatment under both competition and intellectual property law in Mainland 
Tanzania.521  Finally, a greater degree of policy coherence is needed to balance the policy 
objectives of the country which include a desire to promote a local pharmaceutical industry and 
domestic innovators while keeping the costs of national ART programmes sustainable. This 
requires greater co-ordination between the various institutions with a vested interest in intellectual 
property policy in both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar which, despite its more public health 
sensitive legislative framework, has no ARV pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and is thus 
reliant on mainland Tanzania and foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers as a source of health 
technologies.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
521 See the Fair Competition Act of 2003. 
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5  The Incorporation of Public Health Related TRIPS Flexibilities into Patent, 
Competition and Health Legislation in South Africa: Impact on Access to Health 
Technologies 
 
 
“South Africa is now ground zero for debate on the value of strong IP protection. If the battle is 
lost here, the effects will clearly resonate… without a vigorous campaign, opponents of strong IP 
will prevail – not just on South Africa but in much of the developing world.” 
 
Excerpt from a leaked 2013 proposal by lobbying firm Public Engagement Affairs to Pharma  
 
5.1 An Introduction to Legislation with Implications on Treatment Access 
 
The Republic of South Africa maintains a complex network of laws and policies that can be 
employed to facilitate access to health technologies. While comprehensive in scope, the 
combination of laws and regulations giving effect to public health related TRIPS flexibilities are 
both outdated and contain significant gaps, some of which may prove to impede treatment access 
to health technologies. As will be discussed later in the chapter, South Africa is one of a small 
number of countries in eastern and southern Africa financing the majority of its AIDS response, a 
noteworthy feat given that the country is home to the largest number of people living with HIV 
globally.  
 
As postulated by the first hypothesis in chapter one, the vast majority of people on ART are still 
on first line treatment, which remains significantly more affordable than second and third line 
treatment regimens. Public health related TRIPS flexibilities will become more central to 
sustaining treatment programmes as patients move to newer versions of ART, some of which may 
see greatly reduced competition from generic manufacturers for prolonged periods of time.  
 
The second hypothesis advanced in chapter one asserts that there are capacity constraints within 
the relevant government departments in eastern and southern Africa that hinder the full integration 
of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the relevant national legislation and the use of these 
flexibilities when needed. While the South African government retains a comparatively large 
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degree of capacity within its government departments, this chapter will demonstrate that legislative 
gaps and capacity constraints particularly around the criteria for patentability could undermine 
government’s plans to facilitate the development of a generic pharmaceutical industry and sustain 
national treatment programmes. Finally, the third hypothesis advanced in chapter one namely, that 
a significant degree of policy incoherence exists in the form of national level legislation and 
regional initiatives, which if not addressed by law reform and increased co-ordination, could 
undermine the incorporation and use of TRIPS flexibilities in the national and regional level, will 
also be tested in this chapter. 
  
 5.1.1 South Africa’s Constitution, Bill of Rights and the Right to Health 
 
Chief among the available legal instruments in South Africa is the Constitution,522 adopted 
following the end of apartheid. The South African Constitution is widely lauded for its objectives 
to create a more equitable and inclusive society and contains a Bill of Rights523 of which the right 
to health, Section 27(1), is a key component. It provides that:  
 
 "everyone has the right to have access to health care services including reproductive health care."  
 
The South African Government is required according to Section 27(2), to:  
 
“take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of each of these rights.”   
 
In addition, Section 27(3) states that no one can be denied emergency medical treatment.524 
Reasonableness has proven to be an important component of the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
                                                 
522 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, was approved by the Constitutional Court (CC) on 4 
December 1996 and came into effect on 4 February 1997. 
523 The Constitutional Court has handed down a number of progressive judgments on civil, political, and socio-
economic rights present in the Bill of Rights ranging from the abolition of the death penalty (The State v Makwanyane 
and Another, 1995, ZACC3 at 151, 1995 (3) S.A. 391)to the affirmation of the right to adequate housing (Government 
of South Africa v Grootboom and others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) and equality for same sex 
couples to enjoy the same benefits and entitlements as married people with the case of The Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project and Eighteen Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (1 December 2005).  
524 This was interpreted by the Constitutional Court in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health [Kwazulu-Natal] 
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), to be a right insofar as the State fairly balanced available resources with those requiring 
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in interpreting the duty of the state to fulfil the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The landmark 
decision of the Constitutional Court on treatment access matters remains the 2002 case of The 
Minister of Health and Others v the Treatment Action Campaign and Others.525 The ruling came 
at a time when the government despite having the largest population of people living with HIV in 
the world, and the resources to provide nevirapine to HIV positive pregnant women to reduce the 
risk of HIV transmission to their new-borns, failed to do so, citing the costs of treatment and the 
toxicity of ARVs including zidovudine and nevirapine.526 In ordering the government to provide 
nevirapine to roll out a prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) programme “without 
delay”, the Constitutional Court also required the government to take reasonable measures to 
expand testing facilities  to facilitate the use of nevirapine.  
 
5.1.2 A brief overview of the South African Regulatory framework 
In addition to the Constitution there are a number of domestic laws that can be said to give effect 
to public health related flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement. These include provisions 
contained in the Patent Act,527 Counterfeit Goods Act528 Intellectual Property Rights From Publicly 
Funded Research and Development Act529 and Medicines and Related Substances Control Act,530 
most of which are administered by different institutions who may have different priorities and 
objectives which may not necessarily be aligned with each other. The emergence of a draft 
intellectual property Policy531 in September 2013, developed after years of consultations is an 
important step towards the harmonization and alignment of the various pieces of applicable 
legislation. Treatment activists and patients await the finalization of the draft policy532 released 
                                                 
indefinite medical treatment which, in the case of kidney dialysis, was too expensive to be made available to everyone 
who needed it.  
525 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002). 
526 The circumstances leading up to the filing of the suit by the TAC and others in the High Court, the process of 
appeal by the government and the eventual ruling are comprehensively described in Kapczynski A, and Berger J, ‘The 
Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of Socio-Economic Rights Litigation in South Africa’ in Hurwitz D, 
and Satterwaite M, eds. “Human Rights Advocacy Stories (2009) Volume 47 Foundation Press. 
527 Act 57 of 1978. 
528 Act 37 of 1997. 
529 Act 51 of 2008. 
530 Act 101 of 1965. 
531 See Government Notice 918 of 2013 issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies released the draft 
policy and invited members of the public to make comments. 
532 Treatment activists led by the TAC, MSF and Section 27 have been pressing the government to finalize the draft 
policy as a matter of urgency through a campaign known as “fix the patent laws”. In October 2013, more than 130 
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after the amendments of various pieces of intellectual property related legislation in recent years. 
These include the Intellectual Property from Publicly Funded Research and Development Act as 
well as the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill,533 meant to provide protection for 
traditional knowledge into several pieces of legislation,534 both of which were the subject of much 
criticism.535  
 
Intellectual property legislation aside, South Africa’s Competition Act536 also contains provisions 
which give effect to public health related flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed above 
in Chapter three, the Act has been successfully employed by treatment activists to reduce prices of 
certain ARVs on a number of occasions. There are also a range of laws and regulations overseeing 
the registration, distribution and dispensing of health technologies regulated by the Medicines and 
Related substances Control Act. The implications of these laws and regulations insofar as they are 
relevant to the TRIPS Agreement  will also be discussed in more detail below.  
 
5.2 The Public Health Situation in South Africa and Access to Health Technologies 
 
With an estimated population of almost 52 million at the end of 2011537 or less than 1 percent of 
the global population, South Africa remains the country with the highest number of people living 
with HIV in the world, with an estimated incidence of 6.1 million cases or more than 17 percent 
of the estimated global AIDS population at the end of 2012.538 With more than 500 000 incidents 
of TB at the end of 2011, South Africa is also home to the third largest population of people living 
with TB after India and China. This comes as little surprise when considering that people living 
                                                 
organizations wrote a letter to the Minister of Trade urging swift adoption of the Draft IP Policy, followed by a second 
open letter in June 2014 signed by more than 70 organisations.  
533 Of 2011. 
534 Including the current Trade Marks, Copyright, Designs and Performance Protection Acts. 
535 See for instance an opinion piece by Owen Dean in IP Watch entitled From South Africa Keeping Traditional 
Knowledge Traditional [Online] available: http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/12/07/from-south-africa-keeping-
traditional-knowledge-traditional-2/ . See also Barrett, A (2010) ‘Lessons from Bayh-Dole: Reflections on the 
Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act (South Africa), Journal for 
Juridical Science, Vol. 35, 30-69. 
536 Act 89 of 1998. 
537 More information on the South African census results are [Online] Available: 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/population.htm#.U7CJTqHD-P8   
538 UNAIDS (2013) Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic [Online] Available:  
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2013/gr2013/unaids_global_report_
2013_en.pdf  
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with HIV are 20 to 37 times at greater risk of contracting TB. MDR-TB and XDR-TB continue to 
pose grave challenges with approximately one out of every six global XDR-TB cases having been 
reported in South Africa.539 
 
National HIV treatment programmes for HIV have been scaled up rapidly since the intransigence 
associated with the Mbeki Administration’s AIDS response.  In 2002, there was still no national 
HIV treatment programme. A little more than a decade later, the country had the largest treatment 
program in the world, thanks to a massive investment in the AIDS response by the South African 
government. According to UNAIDS, South Africa has made the highest domestic investment in 
AIDS among all LMICs, having invested US$ 1.9 billion in 2012, a 500 percent increase between 
its investment between 2006 and 2011.540 As a consequence, as of October 2012, approximately 2 
million people were on ART through the national health care system.541  
 
As noted above, the level of domestic investment by the South African government in its AIDS 
response has borne fruit because the vast majority of patients on ART in South Africa are still on 
first line ART regimens, which are affordable.  However, public health related TRIPS flexibilities 
will begin to play a greater role as multilateral funding declines. According to an intervention by 
the Director-General of the Department of Health at the January 2014 WHO Executive Board, 
only 4 percent of people on ART through the government sponsored treatment programme were 
on second line treatment. This number must be increased to 14 percent. The Director General went 
on to emphasise the importance the public health related TRIPS flexibilities in facilitating access 
to new-generation ARVs increasingly being patented in countries with significant pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity.542  
 
South Africa has been lauded not only for the rapid expansion of its state run ART program,543 but 
also for its ability to effectively reduce treatment costs. In December 2010, the Department of 
                                                 
539Stop TB Partnership (2012), ‘Tuberculosis and mining: A challenge to a key Southern African economic sector’, 
WHO, Geneva. 
540 See UNAIDS World AIDS Day Report at 21. 
541 See Irin news story of 9th October 2012  ' Revamped AIDS Council Makes its debut’ [Online] Available: 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96492/SOUTH-AFRICA-Revamped-AIDS-council-makes-its-debut  
542 The intervention by Director General Matsoso is [Online] Available: http://keionline.org/node/1913  
543 UNAIDS (2012) ‘Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic’ Geneva [Online] Available: 
Page | 156 
 
Health announced a new government tender which introduced a reference price for various 
medicines based on information obtained from various databases including the Clinton Health 
Access Initiative and the WHO GPRM. The reference prices were considered by the government 
as an indication of what prices the government expected pay for the various medicines on tender. 
In addition to mechanisms developed to promote price stability for the duration of the contract 
period, the government developed a mechanism to systematically determine contract winners and 
volume allocations. These and other measures resulted in reduce expenditure of ARVs by 53 
percent, amounting to cost savings of US$ 685 million over the 2011-2012 period.544 The same 
approach was used in 2011 for a government tender for TB for which it was estimated that best 
practice interventions to prevent and treat TB would cut treatment and related costs by 
approximately US$ 316 million.545 However, the success in treatment scale up and cost reduction 
are tempered by the fact that with the revision of the criteria for treatment eligibility by the WHO 
in 2013, a staggering 5.1 million people were eligible for ART in South Africa as of the end 
2013.546 
  
While impressive gains have been made in treating the AIDS and TB epidemics in South Africa 
over the past decade, the disparity in cost between the most affordable first generation ARVs and 
the newer generation, of more effective and less toxic first generation ARVs as well as second and 
third generation ARVs remains high in many instances. MSF estimates that of the approximately 
15 000 patients on ART in Khayelitsha township in the Cape Town area, 12 percent had to be 
moved onto 2nd generation treatment within five years because of drug-resistance.547 It is estimated 
that the cost of the most commonly used second generation ART combination the public sector (a 
combination of zidovudine, lamivudine and lopinavir/ritonavir) cost approximately US$ 535 per 
patient per year. According to the WHO, third line treatment comprising of raltegravir, etravirine 
and darunavir/ritonavir cost approximately US$ 2 335 per patient per year in 2014.548  
                                                 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2012/20121120_UNAIDS_
Global_Report_2012_en.pdf  
544  see also UNAIDS (2013) ‘Efficient and sustainable AIDS responses: Case Studies on Country Progress’ [Online] 
Available: 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2450_case-studies-country-progress_en_0.pdf 
545 Stop TB Partnership (2012).  
546 Ibid UNAIDS 2013. 
547 As per opening remarks by Vuyiseka Dubula, then Chairperson of TAC and Mark Heywood, the Executive Director 
of Section 27, made in November 2012 at a global activist meeting on the MPP and voluntary licenses.   
548 According to the WHO GPRM. 
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In addition, the cost of TB treatment is extremely high thanks in part to a patent on an important 
medicine linezolid used to treat MDR TB. In early 2014, linezolid cost as much as US$ 65 per pill 
which amounted to as much as US$ 49 000 per patient in the private sector for a course of 
treatment. Pfizer sold linezolid to the South African Government at a discount price of  US$ 27 
per pill despite the availability of generic versions of linezolid in India for as little as US$ 8 per 
pill, amounting to an 88 percent discount in price. In June 2014, the South African Medicines 
Control Council (MCC) authorized MSF to import generic linezolid for use in its treatment 
programmes. This temporary measure is possible under Section 21 of the Medicines Control and 
Related Substances Act which allows for the sale of unregistered medicines for a specified amount 
of time and for a specific purpose. This has allowed MSF to obtain generic linezolid at Indian 
prices. Despite the fact the fact that Pfizer’s patent on linezolid expired in August 2014, the delay 
in registering generic equivalents has left Pfizer as the only supplier of the medicine in the private 
sector, which enables it to continue charging inflated prices.  
 
If the government’s treatment program is to be sustainable in the long term, additional strategies 
to keep treatment costs low will be required. An application for the fast-track registration of a 
generic version of linezolid was submitted to the MCC in May 2013. Despite its own regulations 
requiring that an application for fast-track registration be completed within nine months, as of 
October 2014, the application had yet to be processed by the MCC.549 
 
 
5.2.1 A profile of the South African Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and the Role 
of Government 
 
The South African pharmaceutical industry is the largest and the most advanced in Africa, with an 
estimated market value of US$ 3.8 billion in 2011, expected to grow to US$ 7 billion in 2018.550 
                                                 
549 According to a letter by a coalition of MSF doctors, people living with HIV and civil society activists to the 
Registrar of the MCC in South Africa. An electronic copy of the letter is [Online] Available: 
http://www.tbonline.info/media/uploads/documents/drtb_patients%2C_activists_demand_registering_generic_linezo
lid%2C_14.10.2014.pdf  
550 See Press Release by Global Business Intelligence of 7 June 2012 entitled South African Bid to Tackle AIDS 
Epidemic to Create National Pharmaceutical Market Boom [Online] Available:  
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According to the National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (NAPM), the total value 
of sales in the South African private market for pharmaceuticals in 2013 was approximately US$ 
2 billion.551  The South African pharmaceutical industry has also been identified as an important 
sector of the Industrial Policy Action Plan.552 South African generic manufacturers also have a 
growing market share in other countries in the region. As far back as 2007, they accounted for 
more than 70 percent of the US$ 1 billion in pharmaceuticals produced in the region.553 A profile 
of the local pharmaceutical manufacturers reveals a mix of research based and generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers of which Aspen Pharmacare, a generic company is the largest, 
accounting for more than 16 percent of 2011 market share.554 
 
Table 2: Ten Companies with the Largest Share of the South African Pharmaceutical  
Market 
 
 
Rank 
 
Company 
 
Value in US$ 
(Thousands) 
Percentage 
of value 
 
1 Aspen Pharmacare 408, 874 16.3 
2 Adcock Ingram 245,392 9.8 
3 Sanofi 190,751 7.6 
4 Pfizer 160,758 6.4 
5 Novartis 150,924 6 
6 Cipla Medpro 121,844 4.9 
7 Astra Zeneca 119,164 4.8 
8 Johnson & Johnson 102,614 4.1 
9 Merck 90,629 3.6 
10 Roche 82,541 3.3 
 
                                                 
http://www.gbiresearch.com/pressreleasedetails.aspx?title=Pharmaceuticals_and_Healthcare&prid=38  
551 See a submission by the South African government  to the Organization for Economic Co-operation (OECD) and 
Development on generic competition, Document number DAF/COMP/WD(2014)68. 
552 The IPAP is an industrial action plan compiled by the Department of Trade and Industry. It aims to promote 
diversification in the economy, promote a labour-absorbing industrialisation path, contribute to industrial development 
in other African countries, and facilitate a movement towards a knowledge economy. 
553 IFC  (2008) ‘The business of health in Africa: Partnering with the private sector to improve people’s lives’ 
Washington DC: IFC, World Bank Group, [Online] Available:  
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/IFC_HealthinAfrica_Final.pdf   
554 See  ‘Focus Reports (2012) Pharmaceutical South Africa Report 2012’, Johannesburg, South Africa [Online] 
Available: http://issuu.com/focusreports/docs/pharmaceuticals_south_africa_report_2012  
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(Source)  Pharmaceutical South Africa 2012 Report 
 
There are two influential industry associations in the country. The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association for South Africa (PAISA) has a membership of 18 predominantly research based 
companies, with a total of 25 percent of the South African pharmaceutical market. It represents 
South Africa on the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations 
(IFPMA).555  The generic industry has the National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
(NAPM)556 representing 90 percent of generic companies in the country, and 45 percent of its 
market share, a sign of the market dominance of Aspen Pharmacare, and Adcock Ingram who are 
not members of the NAPM. Aspen is not a member of either association, while Adcock Ingram 
has chosen to join PAISA.  
 
Founded in South Africa in 1997, Aspen has grown to become now the largest generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer in Africa with an extensive international network. The company now 
has a physical presence in 14 countries across Africa, Latin America, Europe and the Asia Pacific 
regions and supplies a combination of originator and generic medicines to more than 150 countries 
globally. It is now a top 10 generic manufacturer world-wide.557Aspen has a close strategic 
relationship with several research based companies558 which includes the right to distribute GSK’s 
pharmaceutical products in Africa, the acquisition of a GSK manufacturing facility in Germany 
and the issuing of 68.5 million shares to GSK. On intellectual property, Aspen’s strategy has been 
to negotiate voluntary licenses with research based companies for the manufacture of ARVs, a 
measure undertaken with increased frequency as illustrated by the table below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
555 Among its list of shared values available on its website include a respect for intellectual property. 
556 The NAPM was established in 1977 and is the longest standing trade association for the pharmaceutical industry 
in South Africa. Key among its objectives is to promote the use of generics, by increasing the market share and 
registration of generics by the MCC of South Africa.   
557 See Aspen Pharmacare’s website for additional information [Online] Available: 
 http://www.aspenpharma.com/default.aspx?pid=9&stepid=1&oid=9  
558  For example, Aspen’s commentary of the 2012 financial year ends results detail transactions with GSK, Pfizer, 
Novartis and Eli Lilly.  
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Table 3: List of Aspen Pharmacare’s Voluntary Licenses to Produce ARVs 
 
Patent holder ARV License Date  Royalty rate 
and conditions 
Restrictions 
GlaxoSmith-
Kline (GSK)  
 
lamivudine, 
zidovudine,  
 
 
 
lamivudine+ 
zidovudine 
(3TC+AZT)  
 
abacavir 
October 2001  
 
 
 
 
December 2003  
 
 
 
July 2009 
Royalty of 30% on 
net sales  
 
 
 
Royalty not 
exceeding 5% 
 
 
Royalty free 
Public sector and not-for-
profit organizations and 
charities in South Africa  
 
 
Public and private sector 
South Africa and Sub-
Saharan Africa  
 
unclear 
 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim (BI) 
nevirapine 
 
 
nevirapine 
October 2002 
 
 
December 2003 
15% royalty 
 
 
Royalty not 
exceeding 5% 
Public and private Sector 
in SADC Region 
 
Public and private sector 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Bristol Myers 
Squibb (BMS)  
 
stavudine 
(d4T),  
 
didanosine 
(ddI)  
 
atazanavir 
(ATV)  
 
July 2001  
 
 
August 2003  
 
 
February 2006  
 
Immunity from 
suit  
 
Licensing terms 
 unknown  
 
Non-exclusive, 
royalty-free  
technology transfer 
provision  
Public and private sectors 
in Africa  
 
 
 
 
World Bank Tier 1 
designated countries 
(approximately 70 
countries)  
 
Gilead 
Sciences  
 
tenofovir,  
 
tenofovir+ 
emtricitabine 
(TDF+FTC)  
 
April 2005 Non-exclusive, 5% 
royalty, licensing 
and distribution 
agreement  
 
Public and private system 
throughout Africa  
 
Merck and co efavirenz July 2005 Non-exclusive, 
Royalty free 
Public and private system 
in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Hoffmann-La 
Roche  
 
saquinavir 
(SQV)  
September 2006 Non-exclusive, 
royalty-free with  
technology transfer 
provision  
All Sub-Saharan Africa 
and other least-developed 
countries  
 
Tibotec Darunavir 
 
 
 
April 2007 
 
 
 
Distribution until 
demand requires 
manufacture 
 
20 countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
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rilpivirine  
rilpivirine+ 
lamivudine 
 
January 2011 Non-exclusive, 
Royalty of 2-5% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Wilson Kinsley R, (2009) and Knowledge Ecology International (2011) 
 
The South African Government’s policies have contributed to Aspen’s growth. For instance, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) introduced a Strategic Investment Program to induce 
Aspen to invest US$ 28.5 million in a manufacturing facility in the coastal city of Port Elizabeth 
to increase its pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.559 As noted above, Aspen has expanded its 
presence into several countries including its acquisition of Shelys pharmaceuticals of Tanzania in 
recent years. 
 
The two other South African pharmaceutical companies with significant market share in ARVs are 
Cipla Medpro and Adcock Ingram. Adcock Ingram is the larger of the two with a market 
capitalization of over US$ 1 billion and occupies a 13 percent share of the generic pharmaceutical 
market. It has manufacturing plants in South Africa, India and Ghana.560 Cipla Medpro was 
established in South Africa in 1994 and accounted for 12.9 percent of the local generic market in 
2011.561 The company has invested more than US$ 40 million into upgrading a Durban based 
pharmaceutical manufacturing facility, which includes continuous development, to international 
Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-operation Scheme Standards.562 
 
Because of the size of its national ART programme, the decisions the South African Government 
makes regarding the procurement of medicines have a large impact on the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry. At the end of November 2012, the Department of Health released the outcome of a 
government tender contract563 for the supply of ARVs through the public healthcare system for 
                                                 
559  Interviews with Stavros Nicolaou (Aspen Pharmacare), 28 February 2006; 19 July 2006; and, 15 December 2006 
as cited in Sprague C, & Woolman (2007) in ‘A Case Study of Aspen Pharmacare’ UNDP, New York [Online] 
Available: http://www.africa-platform.org/sites/default/files/resources/south_africa_aspen_pharmacare.pdf  
560  See the company’s website  http://www.adcock.co.za/AboutUs_CompanyProfile.aspx for additional information 
561 According to the National Association of pharmaceutical manufacturers (NAPM). 
562 See http://www.ciplamedsa.co.za/ for more information. 
563 Issued in accordance with Chapter 16 A of the Treasury Regulations published in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act 1 of 1999. 
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2013-2014, valued at almost US$ 670 million. Cipla-Medpro was awarded 25 percent of the total 
value of the tender, while Aspen Pharmacare and Adcock Ingram were awarded 20.6 percent and 
14 percent of the tender respectively.564  
 
In recent years, the South African Government has begun to develop a public sector strategy 
around drug manufacturing.  Citing the country high burden of disease, the projection that the 
number of patients who will be on treatment through public sector programs will rise to between 
3.5 and 3.7 million people by the year 2017, and the rise in treatment costs,565 the Government 
announced in 2011, its intention to develop the pharmaceutical sector as part of its industrial policy 
strategy.566 The Government also views the development of a local pharmaceutical industry as a 
way to reduce the import burden of medical products (defined as pharmaceuticals, medical 
diagnostics and devices), currently the fifth largest contributor to the country’s import burden. The 
government has noted with concern that importing 95 percent of APIs for ARVs and antibiotics is 
“a precarious situation considering the level of AIDS and TB epidemics in South Africa and the 
region.”567 The government strategy intends to produce 500 tons of APIs per annum by 2016, 
which amounts to 40 percent of projected needs.568 
 
In February 2012, the South African Government announced an initiative named “Ketlaphela” 
(which in the local language of Sesotho translates to “I will live or survive”) between a government 
subsidiary Pelchem569(pty) Ltd and the Swiss pharmaceutical company Lonza Ltd. The joint 
venture was to have established a plant to manufacture APIs in South Africa. A few months later, 
                                                 
564 The full details of the tender including the types of ARVs, dosages and prices are available from the Department 
of Health circular dated 29 November 2012 [Online]  Available:  
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/contracts/2012/hp13_2o13arv.pdf    
565 According to estimates from the National Treasury medium term estimates in the industrial policy action plan, the 
cost of pharmaceutical procurements will exceed US$ 1 billion for the 2013/2014 financial year. See Department of 
Trade and Industry (2010) ‘Industrial Policy Action Plan 2013/13-2014/15’ [Online] Available: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=162797  
566 More details on the development of a pharmaceutical manufacturing industry are found on pg. 87-92. 
567 Ibid at 88. 
568 Ibid at 90. 
569 Pelchem Ltd is a subsidiary of The South African Nuclear Energy Corporation whose purpose is to maintain and 
grow the portfolio of fluorochemical businesses as envisaged by the national industrial policy Action plan and to 
support the South African Fluorochemical Expansion Initiative. 
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the Lonza Ltd withdrew from the project citing commercial concerns.570 The South African 
government quickly announced its intention to search for a new partner.571 The total planned 
investment in Ketlaphela was approximately US$ 180 million, two thirds of which is funded by 
various South African state institutions.572 The initiative will initially focus on alleviating the 
disease burden of HIV and TB but will eventually also address the manufacturing of APIs for 
NCDs. The modalities and incentives required to ensure the sustainability of the Ketlaphela project 
will be determined by an inter-departmental task team comprising the Departments of Science and 
Technology, Trade and Industry, Economic Development, Health, and Energy, under the 
leadership of the Department of Science and Technology which suggests a degree of inter-
departmental coherence or co-operation.573  
 
However, as will be discussed in chapter six, the Department of Science and Technology has been 
actively involved in initiatives at the continental level, which if successful, would increase the 
level of intellectual property protection and enforcement among African countries. This raises the 
question of whether all the Government departments participating in the initiative are aligned as 
to what the most appropriate intellectual property policy would be for both the Ketlaphela project 
and the sustainability of treatment programmes countrywide. While the viability initiative relies 
on a variety of factors, the Government’s intellectual property policy and the retention of policy 
space available under the TRIPS Agreement will play an important role. Intellectual property 
legislation and policy relevant to access to treatment in South Africa is discussed below. 
 
5.3  South African Intellectual Property Legislation Institutions and Practices: What Impact 
on a Sustainable Supply of Treatment 
 
As discussed above, South Africa’s generic pharmaceutical industry has developed rapidly, 
making inroads into the continent and in some cases, forging strategic alliances with originator 
                                                 
570 According to a News Report  of 22 May 2013 Swiss Company Pulls Out of SA Pharmaceutical Company 
[Online] Available: http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/05/swiss-investor-pulls-out-of-sa-pharmaceutical-
company/  
571 Ibid. 
572 As per the 12 February 2012 media statement by the South African Government on the establishment of a 
pharmaceutical manufacturing plant in South Africa [Online] Available: 
 http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=24995&tid=56037   
573 Ibid. 
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companies. These alliances have been instrumental in expanding the types of health technologies 
it has been able to produce. The legislative and regulatory framework have not kept up with the 
pace of developments in the private sector given that the last significant reform of the Patents Act 
in South Africa took place shortly after the TRIPS Agreement came into force. This delay in 
overhauling the legislative framework raises questions regarding the capacity within the relevant 
government departments to fully integrate and use public health related TRIPS flexibilities. 
Moreover, as highlighted in the third hypothesis in chapter one, policy incoherence or mis-
alignment among governmental institutions responsible for the implementation of intellectual 
property policy may undermine the incorporation or use of public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities.  Various provisions found in the Patent Act, Counterfeit Goods Act, Intellectual 
Property Rights from Publicly Funded Research and Development Act and Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Act all have an impact on the sustainable supply of treatment for HIV, its co-
infections and NCDs in South Africa. 
 
The formal history of intellectual property legislation in South Africa dates back to the Patents, 
Designs, Trade Marks, and Copyright Act of 1916.574 When the 1916 Act was eventually repealed, 
each of the various intellectual property subjects was dealt with under separate pieces of 
legislation.575 South Africa joined WIPO in 1975 and embarked on reforming patent, plant 
breeding and copyright legislation soon after.576 Another wave of legislative amendments followed 
after the establishment of the WTO in 1995.577 South Africa then acceded to the Patent Co-
operation Treaty (PCT) in 1999.578 Since then, there has not been a regular process of law reform 
to comply with developments in international treaties and shifting development priorities and 
objectives such as the development of a local manufacturing industry.  
 
                                                 
574 See Teljeur E, (2003) ‘Intellectual Property Rights in South Africa: An Economic Review of Policy and Impact’, 
The Edge Institute, South Africa. 
575 Burrell T, (1999) “Burrell’s South African Patent and Design’s Law” 3rd Edition, Butterworth’s, Durban, South 
Africa. 
576 The Plant Improvement Act 53 of 1976, the Copyright and Patent Acts both passed in 1978. 
577  Such as the Intellectual property rationalization Act 107 of 1996, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 
1997, the Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997 and the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 
1997. 
578 According to WIPO, South Africa deposited its instrument of accession to the PCT on December 16, 1998 which 
came into effect in March 1999. 
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As noted above, extensive legislative reform has not taken place to incorporate public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation. The DTI is undertaking an additional phase of 
intellectual property related legislative review and had been developing a new intellectual property 
policy since 2012, 579 culminating in the publication of the draft in the Government Gazette in 
September 2013. The draft policy once adopted should eventually result in the reform of 
intellectual property legislation across a variety of subject matter including patents. The current 
policy makes some important proposals incorporating additional public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities. These include the strengthening of provisions relating to compulsory licensing and 
patent oppositions. Most significantly, the draft policy recommends that the government give 
serious consideration to establishing a substantive patent examination system.580 The DTI invited 
interested parties to submit their comments to the draft policy which prompted a plethora of 
submissions from both within and outside of the country. More than 100 submissions were 
received before the deadline from various stakeholders ranging from treatment activists, members 
of academia, industry associations within and outside of the country, United Nations entities, and 
even the European Union.581 
 
Controversy broke a few months later when a leaked email 582exposing a plot by the originator 
pharmaceutical industry to delay the adoption of the policy and the removal of public health related 
recommendations found in the draft policy was uncovered in January 2014. The email which noted 
among other things, that:  
 
“…South Africa is now ground zero for the debate on the value of strong intellectual property 
protection. If the battle is lost here, the effects will resonate… Without a vigorous campaign, 
opponents of strong intellectual property will prevail – not just in South Africa, but eventually in 
much of the rest of the developing world.”  
                                                 
579 According to Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies in a speech given at the Africa Intellectual Property Forum 
hosted by the Department of Trade and Industry in Johannesburg on 27 February 2013.The draft policy was published 
in the Government Gazette in September 2013. 
580 An electronic copy of the draft policy is [Online] Available: 
http://groundup.org.za/sites/default/files/36816_gen918.pdf  
581 See IP Watch Article of 18 November 2013 entitled Comments Received on South Africa’s Process for New IP 
Policy [Online] Available: http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/11/18/comments-received-to-south-africas-process-for-
new-ip-policy/  
582 The full text of the email is [Online] Available: http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/merck-email.pdf   
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The plot evoked a strong response from both the South African government and civil society 
groups.583 South Africa also has observer status at ARIPO.584 According to World Bank country 
classification system, South Africa is an Upper Middle Income Country (UMIC)585 According to 
its GDP, South Africa accounts for approximately a third of the entire sub-Saharan African 
economy.586 Yet, a closer look at the levels of domestic innovation reveal surprisingly low 
numbers of patent applications filed by local people and companies.  
 
A 2011 study which examined the quantity and quality of patents granted by the industrial property 
offices587 of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India and South Africa found that the vast majority of 
patents being granted in all of these countries are of developed country origin. According to the 
research, in Argentina, of the 951 pharmaceutical patents granted from the period 2000-2007, only 
15 were granted to nationals (eight companies, one research institute and 5 individuals).  In Brazil, 
278 patents were granted in 2003-2008 of which only one was granted to a Brazilian 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. Of the 439 pharmaceutical patents granted in Colombia in the period 
between 2004 and 2008, only two were granted to local applicants. In the case of South Africa, 
even though 2442 patents were registered by the then Companies and Intellectual Property 
Registration Office (CIPRO) in 2008 alone, only 10 patents were registered by local companies, 
research institutions or individuals, amounting to less than a tenth of a percent.588 These data raise 
serious questions around the rationale of having laws that do not provide for substantive patent 
                                                 
583 A news article dated 22 January 2014 by IP Watch quoted the Minister of Trade Rob Davies as saying “This is a 
lobby attempt and it’s envisioning a few dirty tricks…. This is to take it outside the realm of a normal democratic 
debate” while an incensed Minister of Health was quoted in the Mail and Guardian Newspaper of 16 January 2014 
referring to the plot as ‘genocide’  and a plot of ‘satanic magnitude.’  The reactions by MSF and Section 27 are 
[Online] Available: http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=823  
584 As provided for under Article VI of the Lusaka Agreement of 1976 which allows the organization to liaise with 
non-Member States. South Africa’s observer status means that it is regarded as a potential member of ARIPO. 
585 By the World Bank, based per capita income. The income bracket to be considered as an UMIC is US$ 4, 036 to 
US$ 12, 475. 
586 International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012) ‘Regional Economic Outlook: Sub Saharan Africa’ IMF, Washington 
D.C. [Online] Available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo1012.pdf   
587  Correa C, (2011) ‘Pharmaceutical innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing’, South Centre, 
Research Paper 41, Geneva at 7. 
588 The vast majority of patent applications came from the US certain European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK) and Japan.  See Vawda Y, (2011) ‘Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental 
Patenting and Compulsory Licensing Case Study: South Africa’ on file with author. 
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examination.589 Tellingly, despite the size and comparative complexity of its economy, South 
Africa does not have a patent office that conducts substantive pharmaceutical patent examinations. 
The absence of a substantive patent examination system appears to seriously undermine both the 
industrial policy objectives of stimulating local pharmaceutical production and maintaining 
sustainable treatment programmes. 
 
Figure 3: Nationality of Patent Holders in South Africa in 2008 
 
 
Source: Vawda, Y 2011  
 
5.3.1 Patent Oppositions, Revocations and Substantive Examinations 
As noted above in Chapter four, the TRIPS Agreement is silent on the issue of patent oppositions. 
Several countries590 provide for patent oppositions to be filed either before or after the grant of a 
patent as a way of adding an additional layer of rigour to the granting of patents which meet the 
                                                 
589 Further analysis of the data shows that in 2012, 685 patents were granted to local entities and individuals while 
5520 patents were granted to foreign entities and individuals at the same time. 
590 For instance Article 100 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) allows any person to file an opposition within 
9 months of publication of the patent on a number of grounds including insufficient disclosure of the method of 
invention, that the subject matter of the patent is actually not patentable as per the requirements of the EPC or that the 
subject matter extends beyond the content of the patent application. Several other countries including Australia, Brazil, 
Egypt, Japan and India also provide for patent oppositions. For more information, see a document prepared by WIPO 
(2010) ‘Opposition Systems’ Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Fourteenth session [Online] Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_14/scp_14_5.pdf  
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required levels of novelty, inventiveness and utility. The challenges posed by the fact that South 
African patent authorities do not substantively examine applications are further amplified by the 
fact that the Patents Act does not provide for patent oppositions before patents are registered. The 
institution that fulfils the roles and functions of a patent office is the Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission, (CIPC) launched in 2011 and  housed within the Department of Trade and 
Industry, does not conduct substantive examinations of patent applications. Instead, patent 
applications are reviewed and either approved or rejected on the basis of their compliance with 
formal requirements. The process of obtaining a South African patent includes a three step 
procedure comprising of: 
 
(i) The conducting of an initial search by the patent applicant to or a representative to 
ensure that the application will not infringe on an existing patent and meets the 
requirement of novelty 
(ii) Applying for the registration of a patent (either through a provisional or complete 
application, or through the Patent Cooperation Treaty); and 
(iii) A process of formal examination which takes approximately six months after the patent 
application has been received.  
 
Figure 4: The Patent Registration Process in South Africa 
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Source: South African Companies and Intellectual Commission (CIPC) 
 
Given the comparative complexity of South Africa’s economy, manufacturing base and industrial 
policy objectives, the absence of an office that substantively examines pharmaceutical patents 
remains a serious shortfall in the government’s plans to sustain its treatment programs. The lack 
of a substantive patent examination system and legislation that takes full advantage of the policy 
space available under Article 27 of TRIPS is amplified by an example found in a briefing note 
prepared by TAC, MSF and Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries (RIS). 
According to the note, that several patents on the third line ARV darunavir, for which the first 
global patent was filed in 1983 have extended the patent life of the medicine in South Africa to 
2028. By contrast, darunavir was not eligible for patent protection in India in 1993 because the 
country did not allow pharmaceutical products to be patented. After the 2005 Patents Amendments 
Act was enacted, subsequent patent applications for new forms of darunavir were rejected by the 
Indian patent office in light of Section 3(d) of the Act, with the result that generic darunavir became 
available in India at a comparatively early stage.591 This example highlights both the importance 
                                                 
591  See  TAC, RIS, MSF (2013) ‘Why South Africa Should Examine Pharmaceutical Patents’, Briefing Note 
[Online]Available:http://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access/Docs/Access_Brief_SApharmap
atents_ENG_2013_final.pdf  
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of establishing a substantive examination system and having comparatively strict criteria for 
patentability as part of a public health sensitive strategy.  
 
There is no explicit provision authorizing patent oppositions in South Africa’s Act. The lack of an 
expedient and accessible patent opposition provision is compounded by the potential expense and 
length of litigation to revoke a questionable patent. According to legal experts, it has been 
estimated that on average it could take up to three years to fully litigate the validity of a single 
patent in proceedings before the patent commissioner.592   
 
The Act provides a limited number of instances593 under which a patent may be revoked including 
the following: 
 
 The  applicant is neither the inventor or a legally assigned representative; 
 The grant would be in fraud of the rights of the applicant or otherwise contains a false 
statement; 
 The applicant is not patentable (including that it does not meet the criteria contained in 
Section 27 requiring an invention to be new, contain an inventive step and be capable of 
industrial or agricultural applicability; 
 Insufficient or incorrect disclosure of the method of invention in the patent claim resulting 
in a person skilled in the art being unable to make the invention; and 
 Frivolity or an invention that is against the public interest. 
While these grounds may benefit from further refinement or definition, the real barriers to greater 
use of patent revocation proceedings include the absence of patent examiners at Department of 
Trade and Industry who, if present, could have acted both as examiners ab initio in the ordinary 
conducting of their responsibilities, and who could have also been participants of an administrative 
board to hear technical arguments about the validity of patents instead of judges who may not 
necessarily have the same depth of expertise. The second key impediment is the set of onerous 
                                                 
592 Ibid Park, Prabhala and Berger at 54. 
593 Including fraud as per Section 63, even though it remains possible for the inventor or his assignee to be re-awarded 
a parent even after revocation on the grounds of fraud, or voluntary surrender, as per section 64 of the Act. 
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procedural requirements contained in the Act594 which, in essence, turn any hearing presided over 
by the patent commissioner into a judicial proceeding. For example, Section 19 (1) of the Act 
requires that: 
 
“Save as is otherwise provided in this Act, the procedure in connection with any proceedings 
before the commissioner shall, as far as practicable, be in accordance with the law governing 
procedure in civil cases in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa…” 
 
In addition, Section 19(3) of the Act requires a party to any proceedings presided over by a patent 
commissioner to be an attorney, patent agent or advocate of the High Court of South Africa. The 
third impediment concerns the general lack of information around patent claims. Section 42 of the 
Act only requires that information about a patent be published after it is granted.595 Requiring the 
publishing of information when the patent application is filed could have implications for treatment 
access. Interested parties could be provided with the opportunity to participate in patent 
oppositions.  This may be particularly important in South Africa where judicial precedent reflects 
a reluctance on the part of the Courts to revoke patents.596 
 
There are a variety of policy options597  under the current Patent Act which would make patent 
oppositions less onerous. The most important step would be to move the patent application system 
away from registration to one where substantive examinations are undertaken. While the thought 
of establishing an office that examines thousands of patents every year may appear daunting,598 an 
                                                 
594 Further elaborated upon in Sections 18 and 19. 
595 The relevant portions of Section 42 read as follows: 
(1) When a complete specification has been accepted, the registrar shall give written notice of that fact to the 
applicant. 
(2)  Such notice shall contain— 
(a) the date of acceptance of the specification; and 
(b) a statement that on publication by the applicant in the journal of the acceptance of the specification, the patent 
concerned shall be deemed to have been sealed and granted as from the date of such publication. 
596  In the case of Pfizer & Another v Cipla Medpro & Others 2005 BIP 1, the Court refused to revoke, accepting 
that the besylate salt was itself unexpected, constituted an advance on the prior art, and represented an inventive step 
forward. 
597 See Park, Prabhala and Berger at 52-55 for a discussion of possible remedies available to authorities. 
598 According to information obtained from WIPO, more than 7440 patent applications were filed in South Africa in 
2012. 
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interim measure could be the adoption of an examination system for patent applications involving 
certain sectors such as pharmaceuticals. An even more plausible starting point could be to only 
subject applications for pharmaceuticals important to meet broader government public health 
objectives to patent examination, and to focus on applications for pharmaceutical products used to 
treat AIDS, TB, viral hepatitis and key NCDs. The job of potential patent examiners could be made 
easier by the inclusion of TRIPS flexibilities such as imposing a duty on the applicant to disclose 
the best method of carrying out the invention. 
 
Other ways to facilitate patent oppositions include the providing of clear and explicit provisions 
for pre and post- grant patent oppositions complete with broad grounds under which they may 
activated or used. Broadening the scope of interested parties to include civil society and 
government is another option.599  Another important addition to patent opposition provisions 
includes the setting of timelines under which such oppositions should take place. For instance, the 
Brazilian Industrial Property Law600 requires the INPI upon accepting a request for a patent 
nullification, to give the patent applicant and the person who filed the opposition 60 days to make 
written representations. The law also requires the president of INPI to make a decision regarding 
the validity of the patent law within an additional 60 days.601  Egypt’s law gives even stricter 
timelines and gives a specially constituted administrative committee 60 days from when the 
opposition was filed to make a decision on the validity of the patent application. 
 
Patent opposition or revocation proceedings could also be simplified by replacing the judicial 
proceedings presided over by the patent controller with an administrative or quasi-judicial body 
which operate in a more informal matter. This should make patent oppositions easier, faster and 
less expensive to use than the current revocation proceedings under the Patent Act. In addition, the 
patent commissioner could be replaced with an administrative body that includes people with 
practical expertise and a sound technical knowledge of the subject matter at hand. In India, patent 
oppositions are first heard by patent controller. In Brazil, the final decision regarding the success 
                                                 
599 For example, Egypt’s law on the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (Law 82 of 2002) allows the relevant 
government department under whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the patent application falls, to oppose the 
application within 90 days from the publication of the patent application. 
600 Law 9.279 of 1996. 
601 As per Articles 53 and 54 of the law. 
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of a patent opposition lies with the head of the INPI, while in India, the Patent Controller after 
considering evidence from both parties, is responsible for deciding on the success of a pre or post 
grant patent opposition.602 Finally, a key concern should be to keep proceedings as expedient as 
possible and to prevent the unnecessary delay of the outcome of patent oppositions, including the 
strategic use of judicial systems to delay the outcome of a patent opposition.  
 
5.3.2 Patentability Criteria and Exclusion from Patentability 
 
Aside from moving away from a system of patent registration to a substantive examination system 
and providing for more explicit, broader and expedient patent opposition provisions in the Patent 
Act, other policy levers that merit closer attention by South African authorities are the criteria for 
patentability. As discussed above in chapter four, the TRIPS Agreement provides WTO Members 
significant latitude to further define criteria for patentability in their national patent legislation.  
 
In deciding what approach to take, a country like South Africa may wish to consider a variety of 
factors including the innovative capacity of its manufacturing industry in key sectors of agriculture 
and pharmaceuticals as well as the extent to which local innovators make use of the patent system. 
While recent data indicates that South Africa pharmaceutical companies accounted for almost 40 
percent of the local market in 2010, the bulk of market presence related to generic medicines, in 
particular, ARVs. As discussed in chapter two, there is increasing evidence that the granting of 
patents for incremental innovation can stifle rather than incentivise it. In determining its policy on 
patentability criteria, the question as to the quality of patents being granted and whether they are 
helping to stimulate innovation remains an important consideration.  
 
Government policy on this matter should be determined by whether the registered patents reward 
genuine innovation or are examples of ever greening. An analysis of the pharmaceutical patents 
registered in South Africa in 2008 indicates that the majority of them were so called Markush 
claims, which essentially are claims that include broad or general formulae with multiple options 
                                                 
602 Section 25(4) of the Patents Act 1970. 
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that allow for the protection, under a single patent, of up to several millions molecules.603 This is 
problematic for reasons elaborated upon by Correa below: 
 
“Markush claims raise issues concerning sufficiency of disclosure, since normally the patent 
applicant has empirically obtained only a few of the multiple claimed compounds. In addition, it 
is virtually impossible to make prior art searches for thousands or millions of compounds. They 
also pose a transparency problem, since it is very difficult for third parties to identify patent 
applications that would merit a pre or post-grant opposition.”604 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of pharmaceutical patents in South Africa 2008 by claim 
 
Source Vawda (2011) 
 
Another factor that may inform a country’s decision to set strict or lax criteria for patentability is 
the extent to which local innovators make use of the patent system. Given that South African 
individuals and companies accounted for less than a percent of pharmaceutical patent registrations 
in South Africa in 2008, and considering that policies that encourage generic competition are 
                                                 
603 Ibid Correa at 12. As elaborated upon, Dr. Markush was the founder and head of a pharma-chemical in the US and 
was a leading manufacturer of dyes. Dr. Markush had over 20 patents on synthetic dyes and related fields. In 1924, 
Dr. Markush obtained a patent on pyrazolone-based dyes (U.S. No. 1,506,316) which protected a generic chemical 
structure, in addition to the products already synthesized. Since then patenting of such structures have been allowed 
in the US. 
604 Ibid Correa at 13.  
Type of Claim
None
Product + Markush
Process + Markush
Product & Process + Markush
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advantageous regarding the sustainability of its national AIDS treatment program, it follows that 
a policy that allows patents to be granted only where genuine contributions to the state of the art 
are made, would be the most desirable one for South Africa at this stage. It also follows that the 
success of patent claims that relate to incremental innovation, second indications of pharmaceutical 
products and selection patents on a narrow gap of molecular compounds should be minimized. The 
three criteria of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability as found in the South African 
Patent Act are briefly discussed below: 
 
(i) Novelty 
According to Section 25 (1) of the Patent Act: 
 
“A patent may, subject to the provisions of this section, be granted for any new invention which 
involves an inventive step and which is capable of being used or applied in trade or industry or 
agriculture.”   
 
The definition of novelty or what is considered to be a new invention is elaborated upon in the 
Section 25(5) which notes that: 
 
“An invention shall be deemed to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art immediately 
before the priority date of any claim to that invention.” 
 
On the face of it, the Patent Act contains a public health sensitive reading of the concept novelty 
by having a requirement of absolute novelty. Section 25(6) describes the state of the art to comprise 
all matter made available to the public anywhere in the world, through written, oral description or 
any other use. This increases the requirement on the patent applicant to demonstrate genuine 
innovation. Section 25(8) for instance also notes that an invention used secretly and on a 
commercial scale shall be considered to for part of the state of the art. From a public health 
perspective, the high standard of novelty is to some degree undermined by the contents of Section 
25(9) which reads as follows: 
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“In the case of an invention consisting of a substance or composition for use in a method of 
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy or of diagnosis practised on the 
human or animal body, the fact that the substance or composition forms part of the state of the art 
immediately before the priority date of the invention shall not prevent a patent being granted for 
the invention if the use of the substance or composition in any such method does not form part of 
the state of the art at that date.” 
 
The impact of Section 25(9) is that the requirement of novelty can be satisfied even if a substance 
was already known provided the particular medical or therapeutic use for that substance had not 
been known. This greatly expands the possibility to register new patents on pharmaceutical 
products that are not only known, but already on the market.605 Park Prabhala and Berger606 also 
highlight the possible consequences of adopting narrow definition of novelty, which is the 
possibility of obtaining additional patents for the same technology over a period of time through 
the filing of selection patents,607 thereby prolonging the period of patent exclusivity. The addition 
of a provision explicitly precluding the selection of a sub-set of existing molecules from 
patentability would give further effect to the principle of absolute novelty. 
 
(ii) Inventive Step 
 
As discussed above in Chapter four, the requirement under Article 27.1 of TRIPS that a patent 
contain an inventive step has been applied in different ways by countries depending on their policy 
objectives. For developing countries whose priority should be to reduce the eligibility of 
incremental innovations to be granted patents,608 a high level of inventive step would be more 
advantageous.  
 
According to the relevant portion of Section 25(10) of the Patents Act: 
 
                                                 
605 Park, Prabhala and Berger at 29.   
606 Ibid at 28. 
607 It is common practice for pharmaceutical companies to initially file patent applications on as broad a range of 
molecules and compounds as possible, and as the period of patent exclusivity draws to a close, to select a sub-set of 
compounds for a subsequent patent application. 
608 Ibid Correa 2007.  
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“…an invention shall be deemed to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to a person 
skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms, immediately before the priority 
date of the invention, part of the state of the art…” 
 
While Section 25(10) refers to “a person skilled in the art” there is no elaboration on whether such 
person should be ordinarily or highly skilled.  One of the key criteria in evaluating the inventive 
step criterion is what a person skilled in the art (such as a person trained and experienced in 
pharmaceutical formulation) could consider the invention obvious in the light of such prior art.  
The theoretical rationale here is that a pharmaceutical patent examiner who is highly skilled and 
hypothetically speaking, has twenty years of experience working in a pharmaceutical laboratory 
and a PhD in the field of molecular chemistry is likely to consider a greater number of 
pharmaceutical patent claims to be obvious and consequently not patentable as compared, for 
example,  with a patent examiner with a Bachelor’s degree in physics with two years of relevant 
work experience. The South African Courts 609have given some interpretation to the tern “skilled 
in the art” and have proposed that an enquiry focusing on what the art or science to which the 
patent relates is, who the person skilled in the art is and what the state of the art at the relevant date 
was, are key elements in determining inventive step. Regardless of the interpretation of the term 
provided by the Court, it goes without saying that raising the requirement to a person highly skilled 
in the art is likely to increase the threshold for patentability as the patent examiner would be more 
likely to consider selection patents or new uses of known substances to be obvious. 
 
(iii)  Exclusion from patentability 
 
As noted above in chapter four, Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement provide WTO 
Members with the additional flexibility to exclude certain products from patentability. Article 27.2 
reads as follows: 
 
“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
                                                 
609 See for instance, Ensign-Bickford, Ltd. V. AECI Explosives & Chemicals Ltd, 1999 (1) SA 70 (SCA) at 80. 
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provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their 
law.”  
 
While the Patents Act contains a provision which gives some effect to Article 27.2 of TRIPS, 
Section 25 (4) does not take full advantage of the policy space provided by TRIPS. Section 25(4)(a) 
notes that: 
 
“A patent shall not be granted 
 
(a)  for an invention the publication or exploitation of which would be generally 
expected to encourage offensive or immoral behaviour” 
 
The narrow wording of Section 24(4)(a) means that patents can only be excluded from 
patentability for moral grounds whereas Article 27.2 of TRIPS allows the exclusion of certain 
subject matter as may be necessary to protect human animal or plant life or to protect public order. 
The Act could be made more sensitive to public health concerns with the inclusion of  a provision 
expressly limiting from patentability, new uses on existing or known substances regardless of how 
the patent claim is drafted, which is the essence of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Amendment 
Act of 2005. The validity of Section 3(d) was affirmed by the Indian Supreme Court in April 2013 
in its endorsement of the decision of the Patent Controller of India to reject a patent application by 
Novartis on the beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate, a drug used to treat chronic myeloid 
leukaemia and other tumours.610 The affirmation of the Indian government’s prerogative to provide 
a public health sensitive interpretation of Article 27 of TRIPS as a means of keeping the cost of 
treatment affordable, coupled with the strategic interests of the South African Government in 
investing in a domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, make compelling arguments for 
the adoption of a similar clause in the South African Patents Act.  
 
                                                 
610 The basic molecule, imatinib, had been discovered in the early 1990s and according to the Court, should not be 
patentable because of trifling changes to it. See Novartis AG vs. Union of India and Others, Supreme Court of India, 
Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 201, 1 April 2013 
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5.3.3 Duration of Patents, Disclosure Requirements,  Exhaustion of Rights and General 
Exceptions  
 
(i) Patent term durations and Disclosure requirements 
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to provide a minimum period of 20 
years patent protection,611 which appears to be the language adopted in Section 46 of the Patent 
Act. However, as described above, the impact of not strategically defining the criteria for 
patentability or the exclusion of certain subject matter from patentability can result in the extension 
of the patent term through for instance, the process of filing Markush claims selection patents. The 
20 year period of patent duration is subject to the patent being maintained in accordance with 
Section 46(2).612  According to an experienced South African patent attorney, more than two thirds 
of patents registered in South Africa expire well before the 20 year period of patent exclusivity 
elapses because maintenance fees are not paid.613  
 
As discussed above in Chapter four, Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO Members 
to require that the applicant disclose the invention in a manner that is sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. Members may also 
require applicants to disclose the best mode of invention known to the inventor at the filing date.614 
The important discretion is provided to WTO Members to require a patent applicant to provide 
information regarding corresponding patent applications and grants in other countries.615 Article 
29 of TRIPS provides two important opportunities for the South African policy makers for two 
reasons: First, for a country interested in strengthening its local pharmaceutical industry, the 
requirement for the disclosure of best mode of carrying out the invention provides a policy avenue 
to promote the transfer of technology from the innovator to others, be they state owned or private 
sector. Second, for a country with a patent registration system that should be moving towards the 
                                                 
611 The 20 years is counted from the date of filing. 
612 According to Section 46(2): 
“A patent shall lapse at the end of the period prescribed for the payment of any prescribed renewal fee, if it is not paid 
within that period: Provided that the registrar may upon application and subject to the payment of such additional 
fee as may be prescribed, extend the period for payment of any such fee for a period not exceeding six months.” 
613 Statements by Dani Dohmen of the law firm Adams and Adams at the IP forum hosted by the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry in Johannesburg on 27 February 2013. 
614 As per Article 29.1 of TRIPS.  
615 See Article 29.2 of TRIPS. 
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substantive examination of pharmaceutical patents, imposing a requirement for a patent applicant 
to disclose the status of patent claims in other jurisdictions can be instructive in applying the 
novelty requirement for patentability criteria. This information could also be of invaluable use to 
patent examiners in determining whether countries with similar criteria for novelty, inventive step 
and industrial applicability have accepted or rejected patent claims similar to those filed in South 
Africa.  
 
The relevant section of the Patents Act giving effect to Article 29.1 is Section 32(3) which requires 
a complete patent claim to: 
 
 “(a) have an abstract as prescribed; 
(b) sufficiently describe, ascertain and, where necessary, illustrate or exemplify the invention and 
the manner in which it is to be performed in order to enable the invention to be performed by a 
person skilled in the art of such invention; and 
(d) end with a claim or claims defining the invention for which protection is claimed.” 
 
While Section 32(3) requires disclosure sufficient to allow the carrying out of the invention to 
allow performance by a person skilled in the art, the failure to include a requirement to disclose 
the best mode of carrying out an invention continues to provide the inventor with a comparative 
advantage even after the expiry of the patent. Some would argue that Section 32(3) undermines 
the basic social contract between an inventor and society in terms of which the former is granted 
a period of temporary exclusivity in exchange for the technological advancement of society.616 
Moreover, the Patent Act does not contain any provisions requiring that information relating to the 
status of patent applications in other countries be provided. In the interests of meeting public health 
objectives and as an integral step towards a substantive patent examination system the introduction 
of the requirement that the patent applicant disclose the best method of making the invention 
together with information relating to the status of patent applications for the same pharmaceutical 
                                                 
616  See the recent ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Teva Canada Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2012 
SCC 60, in which the Court, in paragraph 31 noted: 
“The patent system is based on a “bargain”, or quid pro quo: the inventor is granted exclusive rights in a new and 
useful invention for a limited period in exchange for disclosure of the invention so that society can benefit from this 
knowledge. This is the basic policy rationale underlying the Act. The patent bargain encourages innovation and 
advances science and technology.” 
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compound in other countries could be an important step in South Africa, as would the requirement 
that the applicant disclose the international non-proprietary name (INN).617 
 
ii)  Exhaustion of Rights, General Exceptions to Patent Rights  
 
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement provides countries with the flexibility to determine what system 
of exhaustion of rights is applicable. Unlike most other countries, the exhaustion of rights has not 
been addressed in the Patents Act but in the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act.618 The 
implications of including Section 15 (C) in the Act which authorizes parallel importation, have 
been discussed in Chapter three. Section 15 (C) is a broadly worded provision, the relevant portion 
of which notes that:  
 
“The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain 
circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may-  
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 1978 (Act 57 of 
1978), determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the 
Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the 
market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent” 
The wording of Section 15 (C) has generated differences of opinion as to whether it can be read as 
authorizing compulsory licensing,619 or whether it was drafted to facilitate parallel importation 
alone.620 The matter was never addressed by the Courts following the decision by the 
                                                 
617 Park, Prabhala  and Berger refer to a proposal by the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance suggesting that disclosure of 
information on similar patent filings in other countries should include reference to the INN or the generic names 
assigned to pharmaceutical molecules as this would make it significantly easier to identify among a plethora of 
patent claims given the large volumes of patent filings with the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),  the EPO, 
the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and other large patent offices. In Uganda, civil society made a submission in 2012 
for the disclosure of INNs by patent applicants. However, the Ugandan Industrial Property Act passed by Parliament 
in 2013 and signed by the President in 2014 does not contain the requirement to include INNs. The submission of 
the Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development, is [Online] Available: http://www.cehurd.org/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/IP-Bill-model-provisions.pdf  
618 Act 101 of 1965. 
619 See for instance Bombach K, ‘Can South Africa Fight Aids? Reconciling the South African Medicines And 
Related Substances Act with the Trips Agreement’, Boston University International Law Journal, 19,  273-306’ 
620 As noted in Abbott F, (2002) ‘WTO TRIPS Agreement and its Implications for Access to Medicines in 
Developing Countries’ Study Paper 2a, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 53-54. 
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Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association to drop the Court case challenging the legality of 
Section 15(C).  
 
On the issue of general exceptions to patent rights, the bolar exception found in Article 30 of the 
TRIPS Agreement has been incorporated into domestic legislation with the amendment of Section 
69A(1) of the Patent Act thus making it permissible to work a patented product without the 
permission of the patent holder provided the purpose of the patent being worked is to obtain and 
submit information required to sell, distribute, market or produce a medicine in the country.621 
While it is commonly agreed that the incorporation of the bolar exception has the greatest bearing 
on the introduction of generic competition, the Act could be amended to include other general 
exceptions. The experimental use or scientific research exception in particular may be important 
for a country interested in promoting a pharmaceutical manufacturing industry in line with its 
industrial policy objectives. Many aspects of innovation entail making minor improvements to 
existing technologies. The ability of a country’s scientific community to be able to make use of 
such technologies without fear of patent infringement can only serve to strengthen the likelihood 
that such innovation would occur.622 Several developing countries including Brazil623 have 
adopted research exemptions for scientific purposes. While some authors note that countries have 
elected to specify under what grounds the research exceptions apply,624 it may be advantageous to 
the country’s public health objectives to word the research exception as broadly as possible to 
include scientific research being undertaken by generic companies.  
 
 
                                                 
621 Section 69A(1) reads as follows: 
“It shall not be an act of infringement of a patent to make, use, exercise, offer to dispose of, dispose of or import the 
patented invention on a non-commercial scale and solely for the purposes reasonably related to the obtaining, 
development and submission of information required under any law that regulates the manufacture, production, 
distribution, use or sale of any product.” 
622 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement notes that: 
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare” 
623 According to Brazil’s Industrial Property Code of 1996, acts by third parties with an experimental purpose, specific 
to scientific or technological studies or research are permissible even if undertaken without the permission of the 
patent holder. 
624 Some countries like Taiwan and Argentina allow the research exception only for non-commercial use, while others 
like Trinidad and Tobago or Turkey provide it for any experimental purposes.  
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5.3.4 Compulsory Licensing and Government Use 
As discussed above in chapter three, compulsory licensing remains the most debated and attention 
generating public health related TRIPS flexibility. Compulsory licensing provisions may prove to 
be important for local producers who for now appear content to negotiate voluntary licenses with 
originator companies as a way of expanding their product portfolios. Aside from the potential 
benefit to generic manufacturing companies such as Aspen Pharmacare Adcock Ingram and Cipla-
Medpro, the decision by the South African Government to develop a state-owned pharmaceutical 
industry to meet the public health needs of the population would be supported by the presence of 
compulsory licensing provisions which are expedient and relatively easy to use. The second reason 
relates more to treatment sustainability. When one considers that the South African Government 
invested approximately US$1.8 billion in 2012 alone in its AIDS response625 and that most of the 
medicines used to treat people living with HIV through the South African public health care 
programme are generic, as more patients require new generation ARVs some of which remain 
expensive by South African standards,626 or as new treatments for TB, Hepatitis C and NCDs 
emerge, the need to promote generic competition through the use of compulsory licenses should 
increase. The presence of effective provisions which are simple to use must be a core component 
of a public health sensitive legislative framework. 
 
Section 56 of the Patents Act regulates compulsory licensing and to some degree, incorporates 
some of the policy space provided by Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. However, a number of 
provisions impose additional conditions and requirements thus complicating their use. The first set 
of concerns with Section 56 are procedural in nature and start with Section 56(1) which reads: 
 
“Any interested person who can show that the rights in a patent are being abused may apply to the 
commissioner in the prescribed manner for a compulsory licence under the patent.” 
 
                                                 
625 Ibid UNAIDS 2012. 
626 According to the South Africa country website of the World Bank [Online] Available:  
http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa 
The Gross National Income (GNI) for South Africa in 2011 was approximately US $ 6, 960 which does not factor in 
the fact that South Africa has among the highest levels of income inequality in the world.  
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By restricting authority to issue a compulsory license only to the patent commissioner, who is 
required by the Act to be a sitting or acting Judge,627 complete with formal judicial proceedings,628 
the Act imposes the requirement for judicial proceedings to be undertaken before a compulsory 
license can be issued. The TRIPS Agreement merely requires that the decision to issue a 
compulsory license be subjected to a process of independent review, by a higher authority. This 
need not involve judicial proceedings629 and can involve the review by an administrative body 
distinct from the patent commissioner, duly appointed by a government official such as the 
minister of trade and industry, or even the minister him or herself.630 Litigation before the patent 
commissioner can take up to three years.631 A ruling by the patent commissioner can also be 
appealed, 632 thus increasing the possibility of further delays should one of the parties tactically 
opt to delay the issuance of a compulsory license.  
 
One way to prevent the possibility of a party resorting to litigation as a delay tactic would be to 
insert deadlines by which the process of a compulsory license application should take place. This 
can also be used to implement the requirement under Article 31(b) that the negotiations for a 
voluntary license must take place within a reasonable period of time. In addition to negotiations 
for voluntary licenses, timelines could be imposed for the hearing of a request for a compulsory 
license before the competent authority. Timelines can also be imposed to determine how quickly 
an appeal should be heard, and a final decision made. A further provision enabling the use, 
importation or production of a product that is the subject of a compulsory license in the situation 
of extreme urgency even before the conclusion of the appeal process could reduce the risk of a 
compulsory licensing being unduly delayed. Another option may be to increase the number of 
authorities who may grant a compulsory license beyond the patent commissioner. This could be 
done by explicitly conferring the right to issue a license to the Minister of Trade and Industry or 
an administrative body established by the Minister. 
                                                 
627 As required by Section 8 of the Act. 
628 Section 19(1) requires all proceedings before the patent commissioner to be conducted in accordance with the High 
Court rules.  
629 While judicial review is required to determine the remuneration rate set by the authority issuing the compulsory 
license, it need not delay the entry into market of the generic product, especially if the product, particularly if the 
product in question is an essential medicine. 
630 See UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 478. 
631 Ibid Park, Prabhala and Berger at 54. 
632 Section 76 
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There are a number of areas where the patents Act could be said to impede the ability of South 
African consumers to access affordable health technologies. One such instance relates to the 
grounds under which a compulsory license may be issued. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
does not limit the grounds under which a compulsory licence may be issued, a situation that was 
re-affirmed by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.633 By contrast, Section 56(2) 
limits the grounds under which a compulsory license may be issued to the following: 
 
(a) the patented invention is not being worked on a commercial scale or to an adequate extent, 
and there is, in the opinion of the patent commissioner, no satisfactory reason for such non-
working; 
(b) the demand for the patented article is not being met to an adequate extent and on reasonable 
terms; 
(c) by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences upon reasonable terms; 
(d) the establishment of any new trade or industry is being prejudiced; 
(e) it is in the public interest that a licence or licences should be granted; or 
(f) the demand in the Republic for the patented article is being met by importation and the 
price charged by the patentee, his licensee or agent for the patented article is excessive in 
relation to the price charged therefor in countries where the patented article is manufactured 
by or under licence from the patentee or his predecessor or successor in title.  
 
While a case can be made that Section 56(2)(e) provides a sufficiently broad chapeau under which 
most claims can be brought in addition to the five other specific grounds, there are three glaring 
omissions in the Act. One of these is the absence of an expedient, clearly worded provision around 
the government use of a patented product without the patent holder’s consent. A general provision 
on public non-commercial use of a patented invention can be found in Section 4 of the Patents Act, 
the relevant portion of which reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
633 Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration notes that: 
“Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
licences are granted.” 
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“…  a Minister of State may use an invention for public purposes on such conditions as may be 
agreed upon with the patentee, or in default of agreement on such conditions as are determined 
by the commissioner on application by or on behalf of such Minister and after hearing the 
patentee.” 
 
As noted above in Chapters three and four, the requirement under Article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement that prior negotiation must take place in order to obtain a voluntary license on 
reasonable terms and conditions and within a reasonable period of time is waived either in 
situations of national emergency, situations of extreme urgency or for public non-commercial use. 
Several countries have adopted wide-ranging government use provisions in which provide the state 
with the discretion to act as expeditiously as is required,634 something worth considering in the 
South African context as well. 
 
Another important flexibility available under Articles 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement is the 
possibility to issue compulsory licenses on the basis of anti-competitive behaviour. In such 
instances, the requirements under Article 31(b) are waived, as is the requirement in Article 31(f) 
that the license can only be used to predominantly supply the domestic market. This is an important 
flexibility in the South African context given the active involvement in the competition authority 
in previous matters on access to treatment.  
 
Another omission in the current Act is the absence of a provision implementing the 30 August 
2003 Decision. As noted above, the Decision allows for the wholesale export of health 
technologies produced under a compulsory license to be exported to other countries. This provision 
has added relevance in South Africa given its position both as a large producer of generic 
medicines and importer of essential health technologies. The latter may result in a potential 
revenue source for the government owned pharmaceutical industry if its plans to establish an API 
manufacturing are realised. The South African Government is well placed to use paragraph 6 of 
                                                 
634 For instance, Reichman J, (2006) ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing US Law and Practice 
with Options under the TRIPS Agreement’ presented at the AALS mid-Year Workshop on Vancouver, Canada notes 
that the US Code 1498 authorizes the government or its contractors to  make any ‘use or manufacture of a patented 
product or process “by or for the United States without license” and without incurring liability for infringement, other 
than a duty to pay “reasonable and entire compensation” to the patentee or his assignees for such use and 
manufacture.’ 
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the 30 August Decision which provides a waiver to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement for any 
regional economic organisations South Africa is a member of SADC, whose membership 
comprises at least 50 percent of LDCs. While the Government of South Africa is yet to ratify the 
30 August Decision,635 it remains possible to use the Decision without having to ratify it. As 
discussed above in Chapter four, the Patent Act in Zanzibar was amended to incorporate the 30 
August 2003 Decision although Tanzania is yet to ratify the amendment to Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
 
The final substantive concern relates to the remuneration to be paid to a patent holder in the event 
a compulsory license is issued. While the TRIPS Agreement is silent on the issue, previous 
compulsory licenses issued for public health grounds as discussed in chapters three and four have 
limited the royalty rate to no more than 6 percent of the net cost of the licensed product. Zanzibar 
has explicitly included a provision which caps the royalty rate at 4 percent where a compulsory 
license is issued for anti-competitive behaviour and for the waiver of the royalty: 
 
“Where importation takes places pursuant to the Decision of the General Council of the WTO of 
August 30, 2003 or Article 31 bis of TRIPS whichever that is applicable, and the exporting country 
issues a compulsory licence for the same patented invention.”636 
 
The inclusion of language in the Patent Act or its enabling regulations providing guidance on the 
calculation of remuneration to be paid upon the issuance of a compulsory license may be necessary, 
but worth considering. 637 
 
                                                 
635 As of October 2014, South Africa had not ratified the Decision according to a dedicated website maintained by the 
WTO Secretariat. The website is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm  
636 Section 14(1)(b) of the Patent Act 4 of 2008. 
637 Most countries that have recently issued compulsory licenses as a measure to increase access to essential medicines 
do not have provisions in their legislation providing guidance on the calculation of royalties, but rely on different 
methods to calculate royalties.  In issuing a compulsory license in March 2012 for a cancer medicine in India, the 
patent controller was guided by the UNDP Royalty Guidelines recommending that a starting point of 4 percent royalty 
adjustable up or down depending on the therapeutic value of the medicine would be an appropriate fee. See page 60 
of the compulsory licensing order of the Patent controller [Online] Available: 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf.  
The government of Indonesia for instance set a royalty rate of half a percent for compulsory licenses issued in 2004 
and for seven compulsory licenses issued for the treatment of HIV and Hepatitis B in September 2012. 
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5.3.5 Provisions Relating to Intellectual Property Enforcement  
As discussed in Chapter four, part III of the TRIPS Agreement contains the minimum requirements 
for WTO Members on intellectual property enforcement. Some of the key principles in the 
intellectual property enforcement provisions are first that they should not constitute a legitimate 
barrier to trade,638 second, decisions on the merits of a case shall be made expeditiously, and only 
on the basis of evidence which the parties were offered an opportunity to be heard and639third, that 
any decisions made by administrative or judicial authorities on intellectual property enforcement 
should be subject to review.640 Unlike mainland Tanzania which has seen the introduction of new 
legislation on counterfeit medicines which may have negative implications on access to generic 
health technologies, South Africa’s Counterfeit Goods Act641  mostly avoids the controversial 
provisions found in east African counterfeiting legislation through the exclusion of patents from 
the scope of the Act.642 That said, Section 2(1) criminalizes the sale, possession, exhibition, trade 
or distribution of counterfeit goods but does not impose the standard of “wilful trademark 
counterfeiting on a commercial scale” provided for under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement authorises judicial authorities to issue injunctions- or interdicts 
as they are referred to under South African law- preventing the entry into the market of goods that 
infringe the intellectual property. Article 44.2 does however provide an exception to the injunction 
rule, thus ensuring that medicines being imported under compulsory license are not subject to this 
provision.643 
The Justice Harms of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in commenting on interdicts has 
noted, that: 
                                                 
638 See Article 41.1. 
639 See Article 41.3. 
640 Article 41.4 reads: 
“Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of final administrative 
decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Member’s law concerning the importance of a case, of at 
least the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case.” 
641 Act 30 of 1997. 
642 The definition of intellectual property under the Counterfeit Goods Act is limited to copyright and trademarks as 
is the case in the TRIPS Agreement. 
643 This is subject to the payment of adequate remuneration, as envisaged by Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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“…final interdicts are granted as a matter of course in South Africa.  Otherwise it would amount 
to granting the defendant a compulsory licence.  It is nevertheless foreseeable that in, say, 
pharmaceutical patent cases, where public health concerns or the constitutional rights to health 
care arises, a court may have to consider whether or not to leave the rights holder to a damages 
claim instead of a final interdict”644 
With this in mind, Park, Prabhala and Berger recommend that the Act be amended in South Africa 
to include a specific provision that final interdicts shall not be granted where the payment of 
damages is sufficient adequately to compensate the patent holder or where it would not be in the 
public interest to do so.645 
 
5.3.6 Competition related TRIPS Flexibilities  
 
There are a number of reasons why competition law and policy present a good opportunity for 
developing countries to increase access to health technologies. First, it presents a fluid area of law 
under the TRIPS Agreement with no formal degree of consensus between WTO Members, the 
way for instance, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health may have brought a degree 
of certainty regarding the ambits and limitations of patent law and policy. Second, developing 
countries retain significant more policy space and the freedom to interpret and implement the 
TRIPS Agreement under competition law. Moreover, the use of competition law as a public health 
related TRIPS flexibility is not dependent on political will. 646 This is because unlike patent law, 
the initiation of competition complaints does not rely on the failure of certain parties such as 
ministries of trade and industry or health to take measures. As the use of competition law in South 
Africa has shown, action can be initiated by a range of parties including patient groups, generic 
companies, international relief organisations or interested parties that does not necessarily require 
such parties to invest significant resources. 
                                                 
644 Harms L, (2004) ‘The Role of the Judiciary in the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Intellectual 
Property Litigation Under the Common Law System With Special Emphasis on South Africa, prepared for the 
Second Session of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement, WIPO/ACE/2/4. 
645 Ibid at 78-79. 
646 Avafia T, Berger J, and Hartzenberg T, (2010) ‘Using competition law and policy to increase access to a 
sustainable supply of affordable medicines’ Paper 16, in “Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines: Papers and 
Perspectives” WHO SEARO, New Delhi,  at 200 [Online] Available: 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s17521en/s17521en.pdf  
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As noted in Chapter three, the South African Competition Act provides the most concrete example 
of how access to treatment objectives have been met by employing competition law and policy. 
The South African Act distinguishes itself from competition legislation of other countries whose 
primary focus is on preventing the monopolization of certain sectors of the economy, in that it 
explicitly provides for a broad range of economic and developmental goals as key among its aims 
and objectives.647 This is not uncommon in a number of LMICs where development objectives and 
the public interest are often listed as key drivers of competition legislation,648  but given the 
country’s recent history, the emphasis on economic development is not surprising. According to 
Hartzenberg: 
 
“Competition challenges arose from South Africa’s apartheid history, its economic isolation, 
financial sanctions and high levels of market and ownership concentration, especially in mining 
and manufacturing.”649 
 
The aims and objectives of the Competition Act are consistent with Article 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement which provides that WTO Members may adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The Act also establishes an independent investigatory body 
known as the Competition Commission,650 an adjudicatory body, the Competition Tribunal651 and 
an Appeal body Competition Appeals Court,652 to enforce the Act. Aside from its involvement in 
access to medicines and competition issues, the role played by the Competition Commission in the 
Hazel Tau complaint discussed in Chapter three, it is widely agreed that the South African 
                                                 
647 Section 2 on the purpose of the act includes among its objectives: 
“ a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
   b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
   c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans 
   e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy;  
   f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically  
      disadvantaged persons.” 
648 Hartzenberg T, (2002) ‘Competition Policy in SADC, Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 2002 Annual 
Forum) 1. 
649 Ibid Hartzenberg at 8. 
650 Section 19. 
651 Section 26. 
652 Section 36. 
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Competition Commission is a comparatively active institution with more than 2 800 intermediate 
mergers having been investigated, and 750 merger decisions having been given by the Tribunal 
between 1999 and 2011.653 
 
The Competition Act contains a list of prohibited practices such as the abuse of dominance 654 and 
within that, excessive pricing655 and refusing access to an essential facility656 in addition to a 
variety of specific exclusionary acts657 There are several other ways in which anti-competitive 
behaviour can manifest itself which go well beyond the scope of this chapter but insofar as 
provisions related to TRIPS flexibilities are concerned,658 one of the key remedies that should be 
included is compulsory licensing as envisaged by Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement. Section 
56 of the Patent Act could be expanded to include the possibility of a compulsory license being 
issued for anti-competitive behaviour and could be added as a remedy available to the competition 
tribunal659 
 
It has also been previously noted elsewhere660  that the Competition Commission could choose to 
make use of its powers in Section 79(1) of the Competition Act to prepare guidelines which can 
be used to address the interface between intellectual property and anti-competitive behaviour. 
While these would not necessarily be binding, they would provide much needed guidance not only 
to policy makers but to consumers and the private sector. Finally, both the remedy of a compulsory 
                                                 
653 See Competition Commission South Africa Annual Report 2010/2011 [Online] Available: 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Publications/Annual-Reports/CC-Final-Annual-Report-2010-2011-lowres3.pdf  
 as discussed by Staples J, and Masamba M ,(2012) ‘Fourteen Years Later: An Assessment of the Realization of the 
Objectives of the competition Act 89 of 1998’, Siber Ink CC, Westlake, South Africa. 
654 Section 8 of the Act. 
655 Section 8(1). 
656 Section 8(2). 
657 Sections 8(3) and (4). 
658 These include and are not limited to horizontal restraints such as price fixing, agreements limiting the 
geographical scope of sales, collusions and vertical restraints such as denying access to an essential facility, abusive 
of dominant position. For a thorough discussion of the various ways anti-competitive conduct may impede access to 
affordable treatment,  see Abbott F,  (2014) ‘anti-competitive behaviours and remedies available for redress’ in 
“Using Competition Law to Promote Access to Health Technologies: A Guidebook for Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries” Abbott F (ed), UNDP, New York, [Online] Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2439416  
659  Under Part D of the Competition Act regulating tribunal hearings and orders. 
660 Ibid Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg 2010 at 200. 
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license and clear grounds for its issuance on the grounds of anti-competitive behaviour could be 
included in the Competition Act itself.661 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
As discussed above, South Africa continues to shoulder a disproportionately high portion of the 
AIDS epidemic with the largest number of people living with HIV. The unprecedented public 
health crisis fuelled by the AIDS epidemic has galvanised the government into establishing the 
largest national HIV treatment programme in the world which, laudably, is mostly self-funded. 
The decision to domestically finance the bulk of its AIDS response would have contributed to the 
introduction of innovative cost reduction measures by the South African government linked to the 
national ARV tender.  
 
While non-intellectual property related mechanisms have been successfully utilised to 
significantly reduce the cost of government sponsored ART, as patients start to make greater use 
of newer ARVs which, in some cases, will remain under patent protection for lengthy periods of 
time, the public health related TRIPS flexibilities will become of greater importance as senior 
Government officials have noted, which constitutes a validation of the first hypothesis advanced 
in chapter one. The release of the draft IP policy by the DTI in 2013 is an important sign that the 
government is starting to prioritize legislative reform in order to keep treatment costs sustainable 
in the long term and an additional validation of the first hypothesis. The need to identify a long 
term sustainable source of ART is also one of the underlying factors behind the increased focus on 
local pharmaceutical production as an industrial policy objective and the decision by the 
government to establish a government owned pharmaceutical manufacturing entity with the 
capacity to produce APIs. 
 
Given its comparative sophistication and economic size, it is clear that South Africa possesses 
more related capacity both within its government and civil society sectors than any other country 
in the region to incorporate and use public health related TRIPS flexibilities. Civil society has been 
                                                 
661 Ibid at 200-201 for more recommendations regarding possible amendments to the Competition Act to remedy 
anti-competitive behaviour.  
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particularly active in using both the Bill of Rights and national legislation to facilitate treatment 
access. The South African legislative framework is also the most complex in the region with public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities present in medicines, patent and competition legislation. 
However, for all the progress the South African Government has made in the past decade aimed 
at making treatment sustainable, it lags behind on policy and legislative reform. While there is 
room for further flexibilities to be incorporated into legislation such as a clearer provision around 
patentability criteria and some general exceptions under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, and 
for the refinement of existing flexibilities such as compulsory licensing for private and public non-
commercial use, the most important policy change under the TRIPS Agreement must be the 
decision to start examining pharmaceutical patents in order reduce the number of incremental 
innovations that are automatically granted patents, and to ensure that only patents of the highest 
quality are granted.  
 
However, the fact that the Department of Trade and Industry has to date, relied on a system of 
patent registration rather than substantive examination means that it faces a critical shortage of 
qualified patent examiners to implement a change from registration to examination. This capacity 
constraint supports the hypothesis advanced in chapter two that capacity constraints in government 
departments in eastern and southern African countries could hinder the integration and effective 
use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities.   
 
As examined above, South Africa possesses a complex but rich legislative framework spanning 
across industrial property, medicines, and competition legislation that can be leveraged in order to 
increase access to treatment. While there are advantages to employing various pieces of legislation 
to promote competition or to generally decrease the cost of treatment, a consequence of South 
Africa’s legislative framework is that there are several ministries involved in administering and 
implementing relevant legislation.  
 
At present, the Department of Trade and Industry is responsible for administering the Patents Act 
while the Department of Health is responsible for the administration of the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Act and the Department of Economic Development oversees the Competition 
Act. On the other hand, implementation of the government’s plans to develop a local 
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pharmaceutical industry is led by the Department of Science and Technology with the participation 
of the Departments of Trade and Industry, Health, Economic Development, Energy and the 
Treasury. The degree to which these actors are working towards the governments common 
objectives of promoting local pharmaceutical production and sustaining large self-financed 
treatment programmes is questionable given the recent establishment of Pan African Intellectual 
Property Office (PAIPO) through the African Union.662 As will be discussed below in chapter six, 
a major proponent of PAIPO was the South African Department of Science and Technology which 
has been involved in inter-departmental discussions around the establishment of a state owned 
pharmaceutical company but otherwise is not involved in formulation, writing or implementation 
of any of the key pieces of legislation in where TRIPS flexibilities are present.  
 
The involvement of a ministry in the establishment of a regional organisation whose impact on the 
government’s treatment sustainability and local pharmaceutical production objectives is unclear 
which supports the third hypothesis advanced in chapter one regarding the policy incoherence 
between national stakeholders and the potentially harmful impact this could have on the 
sustainability of national treatment programmes. Another sign that the various government 
stakeholders are not necessarily aligned was the notable absence of any official from the 
Department of Health from a forum organised by the Department of Trade and Industry in 
February 2013 to discuss the role of intellectual property in facilitating treatment access in 
Africa.663  
 
                                                 
662 Following a decision in 2007 by African Heads of State and Government of the African Union to establish PAIPO, 
African Ministries of Science and Technology have been leading efforts to establish a single African intellectual 
property agency. The AU Scientific, Technical and Research Commission started drafting the statutes of this new 
entity with a validation exercise taking place at a stakeholder’s Workshop in 2011, in Senegal. The final draft of the 
PAIPO statute was submitted to AU Member States and at a meeting in January 2013, a decision was reached to 
establish PAIPO. In April 2014, a communiqué was adopted by the joint meeting of the chairmen of ARIPO and OAPI 
in Harare, Zimbabwe which mentioned the fact that ministers involved in the administration of intellectual property 
matters noting that they had not been consulted in African Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology 
(AMCOST) meetings which led to the establishment of PAIPO, and requesting that an urgent stakeholder’s meeting 
be convened to enable the participation of all stakeholders including ARIPO, OAPI and WIPO and that the national 
ministries responsible for the administration of intellectual property play a key role in the establishment of PAIPO. 
663 Information on the Forum can be found on the website of the DTI [Online] Available: 
http://www.dti.gov.za/business_regulation/business_regulation.jsp  
A government official noted that the absence was a manifestation of the policy tensions which existed between the 
Department of Trade and Industry on the one hand, and the Department of Health on the other, over the regulation 
of intellectual property. 
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6 South-South Co-operation: Opportunities and Challenges for Eastern and Southern 
African Countries Within the Region and Beyond 
 
“Cross the river in a crowd and the crocodile won’t eat you.”   
 
African proverb 
 
The past few years have seen an unprecedented level of activity by countries in eastern and 
southern Africa in promoting intra-regional co-operation on access to health technologies. In 
assessing the potential public health impact of efforts to date, this chapter examines the ways in 
which bilateral and sub-regional co-operation between countries with differing degrees of 
pharmaceutical production capacity in eastern and southern Africa could facilitate a sustainable 
supply of health technologies. In so doing, this chapter will examine the various sub-regional and 
continental initiatives embarked upon in recent years and test the first hypothesis advanced in 
chapter one, namely that public health related TRIPS flexibilities will become more important as 
multilateral funding declines and treatment programmes require the greater use of more expensive 
new-generation ARVs. In testing the second hypothesis namely, advanced in chapter one, namely 
that capacity constraints have impeded the incorporation and use of public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities, this chapter investigates some of the capacity constraints facing countries in the region 
which have may have led to their involvement in regional initiatives and mechanisms that appear 
in some instances to prioritize intellectual property protection and enforcement above access to 
affordable health.  
 
To test the third hypothesis advanced in chapter one, namely that a significant degree of policy 
incoherence in the form of national legislation and regional initiatives could undermine the 
incorporation and use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities in the national and regional level, 
this chapter examines how also examines how policy incoherence has impeded existing initiatives 
aimed at expanding treatment. This chapter also discusses how the reform of enabling statutes and 
examination policies at ARIPO could improve the ability of countries to promote sustainable 
national treatment programmes. The chapter also explores ways that increased co-ordination can 
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increase opportunities for regional co-operation in the EAC,664SADC665 and to a lesser degree, 
COMESA666 thus facilitating more favourable public health outcomes in the region and at 
multilateral forums where normative intellectual property related rules are developed. Finally, this 
chapter draws on how intellectual property legislation and policy reform can be used to facilitate 
south-south co-operation in the region. 
 
6.1 Opportunities for sub-regional co-operation in the East African Community  
 
The EAC was officially established on 30 November 1999 with the signing of a treaty by the 
original three Partner States – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.667 The Republic of Rwanda and the 
Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007668 thus bringing the membership 
to its current number of five. The EAC aims to deepen the integration process among the five 
Partner States, thus resulting in the establishment of a customs union,669 the adoption of a Common 
Market Protocol and plans to adopt a Monetary Union Protocol.670 The EAC Customs Union 
requires Partner States to conclude protocols in the cooperation in intellectual property rights, 
which shall spell out the objectives, scope of co-operation and institutional mechanisms for co-
operation.671 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
664 Given Tanzania’s membership of the EAC. 
665 South Africa and Tanzania are two of the 15 Member States of SADC. 
666 While Tanzania withdrew from COMESA in 1999, all the remaining Partner States of the EAC- Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda- are still Member States of COMESA.  Furthermore, several SADC Members also continue to 
be Members of COMESA, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
667 The treaty came into force on 7 July 2000 upon ratification Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
668 Burundi and Rwanda became full Members of the Community with effect from 1 July 2007. 
669 As ratified by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 2004 and subsequently by Burundi and Rwanda in 2008. The 
customs union is being implemented incrementally with the eventual goal of an integrated trading bloc in mind. 
670 In November 2007, the EAC heads of state directed the EAC Secretariat to develop a strategic framework to fast- 
track the achievement of the monetary union. Negotiations to conclude a Monetary Union Protocol commenced in 
January 2011. See EAC Secretariat “East African Community Facts and Figures 2012” Arusha, Tanzania [Online] 
Available: http://www.eac.int/statistics/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=153  
In July 2013, agreement was reached on a draft protocol which will lead to the integration of the Members financial 
markets over a 10 year period subject to the meeting of milestone targets by individual members. 
671 Articles 38.1(d) and 38.2 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community.  
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Figure 6: Map of the East African Community 
 
Source: East African Community 
 
The Treaty establishing the EAC notes that its Partner States may work together to promote public 
health goals.672 In line with the Treaty, an area identified early in the regional integration process 
was that of intra-regional co-operation to increase access to treatment for HIV and its co-infections. 
The growing expectation that countries in eastern and southern Africa should assume greater 
domestic responsibility for treatment programmes673 coupled with a rapid scale up in HIV 
treatment has prompted countries in the EAC to more rigorously explore industrial and regulatory 
options to make treatment programmes sustainable. Two of them: the EAC Regional 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan of Action and the EAC TRIPS Protocol are discussed below 
in more detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
672 Article 118 (e) of the Treaty authorises its Partner States to undertake measures for the promotion of quality health 
in the Community. 
673 Moszynski P, (2010) ‘Donor fatigue is slashing access to AIDS care in Africa, warns charity’ BMJ; 340:c2844.  
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6.1.1 EAC Regional Pharmaceutical Manufacturing plan of Action  
 
The EAC Partner States developed a Regional Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan of Action 
(EAC-RPMPoA) from 2012-2016 for a number of reasons.674 First, they were mindful of the large 
number of EAC citizens living with HIV, TB, malaria and other diseases who would be in need of 
sustainable treatment options, which, it was increasingly felt, required an investment in local 
pharmaceutical production.  
 
Table 4: Anticipated need for medicines to treat HIV, TB and Malaria in the EAC  
 
Cases/need/demand 
 
 
             Malaria            Tuberculosis               HIV/AIDS 
2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 
Number of cases 
(000s) 
141,050 191,463 437 603 3,990 5,338 
Total need 
(USD, 000s) 
185,541 309,224 3,516 4,847 218,494 488,893 
Effective demand 
(USD, 000s) 
4,391 59,997 1,640 2,805 56,251 131,157 
 
Source: East African Community Regional Pharmaceutical manufacturing Plan of Action 
 
Second, they were driven by a commitment to make as much progress as possible towards attaining 
as many of the health related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as possible by the 2015 
deadline. Third, they were conscious of the shift in policy space available to countries with 
significant pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, most notably, India’s implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement as of 1 January 2005. Finally, the then looming deadline of 1 January 2016, by 
which time, the exemption granted to LDCs under the Doha Declaration675 created a sense of 
urgency. The objective of the RPMPoA is to develop an efficient and effective pharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry that could one day supply national, regional and international markets with 
                                                 
674 See The EAC Regional Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan of Action 2012-2016, East African Community 
Secretariat, Arusha at 13 [Online] Available: 
http://feapm.com/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/EAC_Regional_Pharmaceutical_Manufacturing_Plan_of_Actio
n.pdf  
675 Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration. 
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medicines required to treat both communicable and non-communicable diseases676 through  the 
promotion of competitive and efficient regional pharmaceutical production, the strengthening of 
pharmaceutical regulatory capacity in the region and increased use of  public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities towards improved local production of pharmaceuticals. 677  
 
With the overall aim of improving local production prospects, the intellectual property related 
objectives of the RPMPoA are: 
 
(i) National and regional sensitization on intellectual property rights and public health 
related WTO-TRIPS flexibilities; 
(ii) Adoption of a regional policy framework and guidelines to effectively implement 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities; and 
(iii) Domestication of public health related TRIPS flexibilities within national laws. 
The eventual success of intra-regional co-operation on local pharmaceutical production depends 
on the optimal use of policy space available under the TRIPS Agreement by each Partner State of 
the EAC. The second hypothesis postulated in chapter one of this thesis, namely, that there are 
capacity constraints within the relevant government departments in the region that hinder the full 
integration of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into the relevant national legislation is 
supported by the numerous national and regional capacity strengthening events being organised 
by bilateral and multilateral organisations with a focus on intellectual property and treatment 
access.678 These capacity strengthening activities have been on-going for a number of years within 
the EAC.679 In the case of Zanzibar these activities led to the adoption of a new Industrial Property 
                                                 
676 Ibid EAC at 30. 
677 Ibid EAC at 30. The full lists of objectives are discussed in more detail between pages 30-32. 
678  These include events organized by The South Centre, TWN, UNDP, WHO, UNIDO, UNCTAD, GIZ, WTO and 
WIPO. 
679 For example, in 2005, UNDP held a training workshop in Arusha for Partner States of the EAC on public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities. Since then, national workshops for trade and health officials have been held for mainland 
Tanzania in 2005 by the WHO and then in 2006 by UNDP in partnership with TWN and WHO. Another national 
workshop was held in Zanzibar in 2007 by UNDP focusing on inserting more public health sensitive provisions into 
a draft Act prepared by WIPO. Two national workshops were also organised by UNDP in Uganda in 2011. Numerous 
national and regional workshops have also been held in various EAC Partner States by GIZ, UNCTAD, and UNIDO 
since 2006. The US PTO has undertaken trainings focused on intellectual property enforcement. Several workshops 
have also been held by WIPO on a broad range of intellectual property matters, some of which are listed on the WIPO 
website [Online] Available: 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/archive_meeting.jsp?meeting_country=176. .. 
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Act in 2008,680 an in the case of both Burundi,681 and Rwanda,682 to the adoption of new intellectual 
property laws in 2009. Neither Kenya683 nor mainland Tanzania,684 have undertaken significant 
amendments to their patent legislation with implications for treatment access in the past decade 
though a draft Act was prepared for Mainland Tanzania by WIPO, which is also assisting with the 
finalisation of a policy as discussed in chapter four.  
 
6.1.2 The EAC Regional Policy on Intellectual Property and TRIPS Protocol 
 
Aside from provisions present in the Customs Union Protocol, the Treaty establishing the EAC 
notes that Partner States agreed to undertake to promote intra-regional co-operation in the field of 
science and technology through the harmonisation of policies on the promotion and protection of 
intellectual property rights and to undertake such additional activities in that regard as the Council 
may determine.685 Intra-regional co-operation on public health related intellectual property has 
taken two forms: a regional intellectual property policy on using public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities686 and an EAC regional Protocol on public health related TRIPS flexibilities both of 
which are discussed below. 
 
The genesis of the EAC regional policy dates back to 2005, when the Secretariat launched an 
initiative to harmonise policies, legislation and regulations on intellectual property in order to 
facilitate intra-regional trade and local pharmaceutical production of essential medicines. The EAC 
Secretariat with the support of GIZ finalised the policy in February 2013. Designed as a ‘roadmap’ 
to EAC Partners on what type of law reform is required of each country to optimise policy space 
available in the TRIPS Agreement, the policy makes several key recommendations for each 
Partner State regarding the integration of public related TRIPS flexibilities into national 
                                                 
680 Ibid chapter four. 
681 Intellectual property law 1/13 of 2009. 
682 Law 31 of 2009 on the Protection of Intellectual Property.  
683 Industrial property Act of 2001. 
684 The Patents Registration Act of 1995. 
685 See Articles 103.1 (i) and 103.2 of the Treaty establishing the EAC. 
686 the EAC Regional Intellectual Property Policy on the Utilisation of Public Health Related WTO-TRIPS Flexibilities 
and the Approximation of National Intellectual Property Legislation [Online] Available: http://www.cehurd.org/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2013/05/EAC-TRIPS-Policy.pdf  
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legislation. A brief summary687 of the recommendations in the policy in relation to various public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities can be found in Appendix two. 
 
The recommendations in the EAC regional policy on intellectual property have been replicated in 
a draft Regional Protocol on public health related TRIPS flexibilities.688 The value added of having 
directives on intellectual property addressed in the Protocol is that it provides clear political 
guidance to the Partner States about the common objectives, and interpretive value where needed. 
However, unlike a treaty,689 the Protocol does not create a legal obligation on the Partner States to 
enact legislation giving effect to its contents.  
 
As discussed above in Chapter two, the EAC has in recent years, seen the emergence of anti-
counterfeiting legislation, both at the national 690 and the regional levels with the draft EAC anti-
counterfeiting policy and Bill.691 In the case of the EAC, the draft Bill contains a problematic 
definition of anti-counterfeiting692 which neither captures the definition provided by the WHO693 
which makes it clear that counterfeiting can affect both originator and generic medicines, nor the 
                                                 
687 The full list of recommendations on these flexibilities and others including exclusions from patentability, patent 
oppositions and disclosure requirements as well as some recommendations related to ARIPO are found on pages 13-
21 of the policy. 
688 Draft East African Community Regional Protocol on Public Health Related WTO-TRIPS Flexibilities (2010), on 
file with author. 
689 According to Article 8.4 of the Treaty establishing the EAC: 
“Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to 
the implementation of this Treaty.” 
690  As discussed above in Chapter two, Kenya and Tanzania passed anti-counterfeiting legislation and regulations in 
2008, while in 2009 a draft counterfeit Goods Bill was developed in Uganda, which has as yet, not been passed.  
691 At the regional level, the EAC Secretariat commenced work to draft anti-counterfeiting policy in 2008, culminating 
in the emergence of a draft anti-counterfeiting Bill in early 2010 and the finalization of the draft Policy on ‘Anti-
counterfeiting, anti-piracy and other intellectual property rights violations. 
692 The Bill describes a counterfeit as: 
“…the possessing, manufacturing, producing or making, packaging, repackaging or labelling whether in the 
Community or elsewhere, of any goods whereby those protected goods are imitated in such manner and to such a 
degree that those other goods are substantially identical copies of the protected goods without the authority of the 
Owner of any Intellectual Property Right subsisting in the relevant Partner State in respect of Protected Goods;(or) 
the possessing, manufacturing, producing or making or applying to goods, whether in the Community or elsewhere, 
the subject matter of that Intellectual Property Right, or a colourable imitation thereof so that the other goods are 
calculated to be confused with or to be taken as being the Protected Goods of the said Owner or any goods 
manufactured, produced or made under his license without the authority of the Owner of any Intellectual Property 
Right subsisting in the relevant Partner State in respect of the Protected Goods.”  
693 According to the 1992 definition of the WHO: 
 “A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or 
source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include products 
with the correct ingredients, wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient quantity of active 
ingredient or with fake packaging.”  
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TRIPS Agreement694 which limits its definition of counterfeit to trademarks. Beyond issues of 
definition, there are also public health implications around several other provisions in the draft 
EAC anti-counterfeiting Bill including criminal liability, rules around the seizure and storage of 
suspected counterfeit goods, rules of evidence during hearings over suspected counterfeit goods, 
as well as goods in transit and liability over the loss or damage of goods. It is not clear when the 
draft EAC anti-counterfeiting policy and Bill will be finalised, but it remains important that the 
flexibilities so carefully articulated in the regional intellectual property Policy and Protocol are not 
diluted by an over-reaching if well intentioned anti-counterfeiting policy and legislation.  
 
In conclusion, the EAC’s relatively small membership, coupled with its recent history of co-
operation on intellectual property and local pharmaceutical manufacturing matters has increased 
the likelihood of successful intra-regional co-operation to promote access to treatment. Four of the 
six territories in the Community: Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zanzibar, have recently amended 
industrial property and patent legislation and have mostly incorporated public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities required to facilitate treatment access although additional policy space remains 
unused. As discussed above in chapter four, law reform planned for mainland Tanzania as well. 
However, as discussed overly broad draft anti-counterfeiting legislation could unnecessarily 
complicate the opportunities for effective regional co-operation.  
 
6.2 Opportunities for sub-regional co-operation in the Southern African Development 
Community  
 
The Republic of South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania are now also both Member 
States of SADC, a regional economic community formed in 1980 initially as an alliance of nine 
                                                 
694 Article 51 of the TRIPS Agreement limits its definition of counterfeit to trademarks and notes: 
“counterfeit trademark goods” shall mean any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a 
trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be 
distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of 
the trademark in question under the law of the country of importation.”   
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countries aiming to reduce reliance on then apartheid South Africa.695 SADC has a current 
membership of 15 States.696  
 
Figure 7: Member States of SADC  
  
Source: SADC Secretariat 
 
SADC co-operates on a wide range of development related issues with 22 protocols having been 
concluded and signed including protocols on trade, health and legal affairs. In response to the high 
burdens of disease in the region, SADC has been compelled to prioritize the development of a plan 
to scale up and maintain treatment programmes for HIV and TB, with an eye on increasing levels 
of NCD burdens in the region. A SADC Protocol on health has been in force since 2004.697 Article 
10 of the SADC Health Protocol calls on countries to co-operate in harmonizing, and where 
appropriate, standardising policies in a number of areas, including on the treatment and 
management of communicable diseases. Shortly after the entry into force of the Protocol the SADC 
pharmaceutical Programme was established in 2005 to enhance the capacities of Member States 
to effectively prevent and treat diseases that are of major concern to public health in the region by 
                                                 
695 As discussed in more detail in ‘Southern Africa: toward Economic Liberation; a declaration by the governments 
of independent states of Southern Africa made at Lusaka on the 1st April 1980.’ 
696  Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.   
697 The SADC Health Protocol was developed in 1999 and entered into force in 2004 upon reaching a threshold of 
ratifications required.  
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addressing matters concerning access to quality medicines. It aims to improve the availability of 
affordable; safe; efficacious; and effective essential medicines of acceptable standard. 698 The most 
significant amount of intra-regional co-operation on intellectual property and access to medicines 
in SADC has taken place under the SADC Pharmaceutical Business plan. 
 
6.2.1 The SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan: Implications for Member States  
 
Developed in 2007, the main aim of the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan is to improve 
sustainable availability and access to affordable, quality, safe, efficacious essential medicines.699 
The modalities for doing so include harmonizing essential medicines lists and treatment guidelines 
in the region, developing local pharmaceutical production capacity, strengthening the capacity of 
drug regulatory authorities in the region to control the marketing, sale and distribution of 
medicines, promoting the joint procurement of medicines by SADC Member States to harness 
efficiencies generated by economies of scale and to co-ordinate the implementation of  TRIPS 
flexibilities to increase access to treatment.700 The Pharmaceutical Business Plan has benefitted 
from the involvement of donors who have established the Southern African Regional Programme 
on Access to Medicines and Diagnostics (SARPAM) to support the implementation of the 
Business Plan.701 
 
Several of the strategies outlined in the Business Plan whether they relate to increasing local 
pharmaceutical production levels in the region, or the importation of either patented702 or generic 
medicines703 may rely on the ability of SADC Member States to use public health related TRIPS 
                                                 
698 See the According to the SADC Pharmaceutical Business plan of 2007-2013, page 8 [Online] Available: 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/SADC%20PHARMACEUTICAL%20BUSINESS
%20PLAN%20-APPROVED%20PLAN.pdf  
699 Ibid SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan at 14. 
700 See pages 13-17 of the Pharmaceutical Business plan for more information. 
701 Funded by the UK Department for International Development, (DFID) SARPAM was established in October 
2011 and is operational until December 2014.  Its purpose is to promote a more efficient and competitive market for 
essential medicines in the Southern African region to meet the health needs of poor people. More information on 
SARPAM is available [Online] at: http://www.sarpam.net/about-sarpam-2/about-sarpam   
702 Through parallel importation. 
703 This may either be the importation of generic medicines through a compulsory license to one country in the SADC 
region. It could also be through the use of the 30 August 2003 Mechanism. At present, more than half of SADC’s 15 
Members, namely, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia are classified as LDCs. 
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flexibilities. Since the start of 2013, SARPAM has been strengthening the capacity of countries on 
incorporating public health related TRIPS flexibilities, in partnership with UNDP.704 As is the case 
with the EAC, several multilateral and civil society organisations have engaged in capacity 
development activities around intellectual property and access to essential medicines for SADC 
Member States.705 The involvement of several organisations in activities to strengthen the capacity 
of various officials on intellectual property issues is an indication of the lack of sufficient capacity 
in the region on these issues. It is often also an enabler of policy incoherence given the different 
advice provided to countries in the region by various organisations. 
 
As discussed above in chapter three, countries in eastern and southern Africa have a mixed record 
of success in employing public health related TRIPS flexibilities to increase access to treatment. 
This mixed record of success applies to the SADC region too. Zimbabwe’s government use order 
in 2003 resulted in a price reduction in a commonly used ARV, while two compulsory licenses 
issued by Zambia and Mozambique for local production of a widely used combination ARV did 
not result in the production of the medicines. 
 
Unlike the EAC however with its relatively small membership of five Partner States, and long 
history of regional and economic integration, SADC has a far larger membership of 15 countries 
and has only recently prioritized economic co-operation and regional integration after years of 
advancing a common political agenda. SADC also has three official languages,706 and large 
disparities in economic development between its Members.707  While there has been an increase 
in law and policy reform to facilitate regional co-operation in order to increase access treatment, 
                                                 
704 As of October 2014, national meetings had been held in Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, the Seychelles, Botswana, and 
Zimbabwe with plans to undertake additional trainings in Swaziland before the end of 2014. See SARPAM [Online] 
Available: http://www.sarpam.net/about-sarpam-2/pacts/ttatm-trade-trips-and-access-to-medicines   
705 These include SARPAM, The South Centre, Third World Network, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, UNDP, WIPO, WHO 
the WTO as well as the USPTO. 
706 English, French and Portuguese.  
707 According to the IMF, between 2005 and 2009, South Africa alone accounted for approximately 65 percent of 
SADC’s nominal GDP. Eight countries accounted for less than 10 percent of the nominal GDP. Seychelles and 
Mauritius are listed in 46th and 80th place respectively out of 187 countries ranked by the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) of 2012, while Malawi, Zimbabwe Mozambique and Democratic Republic of the Congo 
are ranked in 170th, 172nd, 185th and last place respectively. 
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since the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan was adopted in 2007, only Namibia708 Zanzibar,709 
Botswana710 and most recently, Seychelles711 have amended their laws to incorporate more public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities. A number of countries in the region are in the process of 
amending their intellectual property legislation, which presents an opportunity to incorporate more 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities as envisaged by the Pharmaceutical Business Plan. As 
discussed above, South Africa is amending its intellectual property legislation,712 as is Zambia,713 
Lesotho,714 Swaziland,715 Malawi,716 and mainland Tanzania.717 
 
Despite the flurry of activity in some SADC Member States regarding to patent law reform, there 
is no indication from a number of countries in the region including that Angola,718 DRC,719 
Madagascar,720Mauritius,721 Mozambique,722 or  Zimbabwe723 are planning any intellectual 
property reform that would further integrate public health related TRIPS flexibilities into their 
domestic legislation. There are also large disparities between countries regarding the extent to 
which public health related TRIPS flexibilities required to facilitate regional co-operation have 
been incorporated. For example, of the 16 patent and industrial property laws currently in force in 
                                                 
708 With the passing of the Industrial Property Act 1 of 2012 [Online] Available: 
http://www.lac.org.na/laws/2012/4907.pdf  
709 Industrial Property Act 4 of 2008. 
710 Industrial Property Act of 2010 [Online] Available: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9602  
711  As of October 2014, Seychelles was in the final stages of WTO accession and to this end, passed the Industrial 
Property Act 7 of 2014. 
712 With the release of the draft IP Policy by the DTI as discussed above in chapter five. 
713 A draft Patent Bill was developed for Zambia in 2011. According to a patent examiner with the Patents and 
Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), the new Patent Bill contains several public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities and has been introduced to Parliament. See a presentation made by Chilambwe at a WIPO seminar entitled 
‘Regional Seminar for Certain African Countries on the Implementation and Use of Several Patent-Related 
Flexibilities’ in Durban, South Africa, in January 2013 [Online] Available: 
 http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent_policy/en/wipo_ip_dur_13/wipo_ip_dur_13_ref_t7c.pdf  
714 Intellectual Property Order 5 of 1989 as amended in 1997. 
715 Swaziland is in the process of replacing its Patents, Utility Models and Industrial Designs Act No. 6 of 1997 with 
a draft Patents Bill developed in 2012 which is yet to enter into force. SARPAM and UNDP are providing technical 
support to integrate public health related TRIPS flexibilities.  
716 Malawi is the process of adopting its first Intellectual Property Policy. The Malawi Law Commission has also 
embarked on the process of revising the 1957 Patents Act according to SARPAM. 
717 As early as in 2006, WIPO Provided Mainland Tanzania with a copy of a WIPO model industrial property law, 
on file with author.  
718 Industrial Property Law No 3/92. 
719 Law No. 82-01 of 1982.  
720 Ordonnance No. 89-019 instituant un régime pour la protection de la propriété industrielle en République 
démocratique de Madagascar de Juillet 1989. 
721The patents, Industrial Designs, and Trademark Act No. 25 of 2002 
722 Industrial Property Code: Decree No. 4/2006. 
723 Patents Amendment Act, 1978, as amended in 2002 and 2005. 
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SADC724 only four, namely Botswana,725 Namibia,726 South Africa,727 and Zanzibar728 contain 
bolar exception provisions. Even where countries have universally adopted certain public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities such as compulsory licensing, the substantive grounds under which a 
license can be issued and the procedural processes vary greatly.729  
 
In addition to patent and industrial property legislation, there may be opportunities to insert public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities into the competition legislation of several SADC Member States. 
These include provisions to regulate the more traditional examples of anti-competitive behaviour 
such as abuse of dominance,730 or excessive pricing. These could also include specific remedies 
for measures where abuse of intellectual property rights may constitute anti-competitive behaviour 
as envisaged under Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, or for remedies under patent legislation for 
anti-competitive behaviour as envisioned for example under Article 31(k) of TRIPS as found in 
Namibia’s Patent Act.731 To date, many LMICs including those in the SADC region have 
experienced significant capacity constraints in reforming and using competition legislation to 
facilitate access to treatment.732  
 
One opportunity for intra-regional south-south co-operation could be for South African 
competition officials to share with competition authorities from other SADC countries how the 
South African Competition Act and Competition Commission have been employed to regulate 
anti-competitive behaviour in the health and pharmaceutical sectors as well as some of the positive 
and negative lessons learned through the use of competition law as a mechanism to increase access 
to treatment. In addition to competition law, other pieces of legislation of SADC Member States 
                                                 
724 Bearing in mind that the United Republic of Tanzania has two pieces of legislation. 
725 Section 25 (h) of the 2010 Industrial Property Act. 
726  Section 43(2) of the 2012 Industrial Property Act. 
727 As per Section 69.A of the Patents Act. 
728 Section 12(4)(a)(v). 
729 As seen in Chapter four in the discussion between compulsory licensing provisions in mainland Tanzania’s patent 
Act of 1987 and Zanzibar’s Industrial Property Act of 2008. 
730 As per Article 8 of the Competition Act. 
731 Section 57(c) of the Patent Act provides for a compulsory license to be issued in the public interest where the 
Namibian Competition Commission established in terms of the Competition Act has determined that the manner of 
exploitation, of the patent by the owner of the patent or his or her licensee, constitutes a restrictive business practice 
prohibited under the Competition Act. 
732 See Nayak N, in UNDP (2014) for a detailed discussion of some of the capacity constraints facing competition 
authorities from developing countries including a number of eastern and southern African countries.  
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including those related to the regulation of counterfeit goods, the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights or the regulation of medicines may be provide opportunities to further incorporation 
of public health related TRIPS flexibilities as is the case in South Africa and Tanzania. 
 
6.3 South-South: Cross Cutting Issues Relevant to Both Regions 
 
There are a number of issues of common concern facing eastern and southern African countries 
regarding regional co-operation on treatment access issues. Some of these provide opportunities 
to deepen regional co-operation, while others are potential impediments to effective co-operation 
that will have to be addressed. One important question centres around whether continental efforts 
to increase access to health technologies through the African Union’s Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing Plan for Africa constitute a synergy or a duplication of sub-regional efforts at the 
EAC and SADC.  A second consideration is the set of intellectual property concerns arising from 
the harmonisation of drug regulatory standards. A third set of considerations pertains to 
opportunities and challenges posed by intra-regional co-operation including the African Union’s 
partnership agreements with India and China on health matters well as the impact of South Africa’s 
membership of the BRICS733 and IBSA734 configurations and what implications this might have 
on treatment access in the eastern and southern Africa. 
 
One commonality between countries in Africa is the overlapping membership of a number of 
countries in regional economic organisations. Aside from the EAC and SADC, several eastern and 
southern African countries belong to a combination of other groupings including COMESA. Four 
out of five EAC Partner States are also Members of COMESA.  In addition, more than half of 
SADC Member States also belong to COMESA.735 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
733 The grouping of emerging countries comprising Brazil, China India, Russia, which South Africa was invited to 
join in 2011. 
734 The country grouping of three BRICS members, Brazil, India and South Africa. 
735 DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 8: Overlapping memberships of COMESA, EAC and SADC 
 
 
 
While COMESA with 20 Member States is the largest of the three regional economic communities, 
it is also the least advanced in achieving its goals for regional co-operation on intellectual property 
and access to treatment. Countries that belonged to more than one of the three regional economic 
communities have consistently opted to leave COMESA when overlapping membership required 
the withdrawing from a regional economic organisation.736 While the EAC has a policy and a draft 
Protocol intellectual property and TRIPS flexibilities in place, and SADC has a Pharmaceutical 
Business Plan, COMESA’s policy on intellectual property covers a broad subject matter including 
copyright, industrial property information communication technology (ICT), traditional 
knowledge, folklore and genetic resources. Moreover, its reference to the role of intellectual 
property in facilitating public health is limited to a sub-paragraph in the section on industrial 
property which calls on Member States to: 
 
                                                 
736 Lesotho and Mozambique exited COMESA in 1997, Tanzania in 2000, Namibia in 2004 and Angola suspended 
its membership in 2007. 
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“ Encourage Member States to utilize and exploit to the full the flexibilities provided in IP 
international treaties such as the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
so to facilitate access to medicines for all people particularly the marginalised of society.”737 
 
The same paragraph also urges Member States to enforce and protect intellectual property despite 
almost two thirds of COMESA’s membership comprising of LDCs.738 For instance, paragraph 
39(c) encourages COMESA Member States to: 
 
“Promote and encourage collaboration in protection and enforcement of industrial property, 
particularly the fight against production, manufacture and trade in counterfeit goods within 
COMESA.” 
 
For the purposes of optimizing policy space required to promote sustainable treatment options, it 
remains unclear whether the national policy objectives of COMESA Member States including 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zanzibar who have taken steps to incorporating public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation would be undermined by their membership of 
COMESA. It is even more important that national and intra-regional initiatives in SADC and the 
EAC are synergistic with regional initiatives being undertaken by the African Union as will be 
discussed below. 
 
6.3.1 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa: Opportunities and Challenges 
 
As discussed above in chapter one, sub-Saharan Africa shoulders a disproportionately large global 
disease burden for HIV,739 TB, and malaria as well as a growing prevalence of NCDs. According 
to projections,740 by 2030, if current trends around the retention of patients in current AIDS 
treatment programmes continue, an increase in ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease 
                                                 
737  Paragraph 39(d) of the intellectual property policy [Online] Available: http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Comesa-IP-policy-May-2013.pdf  
738  Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia.  
739 Approximately 75 percent of AIDS deaths occur in Africa. In addition, nine African countries rank among the 15 
countries with the global TB burden according to the WHO Global Tuberculosis Report of 2011. 
740 See Mathers D, and Loncar D, (2006) ‘Projections of Global Mortality and Burden of Disease from 2002 to 
2030.’ PLOS Med 3(11): e442,  [Online] Available: 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0030442  
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(stroke), and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) will make NCDs the leading cause 
of death on the continent.  
 
The AU’s projections are that the growing health needs mentioned above combined with a 
projected economic growth on the continent and other favourable factors such as the expected 
expiry of several patents on key medicines will create conditions where rapid growth in the 
pharmaceutical industry can be expected.741 At present, African countries remain large net 
importers of medicines and APIs with an estimated 95 percent of APIs and 75 percent of finished 
products consumed on the continent being imported. While an estimated 38 countries engage in 
some form of local pharmaceutical production ranging from granulation, packaging or 
formulations only two countries, South Africa and Egypt have the capacity to produce APIs.742 
 
Figure 9: The Various Stages of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
 
 
Source: PMPA Business Plan 
 
                                                 
741 See the African Union and UNIDO  (2012) ‘The Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa: Business Plan’, 
[Online] Available: 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media_upgrade/Resources/Publications/Pharmaceuticals/PMPA_Business_Pla
n_Nov2012_ebook.PDF  
742 Ibid PMPA Business Plan at 31. A large variation in capacity is reported among the 38 countries with Nigeria 
accounting for 200 registered pharmaceutical manufacturers, with Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Tunisia 
registering between 20 and 40 local manufacturers. The next tier of countries including, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe have between five to ten active companies. 
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The AU Heads of State took the political decision in 2005743 to develop a plan of action to promote 
pharmaceutical production on the continent and endorsed an initial plan in July 2007. Once 
political endorsement was obtained, the AU Commission (AUC) primarily assisted by UNIDO, 
formed a consortium to develop a more detailed Business Plan to implement the PMPA.744  
Developed on the premise that the right to the highest standard of health is a fundamental human 
right,745 and with the realisation that there was a shrinking donor pool available for the AIDS 
response746 the core aims and objectives of PMPA are to support the development of a 
pharmaceutical industry to increase access to affordable quality medicines, to ensure sustainable 
supply of essential medicines to improve public health outcomes to promote industrial and 
economic development.747 
 
The role of intellectual property as both a facilitator and an impediment in meeting the objectives 
of the PMPA are recognised by the AUC. In noting that not enough countries have incorporated 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation, and that a number of LDCs in 
the region have exceeded their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, the PMPA Business plan 
notes that: 
 
“One of the key policy and legislative changes needed in order to benefit our continent, its patients 
and local industry is in the domain of intellectual property rights.” 748 
 
The PMPA Business plan reveals the intention of the AUC to work in partnership with ARIPO, 
UNCTAD and UNDP in part to lobby for simplification of the means by which flexibilities can be 
exploited and to advise and assist governments to revise and amend their patent laws to incorporate 
                                                 
743 As per the AU Assembly Decision (Assembly/Dec.55 (IV), adopted in Abuja in January 2005. The AU is a 
continental organisation with 54 out of 55 African countries listed as Member States. Morocco left the AU in 1984 
because of the organisation’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.  
744 At the request of African Ministers of Health at a meeting held in Namibia in 2011. 
745 Ibid PMPA page 18. 
746 See UNAIDS and the Kaiser Foundation (2011) ‘Financing the Response to AIDS in Low- and Middle- Income 
Countries: International Assistance from Donor Governments in 2010’ [Online] Available: 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7347-07.pdf  
747 Ibid PMPA page 18. While it is expected that the aims and objectives of the PMPA are long term (in excess of 15 
years), it is expected that significant progress can be made in the first phase of the plan which commenced in 2013 
and is expected to last for the next five years.  
748 Ibid PMPA page 79. 
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the flexibilities, assist international GMP compliant Africa based companies wishing to make full 
use of the flexibilities in order to supply LDC markets and to work with RECs to harmonize 
national patent laws to facilitate exploitation of the flexibilities for the benefit of the continent.749  
 
The PMPA operates in tandem with the AU’s Roadmap on Shared Responsibility and Global 
Solidarity for the AIDS, TB and Malaria Response in Africa,750 a document developed to provide 
a pathway for African countries to effectively respond to large disease burdens.  Developed in 
response to the global economic crisis of the late 2000s, which has resulted in decreased funding 
for the AIDS response in Africa,751 the Roadmap acknowledges that multilateral aid budgets will 
continue to be in decline for the foreseeable future.752 The Roadmap also acknowledges the 
potential impact of India’s implementation of the TRIPS Agreement on the sustainability of 
treatment programmes. The Roadmap also concedes  that as an ‘emergency style approach to 
AIDS’ is coming to an end and that with the nearing of 2015, the deadline set for countries to meet 
their MDG targets, countries will be consolidating gains made in responding to AIDS, TB and 
malaria into broader health goals .753 
 
The Roadmap is premised on three pillars, the second of which makes important intellectual 
property recommendations for AU Members including explicit encouragement to create legislative 
environments that fully incorporate public health related TRIPS flexibilities while avoiding 
"TRIPS-plus" commitments in trade agreements. This recommendation is expected to assist in 
keeping treatment sustainable while the continent’s reliance on Indian pharmaceutical products is 
gradually off-set by an anticipated increase in continental pharmaceutical production.  While the 
Roadmap provides important strategic direction and advice to countries, responsibility remains 
with the AU Member States to implement elements of the Roadmap including those relating to 
                                                 
749 Ibid, pages 79-80 of PMPA. 
750 In January 2012, the AU Assembly Decision No: Assembly/AU/Dec.413 (XVIII), requested the AUC “to work 
out a roadmap of shared responsibility to draw on African efforts for a viable health funding with support of 
traditional and emerging partners to address AIDS dependency response” 
751 Page 7 of the Roadmap notes that as of 2012, in 27 African countries, 84 percent of expenditures for ART originated 
from international sources. It is also noted that the decline in multilateral funding resulted in the unprecedented 
cancellation of Round 11 of the Global Fund as a result of the Fund not having met its replenishment targets. 
752 According to the Roadmap, China became Africa’s number-one trading partner in 2009, and other emerging 
economies, including Brazil and India, now account for 37 percent of Africa’s trade. 
753 See page 10 of the Roadmap for a more detailed discussion on the shift from AIDS exceptionalism into broader 
health outcomes.  
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intellectual property. The Roadmap also provides strategic direction over a continental initiative 
to harmonise the rules of drug regulatory authorities on the continent as will briefly be discussed 
next. 
 
The PMPA and the AU Roadmap complement sub-regional efforts at the EAC and SADC aimed 
at facilitating increased access to health technologies. However, there are also a number of areas 
where policy incoherence at the regional level may undermine efforts to increase access to a 
sustainable supply of health technologies. The intellectual property protocols, policies and 
practices of the ARIPO do not appear to complement regional and continental initiatives on access 
to medicines as discussed below.  In addition, two continental initiatives appear to provide contrary 
advice to countries regarding the incorporation and use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities, 
which may impede the availability of affordable health technologies. These are discussed next: 
 
(i) The African Medicines Regulatory Harmonization Initiative  
 
In the same way that local pharmaceutical production is expected to benefit from a co-ordinated 
intellectual property policy framework, there are obvious advantages in increased co-operation 
among DRAs. It comes as little surprise then that, the PMPA and the AU Roadmap754 advocate 
for increased investments to improve the capacity of DRAs in regulating the quality, safety and 
efficacy of medicines manufactured in African countries.  An initiative to increase intra-regional 
co-operation between DRAs commenced shortly after the PMPA was adopted. The African 
Medicines Regulatory Harmonization Initiative (AMRHI) was established in 2009 with the 
intention to improve health in the Region by increasing access to safe and effective medicines of 
good quality. The AMRHI aims to do this by strengthening the technical and administrative 
capacity of participating national medicines regulatory authorities. In so doing, the project will 
lead to the development of collaborative networks of national and regional drug regulatory 
authorities; the harmonization of technical standards and the establishment of a framework for 
joint evaluations of application dossiers and inspections of medicine manufacturing sites.755 
                                                 
754 See paragraphs 54 and 55 of the AU Roadmap for more information. 
755 As per the World Health Organisation’s website on international co-operation and harmonization on medicines 
[Online] Available: 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/harmonization/en/index.html   
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A key outcome of the AU’s efforts to increase co-operation on medicines regulation has been the 
emergence of a Draft Preliminary Model Law on Medicines Regulation Harmonization in January 
2013. While developed with the intention of assisting AU Members to meet their obligations in 
improving access to medicines756 the Draft Preliminary Model law contains a number of 
intellectual property provisions that may end having the opposite impact.757 For example, Sections 
177-179, appear to impose an obligation on DRAs to determine the patent status of medicines 
before granting marketing authorization.758 As discussed above in Chapter two creating linkages 
between the patent status of medicines and marketing approval can pose a serious problem for 
DRAs, especially as patent searches can be time consuming, cumbersome and expensive. Second, 
Section 197 appears to impose a form of pharmaceutical test data protection that exceeds the 
requirements imposed on WTO Members by Article 39.3 of TRIPS. The section notes that: 
 
“Where the Agency receives, or has received not more than 5 years before the commencement of 
this Law a product application in respect of an innovative medicine and confidential supporting 
information, the Agency, during the protected period in relation to that confidential supporting 
information — 
i. shall take reasonable steps to ensure that that confidential supporting 
information is kept confidential to the Agency; and 
ii. shall not use that confidential supporting information for the purposes of 
determining whether to grant any other application. 
 
                                                 
756 Page 2 of the Preliminary Draft Model Law notes that AU Members are: 
“Convinced further that the adoption of a model law on medicines regulation in Africa is essential to the fulfilment 
of the mandate of the African Union to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with Article 
45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 
757 An extensive critique of the Preliminary Draft Model Law has been undertaken by Baker B, Gray A, and Vadwa 
Y, in an unpublished 2013 paper (on file with author). 
758 Section 177 for instance reads:  
“In dealing with an application for a product licence, the Agency –   
i. shall consider whether a patent under any existing patent law in the country is in force in respect of 
any medicine to which the application relates;  
ii. shall further consider whether the applicant is the proprietor of the patent; and 
iii. may rely upon, and shall not be concerned to inquire into the truth of any statement made in the 
declaration regarding the existence, non-existence or invalidity of a patent in respect of the drug. 
Unless the Agency otherwise determines, an applicant for a product licence shall, at the time of their application 
and at such other time as the Agency may require, make and furnish to the Agency a declaration in the prescribed 
form stating whether a patent under any law in the country on patents is in force in respect of any medicine to which 
the application relates.” 
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As discussed in chapter two, data exclusivity could result a de facto monopoly on test data for the 
originator company or additional costs having to be incurred by a generic manufacturer wishing 
to obtain marketing approval. As both outcomes impede competition, this provision seeks to 
undermine the goals of the PMPA and AU Roadmap.  
 
(ii) The Pan African Intellectual Property Organisation  
 
Another ostensibly well intentioned initiative which may have long lasting negative implications 
on access on treatment access in the region is the recently established PAIPO. Following a 
decision759 in 2007 by African Heads of State to establish a continental Intellectual Property 
organisation, African Ministries of Science and Technology took the lead in efforts to establish a 
single African intellectual property agency without involvement of the Ministries of Trade or 
Health. It is unclear why the AU did not mandate ministries of trade and industry, traditionally the 
custodians of intellectual property matters, to oversee the establishment of the PAIPO. The AU 
Scientific, Technical and Research Commission developed the enabling legislation statutes of this 
new entity with a validation exercise at a stakeholder’s Workshop in 2011, in Senegal. The final 
draft of the PAIPO statutes was submitted to AU Member States. In January 2013, the AU Heads 
of Summit ended with a decision to establish the PAIPO.760 
 
According to the Final Draft PAIPO Statute,761 one of the functions of the organisation will be to:  
 
“Take deliberate measures to promote the protection and exploitation of Intellectual Property 
rights within the Member States, including conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements.” 
762 
 
                                                 
759 (Assembly Council/AU/Dec. 138(VIII). 
760 This, according to a press-release following the conclusion of the 20th AU Summit dated 28 January 2012 
[Online] Available: 
http://summits.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PR%20N%2020%20CLOSING%20OF%2020TH%20AU%20SUMMIT
%2028%2001%2013%20f.pdf   
761 See the Final Draft statute of the Pan African Intellectual Property Organisation, Document number: 
AU/STRC/522. 
762 Article 5(iii). 
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This provision infers that intellectual property protection and enforcement are the objective of 
PAIPO rather than the use of intellectual property flexibilities to increase access to treatment. 
Recent developments such as the adoption of the PMPA, as well as the EAC policy on TRIPS 
flexibilities, the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan together with the fact that WTO Members 
have exempted LDCs from having to apply the TRIPS Agreement until 1 July 2021 could be seen 
as a clear sign that a key priority for an a regional organisation in which more than half the 
membership are classified as LDCs763should be to maintain policy space needed by its membership 
around intellectual property. There is problematic language elsewhere in the draft PAIPO statute 
which notes that another objective of the recently established organisation is to: 
 
“Initiate activities that strengthen the human, financial and technical capacity of Member States 
to maximize the benefits of the intellectual property system to improve public health and eradicate 
the scourge of piracy and counterfeits on the continent.”764 
 
These provisions as well as one noting that PAIPO will formulate a common negotiating position 
for Africa countries in international trade negotiations765 could easily impede rather than enable of 
intra-regional co-operation on access to health technologies. Nothing in the draft statute 
acknowledges the potential impediment posed by overly broad anti-counterfeiting legislation at 
the EAC on access to treatment, nor does it appear to distinguish between the different positions 
on intellectual property that might be needed by a regional organisation with a membership as 
diverse as South Africa and Egypt on one hand and Burundi or the DRC on the other.  
For reasons discussed above, the regional initiatives of the AMRHI and PAIPO, which are 
primarily aimed at promoting regional co-operation among Member States  of the African Union 
are also examples of how policy incoherence if unaddressed, would undermine efforts to increase 
regional co-operation in the trade of health technologies as postulated by the third hypothesis of 
the thesis. In the case of PAIPO, the degree of incoherence and lack of involvement in its 
                                                 
763 33 of the world’s 48 LDCs are in Africa. 
764 Article 5(vi). 
765 Article 5(viii). 
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establishment and operation is validated by the emergence of a communique766 adopted by the 
Chairmen of ARIPO and OAPI in Harare in April 2014, which among other things notes:  
“… the fact that the Ministers responsible for Intellectual Property issues/matters in African 
countries have not been consulted and involved in the AMCOST meetings” and requests the 
African Ministers of Science and Technology to “(a)to convene the Stakeholders Meeting as a 
matter of urgency to enable the participation of all stakeholders including ARIPO, OAPI and 
WIPO, and (b)for the Ministries/competent authorities responsible for IP to play a leading role in 
the process of establishing PAIPO.”  
In addition to the involvement of ministries of trade or the authorities responsible for the 
administration of intellectual property, one might assume too that it would be important that the 
Ministries of health and other authorities responsible for the implementation of both sub-regional 
and regional initiatives aimed at increasing a sustainable supply of affordable health technologies 
such as the EAC RPMPoA, SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan and the AU’s PMPA, be closely 
consulted and afforded the opportunity to input into the PAIPO final statute. Moreover, AU 
Member States may wish to pay close attention to ensuring that the content of the draft PAIPO 
statute does not undermine the aims and objectives of the regional and sub-regional initiatives 
discussed above. 
6.3.2 The impact of ARIPO on the use of TRIPS Flexibilities by its Member States 
 
Another key determinant of whether eastern and southern African countries will use public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities to increase access health technologies rests with the enabling statutes 
and regulations of ARIPO, and the practices of its Secretariat.  As noted above in Chapter four, 
ARIPO is one of two regional intellectual property organisations in Africa which examines, grants 
and administers patents, utility models and industrial designs on behalf of its Member States. 
ARIPO is the regional organisation of choice for Anglophone countries while OAPI administers, 
examines and grants patents on behalf of 17 Francophone African countries. Several Member 
                                                 
766 The full text of the communiqué is [Online] Available: http://www.aripo.org/index.php/news-events/press-
room/323-communique-adopted-by-the-joint-meeting-of-the-chairmen-of-aripo-and-oapi-held-at-the-headquarters-
of-aripo-on-april-10-and-11-2014-harare-republic-of-zimbabwe  
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States rely on the ARIPO Secretariat to conduct substantive pharmaceutical examinations on their 
behalf. A number of observer countries also seek technical advice from the ARIPO Secretariat on 
substantive patent examinations 
As discussed in Chapter four, there are benefits to a patent applicant who, by filing one application 
form with the ARIPO Secretariat,767 can elect to file the application in all ARIPO Member States. 
The current mechanism may be problematic for Member States on both substantive and procedural 
grounds. The primary procedural concern is the limited timeline available to Member States to 
respond to patent applications. While countries ultimately retain the right to choose whether or not 
to agree with a decision of the ARIPO Secretariat to grant a patent, the Harare Protocol places the 
onus on the Member State to notify the Secretariat in writing within six months of the patent having 
been granted that it is not valid in the territory of Member State. The following grounds may be 
given by a Member State for patent invalidation: 
 
(i)  The invention is not patentable in accordance with the provisions of the Harare Protocol; 
or 
(ii)  That, because of the nature of the invention, a patent cannot be registered or granted or has 
no effect under the national law of that State. 768 
 
If no objection is received from a Member State within the prescribed six month period, the ARIPO 
Secretariat shall grant and publish the patent which will be valid in all Member States the applicant 
had designated on the application form.769 This procedure places a duty on ARIPO Member States 
to examine a pharmaceutical patent application within a relatively short period of time upon being 
notified of its examination by patent examiners at the ARIPO Secretariat. Depending on the 
capacity of a national patent office, six months is highly unlikely to be a sufficiently long period 
of time within which to substantively examine a patent application and to make a determination as 
to whether the application merits the granting of a patent. The average time from filing to grant of 
a patent in the European Patent Office was reportedly was almost 44 months at the end of 2007.770  
                                                 
767 Section 2 of the Harare Protocol. 
768 According to Section 3 (6) of the Harare Protocol. 
769 As per Section 3(7) of the Harare Protocol.  
770 According to the 2007 Annual Report of the EPO [Online] Available: http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-
reports-statistics/annual-report/2007/statistics.html   
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Another example of the challenges that may occur because of the presumption that a granted patent 
is valid unless a country declares otherwise, is the case of Ghana.  Patent examiners in ARIPO 
granted a number of patent applications filed by the originator pharmaceutical company Glaxo 
Welcome771 in October 1997 for combivir, a combination of two existing ARVs zidovudine and 
lamivudine.772 Despite the fact that pharmaceutical products were not patentable under Ghanaian 
law at the time, Glaxo Welcome was able to disrupt the distribution in Ghana of a more affordable 
generic version of combivir produced by Cipla on the basis of the ARIPO patent.773 One way to 
resolve such episodes from re-occurring would be to lengthen the notification period well beyond 
six months. Another could be to reverse the onus the Harare Protocol places on countries by 
providing them a limited period of time within which to ratify patents granted by ARIPO. Another 
would be to remove LDCs from the list of ARIPO Member States where patent applications can 
be filed for through the Harare Protocol. 
 
There are a number of substantive concerns regarding the potential impact of the Harare Protocol 
on the ability of ARIPO Member States to use public health related TRIPS flexibilities. First, the 
majority of patents being granted by the ARIPO Secretariat are to foreign applicants, According 
to WIPO, of the 435 patents granted by ARIPO in 2008, a mere 11 were from residents of ARIPO 
Member States.774 Moreover, according to the WIPO patent database PATENTSCOPE, 
pharmaceuticals and organic fine chemistry accounted for almost 46 percent of all non-resident 
patent applications at the ARIPO Secretariat during the same time period.775   
 
This begs the question whether the public health interests of ARIPO Member States should be 
prioritised by the tightening of criteria for patentability and to focus on increasing access to health 
technologies as opposed to the granting of patents which may serve as a basis to keep medicine 
                                                 
771 Glaxo Welcome merged with the originator company and SmithKline Beecham in 2000.  
772 Oxfam  (2001)‘Dare to Lead: Public Health and Company Wealth’, Briefing Paper on  GlaxoSmithKline 
773 Ibid Oxfam at 22. A Wall Street Journal Article from  1 December 2000 ‘Glaxo attempts to block access to 
generic AIDS drugs in Ghana’ cited the then Chief patent examiner from ARIPO as saying that Glaxo would lose 
any action it took to enforce those patents in Ghana. 
774 As per information obtained from WIPO’s statistical database in Marongiu A, (2011) ‘Non-Resident Patent 
Applications in the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization’ Mile 11 Thesis, World Trade Institute, 
Berne [Online] Available: http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/wti.org/1_master-
programme/pdfs/Masters_thesis_Alessandro%20Marongiu.pdf  
775 Ibid Marongiu at 32. 
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prices high.  It should be remembered that 13 of the 19 ARIPO Member States are LDCs and that 
a number of them  including Rwanda, Uganda and Zanzibar have chosen to exempt pharmaceutical 
products from patentability under existing legislation while Zambia has incorporated the 
exemption into draft legislation.776 The harmonisation of the Harare Protocol with the development 
objectives of a number of ARIPO Member States would appear to be a matter of urgent priority.  
 
The second and more serious issue the Harare Protocol highlights is the discrepancy in how TRIPS 
flexibilities may be incorporated and used by the ARIPO Secretariat and its Member States. One 
such example relates to the criteria for patentability. On the face of it, the Harare Protocol appears 
to have adopted the same requirements imposed by Article 27.1 of TRIPS around novelty, 
inventive step and industrial applicability.777 However, in practice, some patents granted by 
officials at ARIPO clearly involve a lax rather than strict interpretation of Article 27.1 of TRIPS, 
which may be inconsistent with the public health interests of several Member States. For instance, 
Section 3(10) of the Harare Protocol in defining novelty excludes from the definition of prior art: 
 
“disclosure of the invention at an official or officially recognized exhibition shall not be taken into 
consideration if it occurred not more than six months before the date of filing of the application 
or, if priority is claimed, before the priority date validly claimed in respect thereof” 
  
This is a narrow definition of prior art and in contrast to the definitions adopted by ARIPO Member 
States such as Zanzibar have in a provision on inventive step introduced a requirement that the 
invention must not have been obvious to someone highly skilled in the art.778 The implications of 
lax patentability criteria are evident from the granting of patents to Glaxo Welcome for combivir, 
which as noted a combination of two existing molecules. A number of patent offices in LMICs 
including Brazil, China, Guatemala and Ukraine, did not grant a patent for combivir.779 In the case 
of India, GSK withdrew a patent application for combivir in 2006 on the basis of a patent 
                                                 
776  On file with author. 
777  According to Section 3(10): 
 “Inventions for which patents are granted by the Office shall be new, shall involve an inventive step and shall be 
industrially applicable.” 
778 Section 4(3) of the Patent Act of 2008. 
779 See Boulet P, Garrison C and t’hoen E (2003) ‘Drug Patents Under the Spotlight’, Médecins Sans Frontières at 
Annex A [Online] available: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js4913e/  
Page | 222 
 
opposition filed by treatment groups after the passing of the Indian Patents Act of 2005, containing 
Section 3(d).  A number of countries in the EAC and SADC have either adopted or are considering 
the adoption of criteria stricter than those being used by the ARIPO Secretariat, and should be able 
to exercise national priorities should they so wish, as opposed to the ‘one size fits all’ approach 
being implemented by the Harare Protocol at present. 
 
Another example of how public health related TRIPS flexibilities have not been sufficiently 
incorporated into the Harare Protocol is the absence of a provision enabling oppositions to patent 
applications both before and after the grant of the patent. The Harare Protocol contains a provision 
which attempts to provide a general limitation to patent rights by noting that: 
 
“A patent granted by the Office shall in each designated State be subject to provisions of the 
applicable national law on compulsory licenses, forfeiture or the use of patented inventions in the 
public interest” 
 
However, some of eastern and southern African territories that are ARIPO Member States 
including Zanzibar780 provide for pre-and post-grant patent oppositions by interested third parties, 
while many others provide for post-grant oppositions.781 The right of interested third parties to file 
pre-and post-grant patent opposition proceedings should be reflected in the Harare Protocol as a 
key flexibility particularly given the potentially wide-ranging geographical applicability of an 
ARIPO patent once granted as well as the obvious public health implications given the high 
burdens of disease in the region. 
 
 
6.3.3 Cross-regional co-operation between African Countries and emerging economies of 
the South  
 
While this chapter has to date focused on intra-regional co-operation on intellectual property and 
access to health technologies, this section will discuss opportunities for individual countries in 
                                                 
780 Section 10(7)(a) of the Patent Act. 
781 Including Kenya, Mainland Tanzania and Uganda. 
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eastern and southern Africa as well as the AU to co-operate with other large developing countries 
with similar priorities. There are both public and private sector opportunities for south-south co-
operation on access to treatment, albeit in different ways.  
 
An example of private sector south-south co-operation on access to treatment is the recent 
partnership between the Indian pharmaceutical giant Cipla and Quality Chemicals, a Ugandan 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturing company. In February 2012, news agencies reported that 
Quality Chemicals, a WHO-pre-qualified pharmaceutical manufacturer which is a joint venture 
between Cipla, and the Ugandan government, was to commence with the production of ARVs to 
treat HIV as well as anti-malarial medicines.782  Quality Chemicals also has the capacity to produce 
other ARVs including lamivudine, nevirapine zidovudine and efavirenz783 and is planning to 
produce newer generation medicines in the medium term. Quality Chemicals appears to a number 
of factors in its advantage which should aid its success. It has managed to obtain WHO pre-
qualification which makes its products eligible for procurement by GFATM financed tenders. 
Second, it is situated in an LDC, and in a regional economic organisation where the use of the 
TRIPS flexibilities has been promoted. Third, given the role of the Ugandan government in its 
establishment, it appears to have high level political support. A final key advantage for Quality 
Chemicals must be the recent assent by the President of Uganda to the Industrial property Act784 
in January 2014, which contains a number of important flexibilities, not least of all, an exemption 
for pharmaceutical patents until 2016 or a later date as extended by the TRIPS Council.785Aside 
from private sector partnerships involving developing country companies and governments, inter-
regional south-south co-operation usually takes the form of governmental co-operation as will be 
discussed further below. 
 
                                                 
782 See news story from New Vision Uganda makes new AIDS drug, 8 February 2012 [Online] available: 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/628873-uganda-makes-new-aids-drug.html. See also an article from Xinhuanet, 
Uganda to make new low cost HIV/AIDS drug, 8 February 2012 [Online] Available:  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/health/2012-02/08/c_131398948.htm 
783 According to the website of Quality Chemicals: 
http://www.qcil.co.ug/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=12&Itemid=62  
784 Act passed by Parliament in 2013. 
785 Article 8(3)(f) excludes from patentability, pharmaceutical products and test data. 
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(i) Africa’s Health partnerships with India, China and Brazil  
 
There is a long history of co-operation between African countries and India dating back to the days 
of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM),786 and the formation of the Group of 77 (G77) at the UN.787  
The first formal framework of co-operation between the two partners has its origins in the Indian 
Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC), launched in 1964 and still in existence 
today.788  Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the volume and value of trade between the 
two partners with a projection of US$ 90 billion in trade by 2015.789 Since 2008, the Government 
of India and the African Union have agreed on a Framework for Cooperation to guide their efforts 
to assist each other to achieve inclusive growth, socio-economic development and self-reliance. In 
the 2011 Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, the governments re-affirmed their commitment 
to cooperate, including in the areas of science and technology, health and access to treatment, 
which they specifically made the commitment: 
 
“to enhance collaboration in the application of advancement in science, technology, research and 
development to training in the area of HIV, TB and Malaria… strengthening of public-private 
sector collaboration in the areas of pharmaceutical and procurement in Africa and India in the 
framework of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa and the fight against counterfeit 
medicines. They also undertake to pursue dialogue on intellectual property rights and access to 
medicines; research and development in traditional medicine and practices in Africa and India”790 
 
                                                 
786 The Non Aligned Movement was established as newly independent countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America 
and other regions in the wake of the post-colonial era as a way for so called third world countries to pursue joint 
policies in international forums. The first the First Summit, was held in Belgrade in1961, with the then leaders of 
Egypt, Indonesia, India and Yugoslavia playing a key role.  
787 The Group of 77 is a grouping of developing countries established to articulate and advocate the collective positions 
of its members. Established in 1964, the Group co-ordinates negotiating positions across an array of international 
economic and development issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for 
development. See the website for more information [Online] Available: http://www.g77.org/doc/  
788 ITEC resources have been used over the past few decades to promote south-south capacity development in a wide 
range of sectors and in several forums including the AU, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) and at the WTO.  
789 According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 
790 See paragraph 5.1 of the Outcome Document of the Second Africa-India Form Summit 2011: Africa-India 
Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, Addis Ababa, May 2011 [Online] Available: http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/34/Second+AfricaIndia+Forum+Summit+2011+AfricaIndia+Framework+for+Enhanced+Coope
ration  
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Much like India, Brazil has a long history of co-operating with African countries in several 
platforms including the UN, the G77 and the NAM. While there is continental co-operation, Brazil 
has tended to focus its efforts on public health on Portuguese speaking countries with south-south 
co-operation programmes ongoing in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique as well 
as São Tomé and Príncipe.791  Unlike the partnerships involving Cipla, the channels of co-
operation between Brazil and African countries have been in the public sector. A key agency 
involved in public health co-operation include the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ), an 
institution housed within the ministry of health and working on a wide array of issues including 
pharmaceutical R&D, and local production for HIV, TB, viral hepatitis and NTDs.792 In 2008, 
Fiocruz established its first international representative abroad in Maputo, Mozambique to 
coordinate, monitor and evaluate programs of cooperation between Brazil and Portuguese 
speaking African countries on a variety of matters including, transfer of technology, and other 
systems strengthen the health systems of partner countries.793  
 
On access to medicines related issues, the government of Brazil has supported drug donations and 
provided technical support to national AIDS programmes in Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and 
Príncipe. But it is in Mozambique where the government has made its largest commitment by 
supporting the establishment of a local pharmaceutical production facility at a cost of at least US$ 
34.6 million, excluding the costs technical assistance from Brazilian experts. While the project had 
been in discussion since 2003 with the signing of a co-operation agreement between the then 
leaders of Brazil and Mozambique794 it was six years later that tangible progress occurred with 
approval of the project being obtained in 2009 by the Brazilian Senate approved its 
implementation. According to the Foundation for Scientific and Technological Development in 
                                                 
791 For a table of ongoing health related activities between Brazil and African countries, see Russo G, Cabral L and 
Ferrinho P (2013) ‘Brazil-Africa technical cooperation in health: what’s its relevance to the post-Busan debate on 
‘aid effectiveness?’ Globalization and Health 9:2 doi:10.1186 [Online] Available: 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/2  
792 According to its website, the Drug Technology Institute within Fiocruz known as Farmanguinhos locally 
produces nearly 40 percent of the medicines purchased by the Ministry of Health but accounts for only 5 percent of 
the costs associated with procuring medicines. More information is available from the Fiocruz website at: 
http://portal.fiocruz.br/en/content/production-and-innovation  
793 Ibid Fiocruz. 
794 As documented by Licia de Oliveira, the Associate Director of the Fiocruz Office in Africa in an interview with 
Fiotec [Online] Available: 
http://www.fiotec.fiocruz.br/institucional/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=993:nevirapine-
production-at-antiretroviral-factory-in-mozambique-should-start-in-july&catid=133&Itemid=364&lang=en  
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Health (FIOTEC),795 the pharmaceutical manufacturing facility was inaugurated in July 2012 and 
commenced production in 2013 with five products including two first generation ARVs 
lamivudine and zidovudine being manufactured. It is expected that in the next few years, a total of 
21 medicines including six ARVs will be manufactured locally and that the site will aim to obtain 
WHO pre-qualification, this making it eligible for procurement by GFATM financed tenders.  
 
China’s history of co-operation with African countries dates back to the end of the colonial period 
as is the case with Brazil and India. Recent years have seen a rapid increase in trade to the point 
that China became Africa’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade estimated at US$ 198 billion 
by 2012.796 Annual roundtable conferences have been held since 2010, exploring opportunities to 
increase trade in pharmaceutical products between China and Africa, and to discuss inter regional 
opportunities for co-operation. In May 2013, African and Chinese leaders met in Botswana at the 
fourth health Roundtable797 where issues of joint ventures for local pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
improving quality and safety of pharmaceutical products and transfer of technology were 
discussed. While these framework roundtables and conferences have not yet resulted in results 
similar to the pharmaceutical manufacturing factory in Mozambique or the partnership between 
Cipla and Quality Chemicals in Uganda, there has been a commitment by Chinese officials to 
support existing regional initiatives such as the PMPA and the AU Roadmap on Shared 
Responsibility and Global Solidarity to increase a sustainable supply of essential medicines and 
health technologies.798 
 
The success of initiatives involving either involving the government and private sector from Brazil, 
India, China or similar economies will be partially determined by the degree to which all partners 
                                                 
795 See a Fiotec Press release The first anti-retrovirals manufacturing site in Mozambique starts operations; project 
supported by Fiotec of July 2012, [Online] Available: 
http://www.fiotec.fiocruz.br/institucional/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1077:the-first-
antiretrovirals-manufacturing-site-in-mozambique-starts-operations-project-supported-by-
fiotec&catid=133&Itemid=364&lang=en  
796 According to a synopsis provided by the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac), August 2013 [Online] 
Available: http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/08/Africa-China-trading-relationship-Synopsis.pdf  
797 The fourth forum was co-hosted by the Ministry of Health of Botswana, Peking University and the China 
Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Medicines and Health Products, within the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce. 
798 According to a press statement of 16 May 2013 released after the forum [Online] Available: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201305161396.html  
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retain policy space in their domestic intellectual property related legislation. Aside from drawing 
lessons from some of the public health sensitive sections of each other’s legislation,  potential 
collaboration between Brazil, China, India and several eastern and southern African countries may 
lie in increased co-ordination of common negotiating positions in forums where intellectual 
property matters are negotiated such as at the WTO Council for TRIPS. 799The decision in July 
2013 to exempt LDCs from having to apply the TRIPS Agreement with the exception of Articles 
3, 4 and 5 until July 2021, has a direct impact on the policy space required by several African 
countries to make south-south co-operation a success. The fact that up to 34 African countries are 
classified as LDCs provides great latitude should they choose to customize intellectual property 
legislation to better address public health objectives.   
 
Other opportunities for increased co-operation between African countries and large economies like 
China Brazil and India may lie at the WTO Council for TRIPS where debates in recent years on 
the effectiveness of the August 30 2003 Mechanism at WTO TRIPS Council have taken place in 
recent years. Another area for closer co-operation during negotiations relating to intellectual 
property lies at the WHO, where negotiations on the use of the terms sub-standard/spurious/falsely 
labelled/falsified/counterfeit medical products has a direct impact on the conflation of generic and 
sub-standard medicines produced by emerging economies as discussed in chapter two.800 A brief 
discussion of new south-south co-operation configurations involving South Africa, the main driver 
of economic growth in the SADC region takes place. 
 
 
                                                 
799 This was made clear by the statement made by India at the WTO Council for TRIPS meeting on the LDC extension 
where a concern was raised that the negotiations took place between a small sub-set of WTO Members consisting of 
developed countries like the US and EU, and LDCs to the exclusion of developed countries like India. More 
information on the reaction of developing countries is available from IP Watch Story of 12 June 2013, ‘LDCs Obtain 
New Waiver On IP Obligations At WTO, Take It As A Limited Victory’ [Online] Available: http://www.ip-
watch.org/2013/06/12/ldcs-obtain-new-waiver-on-ip-obligations-at-wto-take-it-as-a-limited-victory/  
800 In light of the seizures of generic medicines in transit as discussed in chapter two and the conflation between 
counterfeit, sub-standard and generic medicines that has taken place in a number of places including in anti-
counterfeiting legislation within the EAC,  the WHA in Resolution WHA63(10) delegated  a working group to assess 
the prevention and control of substandard/spurious/falsely labelled/ falsified/counterfeit medical products form a part 
of its work in the area of quality and safety of medicines. The Working Group as of July 2013 is still embroiled in 
negotiations. More information on the Working Group can be found [Online] Available: 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ssffc/e/ssffc_wg1.html.   
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(ii) IBSA and BRICS configurations: what do they mean for South Africa on IP, south-
south co-operation and treatment access? 
 
South Africa is the latest addition to the BRICS configuration of countries,801 which together, 
account for a third of the global HIV burden and almost half of the global TB burden. Three of the 
BRICS; India, the Russian Federation and South Africa have high and growing infections of multi-
drug resistant TB;802 and two (China and Brazil) have high levels of Hepatitis C infection.803 In 
addition, given that 80 percent of NCDs occur in LMICs804 and the BRICS accounts for half the 
world’s population, it follows that a high priority accorded to sustainable treatment programmes 
among the BRICS.  The importance of the matter for the BRICS has been amplified by the funding 
difficulties which re-shaped list of countries eligible for programming from the GFATM. This re-
classification of countries led to the exclusion of Brazil, China and the Russian Federation from 
eligibility for Global Fund grants as of 2012.805  
 
Co-operation on intellectual property to facilitate access to essential medicines and health 
technologies has been formally on the agenda BRICS meetings since the Health Ministers summit 
held in Beijing China in July 2011. The Health Ministers’ summit culminated in a declaration 
reiterating the commitment of the BRICS to the WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action 
(GSPoA) on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual property806 and a desire to not allow the 
erosion of TRIPS flexibilities as a mechanism to increase access to health technologies. Paragraph 
22 of the Declaration notes: 
 
                                                 
801 The term BRIC was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs to refer to the large emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. At a BRIC foreign ministers meeting on 21 September 2010, it was agreed to extend an invitation to 
South Africa to join the group, which it did in 2011.  
802 While 82 percent of cases of HIV and TB co-infection occur in Africa, India and Russia have significant co-
infections. See Floyd K, et al (2013) ‘Domestic and donor financing for tuberculosis care and control in low-income 
and middle-income countries: an analysis of trends, 2002–11, and requirements to meet 2015 targets’ Lancet Global 
Health, Vol 1, Issue 2 105-115 [Online] Available: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214109X13700329  
803 China is said to have more cases of Hepatitis C than all of Europe. 
804 As per the communique issued by the BRICS Ministers of Health following their summit meeting in New Delhi 
in January 2013 [Online] Available: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=91533  
805 The 25th Global Fund Board meeting held in November 2011 in Accra, Ghana took the decision to exclude upper 
middle income countries that do not have extreme burdens of disease from funding as of 2012. This affected several 
countries including Argentina, Brazil, China, Mexico and the Russian Federation. 
806 See paragraph 18 of the Declaration [Online] Available: http://keionline.org/node/1183  
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“We are determined to ensure that bilateral and regional trade agreements do not undermine 
TRIPS flexibilities. We support the TRIPS safeguards and are committed to work together with 
other developing countries to preserve and promote, to the full, the provisions contained in the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property…. In addition, we support the development of 
innovative mechanisms of transfer of intellectual property rights for priority technologies, to open 
avenues for BRICS countries to supply these medicines to low and middle income countries” 
 
The BRICS health Ministers met again in January 2013 in New Delhi, India and re-affirmed their 
commitment to pursue south-south co-operation South-South cooperation and to support efforts in 
developing countries to promote health for all. The commitment of the Ministers of Health to 
south-south co-operation and the use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities to facilitate access 
to health technologies was again re-iterated at the Health Ministers’ meeting at the margins of the 
2014 WHA in May. It should be noted that despite the communiques from the Ministers of health, 
more formal co-operation among the BRICS has taken place at meetings between ministers of 
trade. At a meeting in Durban, South Africa, in March 2013, the ministers of trade concluded a 
Trade and Investment Co-operation Framework Agreement807 which commits them to co-operate 
on matters of mutual concern at multilateral forums at the WTO and elsewhere. On intellectual 
property, the ministers committed to enhancing information exchange on intellectual property 
legislation and enforcement through meetings or seminars, jointly developing capacity building 
programmes on intellectual property and promoting cooperation among intellectual property 
offices.808 
 
What is not clear from the Framework concluded by the Ministers of Trade and the communiques 
issued by the Ministers of Health is the degree to which there is inter-sectoral co-ordination 
between the various branches of government.  There are different levels of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement among the BRICS with implications on access to medicines. As part 
                                                 
807  The Full text of the 2013 BRICS Trade and Investment Framework is available [Online] at: http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/BRICS-Trade-and-Investment-Cooperation-Framework-25-.pdf   
808 As per paragraphs 4.5 of the Declaration. 
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of their WTO accession commitments, both China809 and Russia810 are required to implement data 
exclusivity despite this not being required by Article 39.3 of TRIPS.811While there may be a few 
areas for inter-regional co-ordination among member of the BRICS, there are sufficient differences 
to prevent a completely integrated level of co-operation.  
 
There are however, opportunities to share experiences among the BRICS on fully incorporating 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities into national legislation and how this can result in 
increases access to essential medicines and health technologies.  Examples of progressive use of 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities already discussed above include India’s implementation 
of Article 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement with the enactment of Section 3(d) of the Patent Act, 
the participation of the drug regulatory agency in Brazil in the examination of pharmaceutical 
patents, the grant of compulsory licenses in India and Brazil,812 and the role of the Competition 
Commission in South Africa in regulating anti-competitive conduct as well as that of the Indian 
Patent Office to grant a compulsory licence for the cancer medicine Sorafenib. Some of the 
examples of patentability criteria may be of interest in Brazil given the commencement of an 
ambitious initiative to reform a number of Brazil’s intellectual property legislation813 with 
implications on TRIPS flexibilities such as patent oppositions, patentability criteria and the 
limitation of TRIPS plus measures such as patent term extensions. Given the capacity constraints 
the South African government may face in implementing the recommendation in its draft IP Policy 
calling for the substantive examination of patents, the sharing of experiences and the providing of 
                                                 
809  China, in Paragraph 284, of document WT/ACC/CHN/49 of 1 October 2001 agreed to six years of data 
exclusivity. The relevant portion of paragraph 284 notes that China agrees that: 
“no person, other than the person who submitted such data, could, without the permission of the person who 
submitted the data, rely on such data in support of an application for product approval for a period of at least six 
years from the date on which China granted marketing approval to the person submitting the data.” 
810 Russia in paragraph 1292 of document WT/ACC/RUS/70 makes a commitment similar to China’s with the result 
that six years of data exclusivity are applicable. 
811According to Article 35 of the Implementing Regulations of the Drug Administration Law of 4 August 2002, 
China provides six years of data exclusivity as from the date of marketing approval. Russia also provides for six 
years of pharmaceutical data exclusivity through Article 18.6 of the “Law on Circulation of Medicines. 
812 It is reported that the issuing of a compulsory license in Brazil for the ARV efavirenz in 2007 resulted in cost 
savings of approximately USD 237 million over five years. See UNAIDS, UNDP, WHO  (2012) ‘Using TRIPS 
flexibilities to improve access to treatment’ [Online] Available at: 
http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=3259398   
813 More information on the proposed reforms including a letter written by academics and members of civil society 
is [Online] Available: http://infojustice.org/support-brazil  
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training by patent examiners from India and in particular could be an optimal example of south-
south co-operation among two of the BRICS to further mutual aims and objectives. 
 
South Africa is also a member of IBSA, a configuration including Brazil and India which was 
formed in 2003.814  However, there has not been the same degree of formal co-operation between 
the leaders of IBSA on intellectual property and public health matters, with BRICS appearing to 
be the preferred configuration for inter-regional co-operation. The future of IBSA as a co-
ordinating mechanism between its members was placed into doubt with the postponement of the 
sixth Heads of State summit scheduled to take place in New Delhi in June 2013.815 No new date 
has emerged for the next summit, thus raising the question whether IBSA’s days as a south-south 
co-operation mechanism are numbered.816 
  
6.4 Conclusion  
As has been discussed above, there are several promising initiatives at the sub-regional, intra-
regional, continental and inter-regional levels that may support countries in eastern and southern 
Africa to maintain and expand programmes to treat people living with various communicable and 
non-communicable diseases. These initiatives are well timed, given the decline in donor funding 
for AIDS in recent years, reflected most recently by the failure by the GFATM in December 2013 
to meet its US$ 15 billion target by US$ 3 billion. The reform of intellectual property related 
legislation to better incorporate public health related TRIPS flexibilities has been taking place 
across more than a dozen countries in eastern and southern Africa in recent years. Both of these 
developments support the first hypothesis advanced in chapter one concerning the increased 
attention that must be paid to the integration and use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities in 
                                                 
814 The first meeting of IBSA leaders was a foreign affairs ministers’ meeting in June 2003 which took place in 
Brazil. The ministers signed a declaration pledging co-operation on several topics of mutual interest including UN 
reform, trade and investment, economic and social development as well as science and technology issues. The 
Declaration is [Online] Available: http://web.archive.org/web/20070915141009/http://www.ibsa-
trilateral.org/brasil_declaration.htm  
815 See Delhi Business standard Newspaper Report of 20 March 2013 ‘Summit in Delhi Put Off’[Online] Available: 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/ibsa-summit-in-delhi-put-off-113052000878_1.html  
816 According to an online article by Stuenkel, O 4 July 2013 ‘Is IBSA Dead?’ [Online] Available: 
http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/07/04/is-ibsa-dead/. The writer points out, among other things, that the 
leaders of IBSA met at a BRICS summit in March 2013 and that a second summit 3 months later would have been 
unnecessary.   
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order to sustain national treatment programmes in the face of declining donor funding for AIDS 
responses.  
 
It should also be recalled that while several countries have undertaken or are in the process of 
amending legislation to take greater advantage of public health related TRIPS flexibilities, many 
are yet to do so. For those countries that have taken steps to reform legislation, the results have 
been mixed for various reasons. These include the fact, as seen in South Africa, that there are 
competing interests advocating for the inclusion of different provisions. Another reason for the 
mixed legislative reform must be the often conflicting policy advice offered by the providers of 
technical and policy advice, a situation exacerbated by low levels of capacity in several 
government departments responsible for the administration of intellectual property as discussed in 
in chapter four and articulated in the second hypothesis of this thesis.  
 
There are several initiatives underway in eastern and Southern Africa to foster south-south co-
operation on treatment access, with the EAC’s RPMPoA, having made the most progress. The 
SADC countries, albeit at a slower pace, have demonstrated political will to implement the SADC 
Pharmaceutical Business Plan. Care has been taken to ensure complementarity of regional 
initiatives with the AU’s PMPA. However much of the promise south-south initiatives could hold 
for the acceleration of treatment access in the region may be undermined by some significant 
challenges. The first of these relates to the prioritization of local pharmaceutical production in the 
region. As noted above, at least 38 countries in Africa engage in some form of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, with companies in South Africa and Egypt retaining the capacity to produce APIs. 
For African pharmaceutical producers to be competitive, harnessing the requisite economies of 
scale is a necessity. Given the importance being attached to the sustaining and scaling up of 
treatment programmes in Africa, it may be a politically untenable prospect for a country’s leaders 
to choose to support a neighbour’s pharmaceutical manufacturer at the cost of its own, particularly 
if the neighbouring manufacturer is not able to provide a pharmaceutical product at a price that is 
close to the internationally most competitive price.   
 
Ultimately, the success or failure of regional co-operation initiatives on local pharmaceutical 
production will depend on the ability of local manufacturers pharmaceutical industries to make 
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safe and efficacious medicines of international quality and at an affordable price. As the example 
of Zimbabwe’s Varichem Chemicals discussed in chapter three illustrates, a commitment by the 
continent’s leaders to support viable pharmaceutical industries is an important determinant of 
success. Another important factor is the presence of a coherent and complementary legal and 
regulatory environment which fully incorporates public health related TRIPS flexibilities as is drug 
regulatory legislation which supports the production of safe and efficacious medicines of good 
quality. 
 
Yet another important factor that could determine the success of promising initiatives is that of 
policy coherence. At present, these regional initiatives aimed at increasing co-operation on access 
to treatment risk being undermined by developments such as the proliferation of anti-
counterfeiting legislation in certain EAC countries and within the EAC itself, the newly established 
PAIPO which appears to be more focused on intellectual property enforcement and protection than 
facilitating the use of TRIPS flexibilities as well as the Draft Preliminary Model Law on Medicines 
Regulation Harmonization which appears to impose some provisions on data exclusivity. An 
additional aspect of policy incoherence at the regional level is the misalignment between some 
provisions of the Harare Protocol as well as the practices of ARIPO patent examiners on the one 
hand, and the national legislation of those ARIPO Member States that have more extensively 
incorporated public health related flexibilities into national legislation such as Zanzibar and 
Uganda. The findings of this chapter therefore validate the third hypothesis advanced in chapter 
one, namely, that policy incoherence at the national and regional levels could undermine the 
incorporation and use of TRIPS flexibilities, thus bringing the sustainability of treatment 
programmes into question unless addressed.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that important but as yet unrealised opportunities exist for countries 
within eastern and southern Africa to share examples of how the implementation of public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities have resulted in increased treatment access. One such example could 
be for South African competition law officials to highlight to other countries in the region how the 
Competition Act law has been used to sanction anti-competitive behaviour in the country. 
Similarly, opportunities exist for the large developing country partners such as Brazil and India to 
share examples with countries in eastern and southern African countries of how certain public 
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health related TRIPS flexibilities were employed to keep treatment costs affordable. One such 
example from India could be its implementation of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement through 
the enactment of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act of 2005. Training for South African and ARIPO 
patent examiners on the undertaking substantive pharmaceutical patent examinations from a public 
health sensitive perspective could be another useful south-south exchange example. A third 
example could be a south-south exchange between Brazilian officials and various national and 
regional government officials in eastern and southern Africa on the involvement of the drug 
regulatory authority in Brazil in the examination of pharmaceutical patents. 
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7  Concluding Reflections 
 
“We can do things the cheap way, the simple way, for the short-term and without regard for the 
future. Or, we can make the extra effort, do the hard work, absorb the criticism and make decisions 
that will cause a better future.” 
 
Mike Rounds 
 
7.1 Background 
 
As the previous six chapters have demonstrated, the public health related flexibilities present in 
the TRIPS Agreement are becoming of greater importance as countries in eastern and southern 
Africa re-examine their policy options available to sustain and expand various national treatment 
programmes. As discussed in chapter one, the revision of WHO treatment guidelines in June 2013 
has increased the number of people eligible for ART to more than 21 million people by the end of 
2013,  the large majority of who live in Africa. While an impressive scale up in treatment has taken 
place in recent years, the reality remains that more people need ART than are currently receiving 
it in eastern and southern Africa. 
 
As also discussed above, the large majority of patients on ART in sub-Saharan Africa are still on 
first-line ART, which as a result of generic competition and donor financing remain relatively 
affordable. However, the combination of drug resistance and the emergence of newer, less toxic 
and more effective medicines more likely to be patented in countries that have traditionally 
supplied generics will require more importing countries to incorporate public health related TRIPS 
flexibilities into national legislation. Moreover, the steady decline in multilateral aid for AIDS and 
health responses as discussed in chapters one, four and six, is an indication that countries in eastern 
and southern Africa will be expected to assume greater financial responsibility for national 
treatment programmes.  
 
The hypotheses advanced in chapter one were the following: First, the incorporation of public 
health related TRIPS flexibilities into domestic legislation has not been a priority for countries in 
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eastern and southern Africa because most patients on ART are still on first-line ART regimens, 
which are both affordable, and funded by bilateral and multilateral donor institutions. However, 
TRIPS flexibilities will become more important as multilateral funding declines and treatment 
programmes require the greater use of more expensive new-generation ARVs increasingly being 
patented in countries with significant pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in the region such as 
South Africa, and elsewhere. Second, there are capacity constraints within the relevant government 
departments in eastern and southern Africa which hinder the full integration of public health related 
TRIPS flexibilities into the relevant national legislation and the use of these flexibilities when 
needed. Third, while capacity constraints and a reliance on donor funding are both present, these 
two factors alone do not present a holistic picture of challenges in the region which are more 
complex than may appear. There is a significant degree of policy incoherence in the form of 
national level legislation and regional initiatives, which if not addressed by law reform and 
increased co-ordination could undermine the incorporation and use of TRIPS flexibilities in the 
national and regional level, thus bringing the sustainability of treatment programmes into question. 
The key findings of the country case studies and the prospects for south-south co-operation as 
postulated in the hypotheses follows below. 
 
 
7.2  Key Findings for Tanzania and South Africa 
 
The United Republic of Tanzania typifies the situation that many countries in eastern and southern 
Africa find themselves in at present. First, the country has seen a significant increase in the uptake 
of ART over the past decade. This development is tempered by the fact a large treatment gap 
remains. Moreover, as is the case with most countries in eastern and southern Africa, Tanzania 
remains heavily reliant on foreign donor assistance to finance its national HIV treatment 
programmes. While the local pharmaceutical industry in Mainland Tanzania is taking hold, it 
remains at a nascent stage and has not been able to compete for tenders financed by multilateral 
donor entities. It is likely that Tanzania can expect to remain an importer of newer generation 
ARVs particularly those used in second and third line ART for the foreseeable future.  
 
Page | 237 
 
South Africa finds itself in a position quite different from other countries in the region for two 
reasons. First, it self-finances the majority of its AIDS response and is less reliant on donor 
funding. Second, it is home to a generic pharmaceutical industry which includes one of the world’s 
largest generic manufacturers Aspen Pharmacare among others. However, South Africa finds itself 
in a position similar to other countries in the region in embarking on significant intellectual 
property reform while exploring other measures including changes in government procurement 
practices all with the aim of achieving cost efficiencies. 
 
As with countries in the region, legislative reform has been mixed in Tanzania. Zanzibar concluded 
the reform of its Industrial Property Act of 2008 and is regarded as a successful example of how 
public health related TRIPS flexibilities can be integrated into national legislation. Mainland 
Tanzania is also undergoing intellectual property law reform although it remains to be seen 
whether public health related flexibilities currently missing from Mainland Tanzania’s Patent Act 
of 1987 will be incorporated into a new Act, and to what degree. The emergence of the first draft 
IP policy in South Africa, the ongoing reform of industrial property legislation in mainland 
Tanzania and the successful enactment of the Industrial Property Act in Zanzibar in 2008 in a 
manner that mostly incorporates key public health related TRIPS flexibilities validates the first 
hypothesis advanced in chapter one concerning the increased importance that countries in the 
region are attaching to the incorporation of public health related flexibilities into domestic 
legislation. 
 
This thesis has also found that in a number of instances, countries in eastern and southern Africa 
continue to face significant, and in some cases, serious capacity constraints. These constraints have 
stymied the effective incorporation of public health related TRIPS flexibilities into national 
legislation. Mainland Tanzania has been undertaking industrial property law reform for several 
years, a situation that a number of countries in the region find themselves in. At present, mainland 
Tanzania has delayed the enactment of new intellectual property legislation until a policy has been 
finalized with the support of WIPO. As noted in chapter six, several counties in the region are 
reforming their laws with support from various bilateral and multilateral technical agencies. These 
reforms which have been ongoing for a number of years with the support of several bilateral and 
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multilateral organisations supprt the second hypothesis regarding the absence of sufficient national 
capacity on the public health aspects of intellectual property.  
 
The challenges experienced by Zambia and Mozambique in attempting to issue compulsory 
licenses for ARVs whose patent status had not even been validated further  underscores the 
capacity constrains the region has, and continues to face. Moreover, the patent offices of many 
countries in the region do not have the requisite capacity to examine patents and are therefore 
reliant on ARIPO to do so despite a misalignment between the operating statute of ARIPO and 
many national laws. Despite its complex framework of enabling legislation and the presence of 
many experienced professionals with experience in intellectual property management and 
administration, South Africa is not immune from the capacity constraints affecting other countries 
in the region. The draft IP policy of 2013 recommended that South Africa consider undertaking 
substantive patent examinations to reduce instances of ever-greening. This is likely to be an 
important factor into the ability of the South African Government to keep its national ART 
programme sustainable in the long term. Yet, as the country has never had a patent examination 
system, it currently does not have the requisite capacity to implement this important 
recommendation immediately. 
 
This thesis has also demonstrated how policy incoherence at both the national and regional levels 
has hindered the development of a legal and policy framework required to sustain treatment in 
Tanzania. For political reasons, the country continues to retain two patent laws. While authorities 
in Zanzibar administer a patent Act that contains several public health related TRIPS flexibilities, 
the fact that Zanzibar’s inhabitants constitute a fraction of the country’s entire population, coupled 
with a comparatively low HIV prevalence, hinders Zanzibar’s ability to employ public health 
related flexibilities to sustain treatment programmes. In order to achieve the requisite economies 
of scale needed to reduce treatment costs, is necessary for mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar to co-
ordinate their use of public health related TRIPS flexibilities. The thesis has also demonstrated 
how regional initiatives such as the ambiguous draft anti-counterfeiting legislation could impede 
the availability of health technologies in the region.  Another important example the thesis 
examines is how incoherence or misalignment between the enabling legislation and practices of 
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ARIPO and its members such as Tanzania could hinder a sustainable supply to more affordable 
health technologies.   
 
One of the largest challenges facing South African authorities involved in legislative and policy 
reform remains the challenge of policy coherence. As discussed in chapter five, the actions of the 
various government departments whose activities relate to competition, intellectual property and 
the regulation of medicines shows a degree of discord among the various government departments, 
chief among them, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of  Health, the 
Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Economic Development. The 
Department of Trade and Industry has stated its intention to reform the patent Act in a way that 
keeps treatment programmes sustainable. On the other hand, the same Department of Trade and 
Industry has stated 817 support for PAIPO, an initiative led by the Department of Science and 
Technology which, from its draft enabling statue, appears to prioritize the protection of intellectual 
property above the sustainability of treatment programmes among others.  
 
 If the development of the draft PAIPO statute is any indication of co-operation between the 
various government departments responsible for the administration of various aspects of 
intellectual property, then the government’s long term objectives to nurture a local pharmaceutical 
industry which innovates, while  maintain the world’s largest ART programme are cause for 
concern. The Department of Health, under whose ambit medicines legislation falls, and the 
Department of Economic Development under whose mandate the Competition Act is 
administered, should be actively involved in intellectual property policy and legislative reform 
undertaken by the Department of Trade and Industry.  
 
As discussed in chapter one, the existing literature on the incorporation and use of public health 
related TRIPS flexibilities in eastern and southern African in almost all cases identifies capacity 
constraints, political pressure and inappropriate technical assistance as the primary reasons why 
more countries have not fully incorporated and used public health TRIPS flexibilities. Far less 
literature addresses the role of policy incoherence among the national and regional stakeholders in 
                                                 
817 According to a media Statement by the South African Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies on 5 November 
2013 [Online]Available: http://www.thedti.gov.za/editmedia.jsp?id=2899  
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perpetuating the current situation. The findings of this thesis in both country studies on the role of 
policy incoherence as a significant impediment in addition to other factors addressed in this thesis 
and elsewhere constitutes a modest contribution to a rich existing field of literature. 
 
 
7.3 Prospects for South-south Co-operation on Health Technologies in Eastern and 
Southern Africa  
 
Recent regional initiatives including the African Union’s PMPA and accompanying Roadmap for 
shared Responsibility and Global Solidarity are further indications of a shift in responsibility from 
multilateral funding mechanisms to African governments as postulated by the first hypothesis.  
 
As discussed at length in chapter six, there is an unprecedented focus on initiatives to increase 
south-south co-operation both within regional configurations in eastern and southern Africa and 
between blocs of countries in the region and large developing countries including India, China, 
Brazil and the BRICS configuration of countries. The EAC, with its RPMPoA and the draft 
Protocol on the TRIPS Agreement has made the largest strides towards regional co-operation. The 
political will to co-operate, combined with the EAC’s relatively small membership of five Partner 
States, decades long history of regional co-operation, donor commitment and legislative reform on 
intellectual property in a number of countries increases the likelihood of successful co-operation 
among its Partner States.  SADC, with its Pharmaceutical Business Plan has made important 
progress towards the joint procurement and intra-regional trade of essential medicines.  However,  
its 15 country membership, three official languages, history of political as opposed to economic 
co-operation, diverse set of members at various levels of development and combination of civil 
and common law legal systems faces significantly more challenges in achieving the level of policy 
coherence required to benefit from pooled procurement and the free movement of health 
technologies.  
 
Initiatives within the EAC and SADC as well as the AU Roadmap for Shared Responsibility and 
Global Solidarity may yet be undermined by a lack of policy coherence with the emergence of 
regional and national anti-counterfeiting legislation, an ARIPO Secretariat, whose previous actions 
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in granting pharmaceutical patents under a lax set of criteria appears to favour the protection of 
intellectual property rights over the increasing of access to new health technologies, and the 
creation of the PAIPO in 2013 which appears to promote the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property above increasing access to health and agricultural commodities. For the 
initiatives at the EAC, SADC and AU level to meet their desired goal, a greater degree of 
coherence is needed between the various institutions involved in intellectual property norm 
making, standard setting and administration than presently occurs.   
 
There is also potential for increased south-south co-operation on legal and policy matters through 
the partnerships between African countries on the one hand, and large developing countries with 
significant pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and expertise such as India, Brazil and China 
on the other. A potential example of such co-operation could be the training of South African 
pharmaceutical patent examiners by Brazilian and Indian counterparts as part of a BRICS co-
operation programme on intellectual property. 
 
Finally, it bears recalling the assertions made in chapter one of the thesis: while the intellectual 
property related policy legislative framework are a key determinant of treatment sustainability, 
there are a number of factors outside the scope of this thesis which will ultimately determine the 
likelihood of success of several regional initiatives. These factors are both technical and political 
in scope. This thesis has examined the intellectual property related technical aspects. Political will 
on the part of the leaders of countries in the region is a key consideration. Policy makers may at 
times have to make politically unpopular decisions against the short term national interest, such as 
choosing to not support a local pharmaceutical industry which is uncompetitive, in favour of 
supporting a competing local pharmaceutical industry from a neighbouring country in order to 
generate economies of scale. At present, a number of regional initiatives have not resolved the 
tensions between the promotion of local pharmaceutical industries and the need to accelerate and 
sustain treatment access.  The provision of sufficient incentives to innovators while ensuring that 
patients in eastern and southern Africa are able to access affordable health technologies remains a 
delicate balancing act, as is the case in developed and developing countries the world over.    
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Appendix One: Terminology  
 
Low and Middle Income Countries 
 
The term “low and middle income” originates from the World Bank Atlas method which is used 
to classify 188 countries who are members of the World Bank and 26 other economies with a 
population of exceeding 30 000 into four income groupings. The calculation is made on the basis 
of gross national income (GNI) per capita converted from local currency into US dollars. There 
are four country categories: low, lower-middle, upper middle and high income. Countries are re-
evaluated on an annual basis and can be re-assigned to different categories every July.  The current, 
the classifications are: 
 
 
Country Income level per annum 
 
Low income GNI of US$ 1045 or less  
Lower middle income Between US$ 1045 and US$ 4125 
Upper middle income  Between US$ 4125 and US$ 12 746 
High income US$ 12 746 or higher 
 
At present, 139 countries and economies are classified as LMICs, with 75 classified as high income 
countries. The World Bank classification has been criticised for relying solely on GNI as a factor 
for classification without consideration of other factors such as levels of industrialisation and 
inequality.  
 
Developed, Developing and Least Developed Countries 
 
The list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is determined on an annual basis by the United 
Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council and the factors considered include the GNI per capita, 
an index of human assets and an economic vulnerability index. In December 2013, 48 countries 
Page | 243 
 
were classified as LDCs although Equatorial Guinea and Vanuatu are to graduate from their LDC 
status by June and December 2017 respectively.  
 
On the other hand, there is no universally accepted definition of developing and developed 
countries. The most widely used definition originates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
which lists 42 UN Member States as developed, a further 18 countries comprising predominantly 
of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as economies in transition, and more than  140  
countries as developing countries. Developed countries are considered to have a comparatively 
high living standard, level of industrialization and a high ranking on the United Nations Human 
Development Index (HDI) which ranks countries on the basis of education levels, life expectancy 
at birth and income levels. Developing countries on the other hand are categorised by their 
generally lower ranking on the HDI, and comparatively lower levels of industrialisation and lower 
living standards. All countries in the eastern and southern African region are listed either as 
developing countries or LDCs. 
 
Eastern and Southern African Countries 
 
There is no commonly accepted list of countries that can be classified as eastern and southern 
African. However, for the purposes of this thesis, countries regarded as being part of the regional 
economic communities including the five East African Community (EAC) Partner States, the 15 
Member States of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the countries 
of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan are regarded as eastern and southern 
Africa countries.  
 
Essential Medicines, Essential Drugs, Pharmaceutical Technologies and Health Technologies 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term essential drugs, essential medicines and pharmaceutical 
technologies are used interchangeably. Essential medicines refer to the list of medicines defined 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) as satisfying the priority health care needs of a 
population. They are selected with consideration to disease prevalence, evidence on efficacy and 
safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness. Health technologies are a more widely encompassing 
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group and for the purposes of this thesis include vaccines, diagnostics, medicines and medical 
devices. 
 
South-south co-operation 
 
South-south co-operation entails collaboration between two or more countries, and occurs on a 
bilateral, regional, sub-regional or interregional basis as some of the examples below. Exchanges 
tend to revolve around the exchange of knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their 
development goals. In the context of access to treatment, it refers to technical co-operation between 
developing countries to meet common development objectives as first formalized at a meeting of 
UN Member States in Buenos Aires in 1978. 
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Appendix Two: Recommendations on TRIPS flexibilities in EAC TRIPS policy document 
 
TRIPS Flexibilities  Recommendations from the EAC Policy on intellectual property 
Transitional periods  All EAC Partner States that are LDCs are to take advantage of 
the 2016 transition period and provide in their national patent 
laws for a further extension of this period as may be agreed upon 
by the Council for TRIPS.  
 All EAC Partner States are to abolish any ‘mailbox’ provision in 
their existing or draft national patent laws. 
Article 31 of TRIPS  Limit remuneration to the UNDP recommended figure of 4% 
maximum, and take anti-competitive behaviour into account 
when determining the amount of remuneration; 
 Include in their patent laws a maximum period of 90 days for 
prior negotiations; 
 Specify all four situations where  prior negotiations can be 
waived, namely, national emergencies, situations of extreme 
urgency, public non-commercial use and to remedy anti-
competitive behaviour of the patent  holder; 
 Exclude injunctive relief as a remedy available under 
independent review of government use licences; 
  Authorise administrative entities to grant all kinds of 
compulsory licenses; 
Patentability criteria  Strictly define in the patent laws and/or patent examination 
guidelines the patentability criteria, and apply them strictly, in 
order to keep a broad public domain. 
 Strictly apply the novelty standard through considering a wide 
concept of prior art  
 Define the inventive step standard by referring to a ‘highly’ 
skilled person; 
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 Strictly apply the industrial application requirement. 
Parallel importation  Adopt an international exhaustion of rights system across all 
forms of IP 
General exceptions 
to 
patentability 
 Explicitly authorise the Bolar exemption for activities reasonably 
related to research and development or marketing approval  
 Explicitly authorise research for scientific, non-commercial and 
commercial purposes 
 Provide a right to claim a non-exclusive licence for the use of 
patented     research tools against payment of compensation. 
Interpreting Article 
39.3 on test data 
protection 
 Kenya as the only non LDC Partner of the EAC should adopt a 
system to protect test and other data against unfair commercial 
use and disclosure, while leaving the drug regulatory authority to 
rely on the results of original test data from domestic or foreign 
approvals when assessing the safety and efficacy of generic 
competing products.  
 None of the EAC Partner States may establish a linkage between 
patent protection and marketing authorisation, which would 
prevent MRAs from granting marketing approval for generic 
medicines before the end of the patent term 
Anti-competitive  
remedies 
 Provide for remedies to patent right abuse, such as compulsory 
licences. 
30 August 2003 
Mechanism  
 Amend compulsory licensing provisions to authorise the export 
of up to 100% of pharmaceutical production to countries with 
insufficient pharmaceutical capacities 
 Draft guidelines both as exporting and importing countries on the 
export/importation of pharmaceutical products into countries 
with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities under 
the 30 August 2003 Agreement 
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Appendix Three:  List of Interviewees (on a non-attributable basis)  
 
1. Researcher for a Geneva based civil society organisation 
2. Official working for a Geneva based inter-governmental organisation 
3. Civil society representative from Uganda 
4. Patent examiner from Zambia 
5. Health official from the East African Community 
6. Officials from BRELA 
7. Official from COSTECH 
8. Local pharmaceutical manufacturer in Tanzania 
9. Official from TFDA 
10. Official from Registrar General’s Office in Zanzibar 
11. Official from Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa 
12. Official from Department of Health in South Africa 
13. Official from African Union 
14. Expert familiar with the PMPA 
15. Official from Department of Economic Development in South Africa 
16. South African Patent Attorney 
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